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2Abstract
This thesis focuses on the analysis of welfare and macroeconomic policy in small 
open economies. The international dimension of monetary and fiscal policy is ex­
amined in a micro-founded New-Keynesian framework. The small open economy 
is characterized as a limiting case of a two-country dynamic general equilibrium 
model featuring imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. Under this specifi­
cation, Chapter 1 formulates a utility-based loss function for a small open economy 
completely integrated with the rest of the world. The study investigates the role 
of the exchange rate in monetary policy and derives the optimal monetary policy 
rule. In this Chapter, the dynamics of the trade balance are shown to be crucial in 
determining the appropriate exchange rate regime.
Chapter 2 analyses optimal monetary policy under alternative asset market struc­
tures; more specifically, it compares and contrasts the cases of incomplete asset mar­
kets, financial autarky and complete asset markets. Furthermore, the performance 
of standard monetary policy rules is evaluated under these different scenarios. The 
results show that the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods 
and the level of risk sharing are important factors in determining the performance 
of policy rules.
Finally, Chapter 3 incorporates fiscal policy in the general framework. This 
Chapter introduces distortionary taxation into the model and characterizes the op­
timal fiscal policy. In addition, a general monetary and fiscal policy problem is 
formulated in the presence of nominal rigidities. The Chapter demonstrates that 
the stabilization problem in an open economy is more complex than in a closed 
economy, even under flexible prices. Apart from the incentive to avoid the dis­
tortions implied by taxation, in a small open economy there is also an incentive to 
strategically affect the real exchange rate. That is, proportional taxation creates 
a distortion in the economy, but also introduces a policy instrument that can influ­
ence the terms of trade and the overall level of production and consumption in a 
welfare-improving manner.
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Introduction
A Bank of England survey documented in Fry et al. (2000) shows that, in 1997-1998, 
more than 70% of central banks had the exchange rate as part of their policy ob­
jectives. Many countries, although officially under a flexible exchange rate regime, 
do not allow a free-floating exchange rate (see Calvo and Reinhart (2002)). More­
over, as detailed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), the most common monetary regime 
throughout modern history has been an exchange rate peg. This evidence motivates 
the following question: should monetary authorities target the exchange rate? To 
deliver an answer to the question, this thesis formulates a micro-founded model of 
a small open economy and its corresponding welfare characterization.
The small open economy setting is derived as a limiting case of a two-country 
dynamic general equilibrium model. The benchmark model features imperfect com­
petition and nominal rigidities following the New Open Economy Macroeconomic 
literature. Under this specification, Chapter 1 characterizes welfare in a small open 
economy and derives the corresponding optimal monetary policy rule. It shows that 
the utility-based loss function for a small open economy is a quadratic expression in 
domestic inflation, the output gap and the real exchange rate.
Previous work has suggested that welfare in a small open economy should not be 
affected by exchange rate variability and that policymakers should stabilize domestic 
inflation (see, for example Clarida, Galf and Gertler (2001) and Galf and Monacelli 
(2005)). Chapter 1, however, demonstrates that a small open economy that is com­
pletely integrated with the rest of the world can indeed be affected by exchange 
rate variability. Consequently, the optimal policy in a small open economy is not 
isomorphic to that in a closed economy and it does not prescribe a pure floating
13
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exchange rate regime. Domestic inflation targeting is optimal only for a particular 
parameterization, in which the unique relevant distortion in the economy is price 
stickiness. In the presence of an inefficient level of steady-state output and trade 
imbalances, exchange rate targeting arises as part of the optimal monetary plan.
The above result was obtained under the assumption that international financial 
markets can provide perfect risk sharing between the small open economy and the 
rest of the world. However, as illustrated in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), “The 
presence of international markets for risky assets weakens and may sever the link 
between shocks to a country’s output or factor productivity and shocks to its resi­
dent ’s income. Sophisticated international financial markets thus force us to rethink 
the channels through which macroeconomic shocks impinge on the world economy 
That is, the assumption that domestic agents can insure against idiosyncratic risk 
has strong consequences for the dynamics of open economies. This issue leads us 
to revisit the findings of Chapter 1, and assess their robustness to different formu­
lations of asset market structure. Chapter 2 addresses this particular question by 
deriving the optimal monetary policy for a small open economy under complete and 
incomplete asset markets, and also under financial autarky.
Our results demonstrate that the configuration of financial markets may signif­
icantly influence policy prescription. In the presence of perfect risk sharing, an 
exchange rate peg outperforms inflation targeting if domestic and foreign goods are 
substitutes in the utility function. On the other hand, in the case of incomplete 
markets, price stability leads to higher welfare than a fixed exchange rate regime 
and the optimal policy does not differ quantitatively from a pure domestic inflation 
targeting regime. If imported goods are complements to domestic goods in agents’ 
utility, this conclusion is reversed.
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis suggest that international aspects of the economy, 
such as the trade balance and international financial markets, may affect the policy 
prescription considerably. In particular, these factors dictate whether or not there 
are policy incentives to affect the exchange rate. When these incentives exist,
15
monetary policy deviates from price stability. But can fiscal policy, rather than 
monetary policy, be used strategically in an open economy? This issue is addressed 
in Chapter 3.
The analysis in Chapter 3 focuses initially on the case of flexible prices, in order 
to highlight the open economy dimension of the fiscal policy problem. Indeed, under 
this structure there are two policy incentives: reducing the inefficiency caused by 
movement in distortionary taxation; and managing strategically the real exchange 
rate. In contrast to the closed economy framework, in a small open economy it 
is not optimal to perfectly smooth taxes to avoid distortions in households’ choices 
regarding consumption and leisure. Distortionary income taxes can be used to 
improve welfare by affecting the overall level of production and consumption and 
the relative price of domestic goods. For example, higher taxes could induce a 
smaller depreciation of the real exchange rate, allowing domestic agents to switch 
consumption towards foreign produced goods. Note that, in a closed economy, this 
mechanism is absent because a fall in the disutility of domestic production would 
be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the utility of consumption.
Chapter 1
M onetary Policy and W elfare in 
a Sm all Open Econom y
1.1 Introduction
Numerous papers have analysed the choice of monetary policy objectives in closed 
and open economies. In the former, the debate has mainly focused on whether 
inflation should be the unique policy target. In open economies, the characterization 
of optimal policy extends beyond policymaker’s decision to concentrate on domestic 
price distortions. More specifically, the role of the exchange rate in the monetary 
policy framework needs to be considered. This Chapter addresses this particular 
issue in a small open economy setting. Our results suggest that including the 
exchange rate as part of the stabilization goals of monetary policy can be welfare 
improving for a small open economy.
We lay out a small open economy model as a limiting case of a two-country dy­
namic general equilibrium framework, featuring monopolistic competition and price 
stickiness. Moreover, the framework assumes no trade frictions (i.e. the law of one 
price holds) and perfect capital markets (i.e. asset markets are complete). This 
benchmark specification allows us to focus on the policy implications of the follow­
ing factors: (a) Calvo-type staggered price setting; (b) monopolistic competition in 
goods’ production and the resulting inefficient level of output; (c) trade imbalances;
16
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and (d) deviations from purchasing power parity that arise from the home bias spec­
ification. The framework presented here encompasses, as special cases, the closed 
economy setting (as in Benigno and Woodford (2003)) and the small open economy 
case with a specific degree of monopolistic competition and no trade imbalances (as 
in Galf and Monacelli (2005)).
The small open economy representation prevents domestic policy from affecting 
the rest of the world and, therefore, permits us to abstract from strategic interactions 
between countries. We focus on understanding how monetary authorities should 
react to fluctuations in internal and external conditions when these reactions have 
no feedback effects.
Following the method developed by Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Suther­
land (2002), we derive a loss function for a small open economy from the utility of 
the representative household. We show that the small open economy’s loss function 
is a quadratic expression in domestic producer inflation, the output gap and the real 
exchange rate. The weights given to each of these variables depend on structural 
parameters of the model, and are hence determined by the underlying economic in­
efficiencies. In addition, the policy targets depend on the source of the disturbance 
affecting the economy, which includes an external shock.
The analytical representation of welfare allows for a precise qualitative analysis of 
monetary policy in a small open economy. The results obtained show that domestic 
inflation targeting is optimal only under specific assumptions. In cases where the 
economy experiences productivity and foreign shocks, a domestic inflation target is 
optimal only under a particular parameterization for the coefficient of risk aversion 
and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Moreover, 
if fiscal disturbances are also present, the optimality of domestic price stabilization 
further requires a production subsidy. Conversely, in the general specification of the 
model, the exchange rate becomes part of monetary policy targets. Therefore, policy 
prescription in a small open economy is not isomorphic to a closed economy and it 
does not prescribe a pure floating exchange rate regime. Moreover, the quantitative 
results show that, for a large set of parameter specifications, an exchange rate peg
18
outperforms a strict domestic inflation target. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Sutherland (2005). The author demonstrates that, for high values of 
the elasticity of substitution between goods, a fixed exchange rate regime leads to 
higher welfare than targeting domestic prices.
1.1.1 R ela ted  L iterature
This work follows the New-Keynesian literature on dynamic general equilibrium 
models featuring imperfect competition and price rigidities. The study of these 
models has been extensive in the past decade.1 Clarida, Galf and Gertler (1999) 
contains a survey of the early works on the closed economy literature. Important 
contributions include Goodfriend and King (1997) and Woodford (1999 and 2001). 
In addition, Woodford (2003) has a comprehensive exposition of the baseline closed 
economy framework and many of its extensions. In the open economy literature, the 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) Redux model is generally accepted as the precursor to 
introducing price stickiness and imperfect competition in an open economy setting. 
Surveys of subsequent contributions can be found in Lane (2001), Sarno (2000) and 
Bowman and Doyle (2002). These authors present the benchmark Redux model, 
followed by a description of alternative specifications and extensions.
This Chapter presents a micro-founded analysis of monetary policy. It de­
rives the loss function from the utility of the representative household. The lin­
ear quadratic approach used in the analysis follows Woodford (2001), Benigno and 
Woodford (2003) and Sutherland (2002b). Other works that employ similar meth­
ods include Benigno and Benigno (2003, 2003b) and Ferrero (2005), amongst others.
The optimality of the inflation target and the role of the exchange rate in mone­
tary policy have been addressed in many previous studies. The closed economy liter­
ature contains extensive analysis of the optimality of inflation targeting. Woodford 
(2001) and Goodfriend and King (2001) are important contributions. Woodford and 
Benigno (2003) incorporate steady-state distortions created by monopolistic compe­
!This Section contains a non-exhaustive account of the related literature. We present a very 
brief exposition of works with the same line of models; studies that have followed the technical 
approach employed in this chapter; and papers that have addressed similar questions to the ones 
asked here.
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tition into the analysis. Aoki (2001) analyses monetary policy in an economy with 
a flexible-price sector and a sticky-price sector.
In the open economy literature, several authors have investigated the role of the 
exchange rate in monetary policy formulation. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) were 
the first to emphasize that a country might benefit from influencing its terms of 
trade. Benigno and Benigno (2003) illustrate the potential gains from cooperation of 
monetary policy between countries by analyzing the incentives of individual countries 
to affect the exchange rate. Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Sutherland (2002c) 
show that, with incomplete pass through, optimal monetary policy is not purely 
inward looking. Tille (2002) draws the same conclusion in the presence of sector 
specific shocks.
However, studies including Sutherland (2002c), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), 
Clarida, Galf and Gertler (2001) and Galf and Monacelli (2005) have found that, 
under producer currency pricing and complete pass-through , there is no role for ex­
change rate targeting in monetary policy. Moreover, the optimal policy is shown to 
be completely inward looking and prescribes a pure domestic inflation target. These 
studies, however, analyse a characterization of a small open economy in which there 
are no trade imbalances. In this Chapter, we attempt to contribute to this vast 
literature by relaxing the last restriction, with the intention of improving our un­
derstanding of the international dimension of monetary policy.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 introduces 
the model and derives the small open economy dynamics. Section 1.3 is dedicated 
to the derivation of welfare and the quadratic loss function. Section 1.4 analyses the 
optimal plan and the performance of a standard policy rule. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 T he M odel
The framework consists of a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with 
complete asset markets. Deviations from purchasing power parity arise from the 
existence of home bias in consumption. This bias depends on the degree of openness
20
and the relative size of the economy. The specification allows us to characterize the 
small open economy by taking the limit of the home economy size to zero. Prior 
to applying the limit, we derive the optimal equilibrium conditions for the general 
two-country model. After the limit is taken, the two countries, Home and Foreign, 
represent the small open economy and the rest of the world, respectively.
Monopolistic competition and sticky prices are introduced in the small open 
economy in order to address issues of monetary policy. We further assume that 
home price setting follows a Calvo-type contract, which introduces richer dynamic 
effects of monetary policy than in a setup where prices are set one period in advance. 
Moreover, we abstract from monetary frictions by considering a cashless economy 
as in Woodford (2003, Chapter 2).
1.2 .1  P referen ces
We consider two countries, H  (Home) and F  (Foreign). The world economy is 
populated with a continuum of agents of unit mass, where the population in the 
segment [0, n) belongs to country H  and the population in the segment (n, 1] belongs 
to country F. The utility function of a consumer j  in country H  is given by:2
oo
V{ = Et J 2 0 ’- ‘ [ U (C i) -V (y .( j) ,e y , , ) ] . (1.1)
S = t
Households obtain utility from consumption U (CJ) and contribute to the production 
of a differentiated good y(j) attaining disutility V’(y(j),ey)).3 Productivity shocks 
are denoted by ey,s- C is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of home and foreign goods, 
defined by
C = v~oCHe + (1  - v ) * C F
0 - 10
0
0 - 1
(1.2)
In the subsequent sections, we assume the following isoelastic functional forms: U (C t) =  ~j^ rp
e-»jyi+*>
and V (y t,£ y ,t) =  y'i+q— , where p is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and 77 is equivalent to 
the inverse of the elasticity of labor production.
3 This specification would be equivalent to one in which the labour market is decentralized. These 
firms employ workers who have disutility of supplying labour and this disutility is separable from 
the consumption utility.
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where 0 > 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution and Ch  and Cf  are con­
sumption sub-indices that refer to the consumption of home-produced and foreign- 
produced goods, respectively. The parameter determining home consumers’ prefer­
ences for foreign goods, (1—v), is a function of the relative size of the foreign economy, 
1 — n, and of the degree of openness, A; more specifically, (1 — v) = (1 — n)A.
Similar preferences are specified for the rest of the world,
C = v**C*H e + (1  - v * ) koC*F
3 - 1
3 (1.3)
with v* = nX. That is, foreign consumers’ preferences for home goods depend on 
the relative size of the home economy and the degree of openness. Note that the 
specification of v and v* generates a home bias in consumption, as in Sutherland 
(2002).
The sub-indices Ch  {Ch ) and Cf  {Cp) are Home (Foreign) consumption of the 
differentiated products produced in countries H  and F. These are defined as follows:
Ch =
C*H =
i \ °  rn
n )  I  C «  '
Cf  = \  <7~ 1 c(z) a dz
C t =
(1.4)
a
<7— 1
5
(1.5)
where a > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the differentiated products. 
The consumption-based price indices that correspond to the above specifications of 
preferences are given by
P  = v P ^  + i l - v )  (PF)1 -6 1=3 (1.6)
and
P* = (1.7)
where Ph  (Ph ) is the price sub-index for home-produced goods expressed in the
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domestic (foreign) currency and Pp (Pp) is the price sub-index for foreign produced 
goods expressed in the domestic (foreign) currency:
Ph =
P'h  =
dz
1
1 —C7
,P f  = dz
dz
,  i 1—a
P* — ) r F ~
(1.8)
• (1-9)
We assume that the law of one price holds, so
p(h) = Sp‘(h) and p (f)  =  £>*(/), (1.10)
where the nominal exchange rate, St, denotes the price of foreign currency in terms of 
domestic currency. Equations (1.6) and (1.7), together with condition (1.10), imply 
that Pfj = SPfj and Pp = SPp. However, as Equations (1.8) and (1.9) illustrate, 
the home bias specification leads to deviations from purchasing power parity; that 
is, P  /  SP*.4 For this reason, we define the real exchange rate as R S  = ^yr.
From consumers’ preferences, we can derive the total demand for a generic good 
h, produced in country H, and the demand for a good / ,  produced in country F:
vim =
y f ( f )  =
Pt{h)
. Pfi,t 
Pt{f)
PH,t -e vCt +
v*(l —n) f  1
n R St
-9
+ Gt
P f j  .
f
PF,t
Pt
1
^ a + ( i - o  ( s W ) ' 9 ^
>
►
K + g ; >
( 1.11)
( 1.12)
where G and G* are country-specific government shocks. We assume that the public 
sector in the Home (Foreign) economy only consumes Home (Foreign) goods and has 
preferences for differentiated goods analogous to the ones of the private sector (given 
by Equations 1.4 and 1.5). The government budget constraints in the Home and
4 The literature investigating the empirical evidence of Purchasing Power Parity is vast and has
shown that short-run deviations from PPP are large and volatile (as documented in Rogoff (1996)).
Even though our model specification is in accordance with these findings, it dismisses the evidence
of failures of the law of one price. Those are extensively documented in the literature (see e.g. Engel
and Rogers (1999) and (2000)) and can be caused by the existence of trade barriers, transportation
costs or the presence of non-traded inputs.
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Foreign economy are respectively given by
Tt [  Pt{h)yt {h)dh = nPH,t(Gt + T rt)
Jo
and
Tt f  p 't(f)y l(f)dh  =  (1 - « )PF,,(G’t + Tr't ).
Jn
(1.13)
(1.14)
We consider the case in which fluctuations in proportional taxes, t* (r£), or gov­
ernment spending, Gt (G£), are exogenous and completely financed by lump-sum 
transfers, Trt (T r f), made in the form of domestic (foreign) goods.
Finally, to portray our small open economy, we use the definition of v and v* 
and take the limit for n —► 0. Consequently, conditions (1.11) and (1.12) can be 
rewritten as
y d(h) =  
y d( f )  =
p t ( h Y PH,t
. PH,t . I Pt
\ P h
1 I [Pt
-e
-e
(1 -A )C ( +  a ( J - )  °C t  + G « j ,  (1. 15) 
(1.16)
Equations (1.15) and (1.16) show that external changes in consumption affect 
the small open economy, but the opposite is not true. Moreover, movements in the 
real exchange rate do not affect the rest of the world’s demand.
1 .2 .2  T h e A sse t M arket S tructure
We assume that, as in Chari et al. (2002), markets are complete domestically and 
internationally. In each period t ,  the economy faces one of finitely many events, 
s‘ e T  (where T is the set of finitely many states). We denote the history of events 
up to and including period t by x l . Looking ahead from period i, the conditional 
probability of occurrence of state st+1 is /j,(st+1 \ x l). The initial realization s° is 
given. We represent the asset structure by having complete contingent one-period 
nominal bonds, denominated in the home-currency. We let (st+l) denote home 
consumers’ holdings of this bond, which pays one unit of the home currency if state 
s*+1 occurs and 0 otherwise. We let Q(st+1 \ x*) denote the price of one unit of
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such a bond at date t and state s* in units of domestic currency. Hence, consumer 
j  faces a sequence of budget constraints given by
F (4‘)Cj'(»‘) + 5 3  <3(s‘+1 I i ‘)Bj(«‘+1) < B j  (s‘)+(l-Tt)pV V V )+fW s,)rr(s‘).
s*GT
(1.17)
A similar expression can be derived for the foreign economy. Households at 
home maximize (1.1) subject to (1.17), and their optimal allocation of wealth across 
the different state contingent bonds implies that
Q(S«  | **) =  /9M*1+1 I (U 8 )
Similarly for the foreign economy,
I x‘) =  Bu(st+1 I (1 19)
<•/(* Ix ) « >  l x I U c { c > ( s *)) 5(«*+1)i>,(«*+1)' 1 J
Thus, the optimal risk sharing setting implies that the intertemporal marginal 
rate of substitution (in nominal terms) is equalized across countries,
Uc (Cm) P,* Uc (Ct+i) St+iPt 
Uc (Ct) PUi Vc (Ct) S,Pt+1'
(1.20)
Equation (1.20) holds in all states of nature. This specification for the asset market 
implies that the risk arising from movements in agent’s nominal wealth is shared 
with the rest of the world. However, because of deviations from purchasing power 
parity, real exchange rate movements may lead to differences between home and 
foreign real income and, consequently, differences in the evolution of consumption 
across borders.
1 .2 .3  P r ice -se ttin g  M echanism
Prices follow a partial adjustment rule k la Calvo (1983). Producers of differentiated 
goods know the form of their individual demand functions (given by Equations (1.15)
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and (1.16)), and maximize profits taking overall market prices and products as given. 
In each period a fraction, a  € [0,1), of randomly chosen producers is not allowed 
to change the nominal price of the goods they produce. The remaining fraction 
of firms, given by (1 — a), chooses prices optimally by maximizing the expected 
discounted value of profits.5 The optimal choice of producers that can set their 
price pt(j) at time T  is, therefore:
Pt (j ) Ph,T <rVy (yt,T (J), Sy,t)
Ph ,t  Pt  (1 -  tt)(<7 -  1)Uc(Ct )
(1.21)
=  0 .
Monopolistic competition in production leads to a wedge between marginal util­
ity of consumption and marginal disutility of production, represented by 1^_Tt^ 0._1^ .6 
We allow for fluctuations in this wedge by assuming a time-varying proportional tax 
Tf. Hereafter, we refer to these fluctuations as mark-up shocks where pt =
( l - r t ) ( < 7 - l ) '
Given the Calvo-type setup, the price index evolves according to the following 
law of motion,
(PH.t)1- ” = aPh~t-i + ( ! - « )  (PtW)1-* . (1.22)
The rest of the world has an analogous price setting mechanism.
In this set-up, the number of firms that can change prices in any given period 
is specified exogenously. The Calvo price-setting mechanism can be interpreted as 
a short-cut for an environment in which firms face costs of changing prices. These 
costs would induce firms to optimize and reset prices only periodically. As described 
in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), ”The type of costs one could have in mind is 
those associated with optimization (e.g., costs associated with information gathering, 
decision making, negotiation and communication) . ” There are alternative set-ups 
to the Calvo approach which antagonize the price setting behavior and introduce a
5 All households within a country (that can modify their prices at a certain time) face the same 
discounted value of the streams of current and future marginal costs. Thus, they choose to set the 
same price.
6Note that, if there are no proportional taxes and an infinitely elastic demand p  =  l,this speci­
fication characterizes the perfect competition case.
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state-dependent price setting behavior. Alternative frameworks include: models in 
which information (rather than prices) are sticky (as in Mankiw and Reiss (2001)); 
menu cost models in which the frequency of price setting is state dependent (e.g. 
Dotsey et al. 1999); and quadratic adjustment cost models and long-term customer 
relationships models (see e.g. Rotemberg (1982) and (2002)). Even though some 
of these models might benefit from endogenous price setting behavior, they are 
significantly less tractable to work with than the Calvo approach.7
1 .2 .4  A  L og-linear R ep resen ta tion  o f  th e  M od el
In this Section, we present a log linear version of the model. This is done to 
obtain a simple representation of the optimality conditions derived above and to 
illustrate the dynamic properties of the model. We later solve the log-linearized 
model numerically using the algorithm of King and Watson (1998) and present a 
quantitative analysis of the model. We approximate the model around a steady 
state in which the exogenous variables (eytt,Gt, pt) assume the values ey > 0, G = 0 
and \x > 1, while producer price inflation is set as IIu,t =  PH,t/PH,t-i =  1- In this 
steady state, R S  = 1, C = C*, Y  =  Y* and Uc(G) = fj,Vy(Y, 0).8 The log deviation 
of a variable from its steady-state value is denoted with a hat.
The small open economy system of equilibrium conditions derived from log lin­
earizing Equations (1.6), (1.15), (1.20) and (1.21) is
(1 -  X)pH +  A R S  = 0, (1.23)
Yt = -e p H +  (1 -  A)C +  AC* +  OXRSt +  9u (1.24)
7 Recent literature testing the Calvo mechanism shows contradictory results. Fuhrer and Moore 
(1995) study the relationship between inflation and output in the US and show that the Calvo 
assumption is inconsistent with the evolution of US inflation. Gali and Gertler (1999) argue that 
inflation should be explained by marginal costs rather than output and demonstrate that when this 
is considered, Calvo pricing does explain US inflation in the period after 1960. Moreover, Gali and 
Gertler (1999) found that the estimates of the degree of price stickiness are stable over different 
samples (consistent with the Calvo assumption). However, other empirical evidence suggests that 
the price setting decision normally depends on the state of the economy (see Fabiani at al. (2004)).
8This specification implies a specific level of the initial distribution of wealth across countries. 
Appendix A contains a full characterization of the steady state.
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C, =  Cl  (1.25)
P
and
7rf =  k (pCt + r\Yt -  pH + f i t~  +  PEtT?t+v ( 1-26)
Equation ( 1.23) describes the relationship between domestic relative prices (pH,t = 
PH,t/Pt) and the real exchange rate. Equation ( 1.24) characterizes the demand for 
domestic goods, with gt defined as Gty G• The risk sharing condition is described 
in Equation ( 1.25). Finally, the last equation represents the small open economy 
Phillips Curve. We define k =  (1 — ctf3){ 1 — oc)/a{ 1 + crj), and nf1 denotes domestic 
producer price inflation; (i.e. 7xjj,t =  ^{PH,t/PH,t-1))- Moreover, as shown in the 
Appendix, p represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and 77 denotes the 
inverse of the elasticity of goods production. It is clear from Equation ( 1.26),  that 
a policy of pure domestic price stabilization that sets =  0 in every state leads 
to the same equilibrium allocation as the case in which prices are perfectly flexible 
(i.e. a = 0, and  ^therefore k —> 00).
The system of structural equilibrium conditions is closed by specifying a mon­
etary policy rule. In this paper, we consider the case in which monetary policy 
follows an optimal monetary policy. We represent the optimal plan in the form of a 
targeting rule. Targeting rules, as expressed in Svensson (2005),  are a description 
of ‘goal directed monetary policy’. Contrary to Taylor rules, an explicit expression 
for the evolution of the monetary policy instrument (i.e. the nominal interest rate) 
is not specified.9 Gianonni and Woodford (2003) describe these rules as flexible 
inflation targets. Following this class of rules, the central bank stabilizes move­
ments in the target variables in order to implement the most efficient allocation of 
resources (i.e. targeting rules are derived from a microfounded welfare maximization 
problem). Moreover, apart from the case in which monetary policy is represented 
by an optimal targeting rule, we consider the case in which the central bank follows 
standard policy rules. In particular, we analyse the performance of a producer 
price index (PPI) inflation target, an exchange rate peg, and a consumer price index
9 For further discussion on targeting rules and instrumental rules see McCallum and Nelson 
(2005).
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(CPI) inflation target.
The dynamics of Y*, R S t , Cf,7r^ and pu,t are determined by Equations (1.23) to 
(1.26) together with the specified monetary policy rule, given the domestic exogenous 
variables £ytt,9t, fit and the external shock C*}°
Foreign dynamics are governed by the foreign Phillips curve and foreign demand:
r t = k (Pc (* +  n?t'  +  s  -  vr Yjt) + m r t+l (1.27)
and
Yt'  = C ' + g*t . (1.28)
The specification of the foreign policy rule completes the system of equilibrium
•A A ^
conditions, which determine the evolution of Yt*,C* and nt . We should note that 
the dynamics of the rest of the world are not affected by Home variables. Hence, 
the small open economy can treat as exogenous. The policy choice of the rest 
of the world modifies the way in which foreign structural shocks affect Ct* but does 
not influence how the latter affects the small open economy.11
1.3 W elfare
The advantage of a microfounded model is that agents’ discounted sum of expected 
utility provides a precise measure for welfare. That is, the small open economy 
objective function can be obtained from Equation (1.1). We follow the method 
developed by Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2003) and obtain a 
quadratic expression for Equation (1.1). This allows us to represent the policy 
problem in a comprehensive manner; i.e. policymakers minimize a quadratic loss 
function subject to linear constraints. Moreover, the resulting optimal monetary 
policy can be expressed analytically. Alternative approaches to welfare evaluation 
include the computational methods described in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004),
10 In order to retrieve the value of the nominal exchange rate and interest rate we can use house­
hold’s intertemporal choice (i.e. the Euler equation) and the definition of the real exchange rate.
11 For example, if the foreign authority is following a strict inflation target the evolution of foreign 
consumption is given by: (p +  rj)Ct =  TfeY,t ~  wdt ~  V-t
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Collard and Juillard (2001) and Kim et al. (2003). These techniques are based 
on perturbation methods and deliver a numerical evaluation of the optimal policy 
problem.
We should note that the linear quadratic approach presented here takes into 
account the effect of second moments in the mean of the endogenous variables. As 
discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2003), this ensures that the method delivers 
an accurate (local) welfare evaluation tool. Another important contribution that 
emphasizes the relevance of second order effects on the mean of variables is Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1998).
In the Appendix we derive analytically a second order approximation to Equation 
(1.1). In order to eliminate the discounted linear terms in the Taylor expansion, we 
use a second order approximation to some of the structural equilibrium conditions 
and obtain a complete second order solution for the evolution of the endogenous 
variables of interest. It follows that the final expression for the small open economy 
loss function can be written as a quadratic function of Y*, RSt, and 7r^:
(Y, -  Y ? f  +  -  R S* f  + )2Lu, =  U c C E t , , ^ ?
+<i.p +  0 ( | |f | | i>), (1.29)
where the term t.i.p stands for terms independent of policy (i.e. they are exoge­
nous shock terms that are not affected by the policy choice). The term 0 ( ||£ ||3)
^    .. y
represents the terms of order higher than two. The policy targets Y* and R S t are 
functions of the various shocks and, in general, do not coincide with the flexible 
price allocation for output and the real exchange rate. The weights of inflation, 
output and the real exchange rate gap in welfare losses, $ y  and $ rsi all depend
on the structural parameters of the model. The expressions for these variables are 
specified in Appendix B. ^
What are the economic forces behind these welfare losses? The small open 
economy specification presented in this work is characterized by two economic inef­
30
ficiencies: price rigidity and monopolistic competition in production. In addition, 
in an open economy, domestic consumption is not necessarily equal to domestic 
production. In particular, movements in international relative prices can create 
differences between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal disutility 
of production that directly affect welfare.12 These factors create different policy 
incentives: the presence of staggered prices brings in gains from minimizing relative 
price fluctuations (justifying the presence $^(7?^)2 in Equation (1.29)); monopolis­
tic competition in production implies a suboptimal level of steady-state output and 
introduces an incentive to reduce steady-state production inefficiencies; and, finally, 
there may be incentives to manage fluctuations in the exchange rate in order to affect 
the wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal disutility 
of production (hereafter this is referred as the ”C7c/Vy gap”). The last two factors 
imply that optimal monetary policy might deviate from price stability (and are also
^  ^    . 71
responsible for the presence of the terms 3>y(Vf — Y* )2 and $Rs(RSt — R S t )2 in 
Equation (1.29)).
To better understand the argument presented above, we first characterize a closed 
economy by setting A =  0. In this case, Equation (1.29) can be written as:
L% =  U ' C E ^ Y , ?  \* v (Y t  ~  V f 'T  + +  t . ip  +  0(||C ||3), (1.30)
where the subscript c denotes the closed economy. The policymaker’s problem in a 
closed economy can be illustrated by the relative weight of inflation with respect to 
output, $ 7,-/ $ y , and by the difference between Y F and YtFlex (where YtFlex represents 
the flexible price allocation for output). The solution to these terms are:
* 1  k{rj + Py  (L31)
OT,c =  qgy,t_______ (/z-l)(ry  +  l )Pt pjrpi +  p)gt . .
1 (v + P) (»7 +  P)(/"? +  P +  ( /* - ! ) )  ('Q + p)(P'V + P + ( p - l ) y
12 This is represented by the term UcC(Ct — Y t/y )  in the Taylor expansion of the utility function 
(shown in the Appendix). Note that in our linear-quadratic aproach this term is expressed in terms 
of second moments. In particular, it can be written as a function of the variance of the real exchange 
rate and output gap.
As the above expressions show, Y F,C 7^  Y Flex’c, so a policy of strict inflation targeting 
(which mimics the flexible price allocation) does not close the welfare relevant output 
gap. In particular, the steady-state level of the mark-up, p, and mark-up fluctu­
ations, pt , imply differences between Y F and YtFlex. Whenever the steady-state 
level of production is efficient (i.e. p =  1) and there are no mark-up fluctuations, 
we have Y f  = Y Flex. Therefore, there is a trade-off between stabilizing inflation 
and output. Moreover, the weight of inflation relative to output in the loss func­
tion depends essentially on the degree of market power, a, and the degree of price 
rigidity, a  (which determines the parameter k). When the elasticity of substitution 
between goods is infinite (i.e. the market is competitive) then the relative weight 
on the output gap vanishes. On the other hand, when a  — > 0 (and consequently 
k — * oo), the relative weight on inflation fades away, as there are no distortions 
associated with price rigidity. d j  Kctljd j j t c b
In a small open economy, real exchange rate movements, as well as domestic 
prices and output fluctuations, can also affect welfare. This is because the ex-
CJ
change rate can generate fluctuations in the so called '^Jc/Vy gap". As shown 
in equation (1.24) and (1.23), the real exchange rate influences the relative price of 
Home produced goods and modifies the small open economy’s demand. Secondly, in 
a world where purchasing power parity does not hold, real exchange rate movements 
generate^realjvealth  variations, which, in turn, create fluctuations in households’ 
spending and consumption (this can be seen by inspection of Equation (1.25)). It 
follows that the impact of the real exchange rate on output and consumption affects 
the wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal disutil­
ity of production. And fluctuations in this gap have an effect on the small open 
economy’s welfare.
The value of intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution, 1/p and
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9, determine the real exchange rate effect on consumption and output through the 
risk sharing and demand channels explained above. Therefore, the weight of the 
real exchange rate in the loss function, $ r s , depends crucially on these parameters. 
More specifically, when pB = 1, the real exchange rate does not affect the "Uc/Vy 
gap" and $ r s  = 0. Section 1.4.1 explores this special case in detail. In addition, 
when the economy is relatively closed, the welfare implications of real exchange rate 
movements are small (as expected, when A — ► 0, $ rs  — > 0).
1.4 O ptim al M onetary P olicy
After characterizing the policy objective, we now turn to the constraints of the policy 
problem. The first constraint the policymaker faces is given by the Phillips Curve
fff  =  k (p(Yt -  Y?) +  (1 -  A) - \R S t  -R S * )  +  u t ) +  0Et (1-34)
where ut is a linear combination of the shocks defined in the Appendix. The policy 
problem is further constrained by the small open economy aggregate demand Equa­
tion (1.24) and the risk sharing condition (1.20). Combining these two conditions, 
the following relationship between output and the real exchange rate arises
(yt - ? (r ) =  (fl5( - f l 5 r ) ^ A  +  x«t, (1.35)
where I =  (p0—l)X (2 — A) and x  is a vector whose elements depend on the structural 
parameters (as shown in Appendix B). From Equation (1.34), we can see that the
^ ._. J*
policy targets Y and R S t are not necessarily the flexible price allocations of output 
and the real exchange rate. That is, the targets do not coincide with the allocations 
that would prevail if a = 0 (and consequently k —> oo). Moreover, Equation (1.35) 
shows that closing the output gap does not eliminate the real exchange rate gap.
We proceed by characterizing the optimal plan under the assumption that poli­
cymakers can commit to maximizing the economy’s welfare. We lay out the Ramsey
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problem and derive the optimal policy response to the different shocks. The policy
problem consists of choosing a path for {7f^, Y*, RSt}  to minimize (1.29), subject to
the constraints (1.34) and (1.35), and given the initial conditions 7r*0 and Yt0. In 
effect, the constraints on the initial conditions impose that the first order conditions 
to the problem are time invariant. This method follows Woodford’s (1999) timeless 
perspective approach, and thereby ensures that the policy prescription does not con­
stitute a time-inconsistent problem.13 The multipliers associated with (1.34) and 
(1.35) are, respectively, (pl and <^2- Thus, the first order conditions with respect to 
7?^, Yt and RSt are given by:
(^1,t — 1) =  k ^ nn^ , (1.36)
<P2,t -  Wifi = ®y(Yt -  ?tT), (1.37)
and
-P i,t -  -  (1-38)
Combininer equations (\  .36b (1.37V a n d  ( 1 3ftV w p o b ta in  t.hp fn llnw ino- p^ -
K.n-c)<S>Y&{Yt-YtM)+ P { l - W R S & { R S t - R S t ) + (p+ rj( l+ l))k^ (n^)  =  0, (1.39)
where A denotes the first difference operator. The above expression characterizes 
the small open economy optimal targeting rule. It prescribes responding to move­
ments in inflation, output and the real exchange rate.14 Equation (1.39) stipulates
how monetary policy should respond to the different shocks, according to the compo- 
. — t
sition of and R St . When following this policy rule, the central bank may allow 
some variability in inflation in order to respond to costly movements in other vari­
ables. Equation (1.39) indicates the policymaker’s behavior that minimizes welfare 
losses generated by such fluctuations. It implements the most efficient allocation of 
resources, conditional on the structural characteristics of the economy.
13 For a discussion on the timeless perspective of optimal rule, see Woodford (2003).
14 Even if we express Equation (1.39) as a function of Consumer Price Index inflation instead of 
producer price inflation 7?^, the targeting rule still includes the term A (RSt — RSt )•
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In the Appendix, we show which parametric restrictions are needed for the above 
first order conditions to lead to a determinate equilibrium. The Appendix also 
contains an analysis of whether the above first order conditions indeed characterize 
an optimal policy. That is, Section l.D investigates if there is any alternative 
random policy that could improve welfare. As shown in Benigno and Woodford 
(2003), this approach coincides with the investigation of whether the second-order 
conditions of the minimization problem are satisfied. It follows that some parameter 
specifications violate these conditions. Those are shown in Table A.l and A.2.
We now turn to the analysis of some special cases of the optimal plan. Further, 
we explore how certain economic characteristics influence the optimal monetary 
policy.
1.4.1 P ro d u ce r P rice  In fla tion  T arget
Under certain circumstances, the loss function approximation leads to clear-cut re-
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where qf =  11 +  \{pO -  1) {RSt)9~l +  j ^ p d  ( R S f ) ^  
notes the efficient allocation. The full characterization of the efficient allocation 
can be obtained by combining the above equation with the constraints of the policy 
problem (i.e. equations (1.6), (1.11), and (1.20)). Furthermore, in steady state we 
have
U c{T)  = (L41)
On the other hand, in the decentralized problem, the equilibrium condition im­
plied by monopolistic competition and price stickiness is given by the price setting 
Equation (1.21). If we assume, however, that prices are flexible, the equilibrium 
condition (1.21) becomes
PhT U c(C [Ux) =  !HVy eYtT) , (1.42)
and in steady state
0-i .
and the superscript e de-
Uc{YFUx ) =  fiVy(YF,ex). (1.43)
Comparing conditions (1.40) and (1.42), it is clear that even with perfectly flex­
ible prices, mark-up shocks and movements in the real exchange rate generate in­
efficient fluctuations in the ratio of marginal disutility of production and marginal 
utility of consumption. In addition, unless p,= 1/(1 — A), the small open economy 
steady-state output is inefficient (this can be seen by inspection of equations (1.41) 
and (1.43)). That is, in general, a policy of domestic price stabilization that mimics 
the flexible price allocation does not implement an efficient allocation.
Nevertheless, if we impose that pQ = 1, the efficiency condition (1.40) and the 
decentralized flexible price allocation (1.42) can be written as follows:
( l - A ) ( Y / - G 1r ' ’ =  ^ ( Y tT (1.44)
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and
- ( > f “  -  Gt)-" = eyj (YtF,e* y . (1.45)
Pt \  /
The above expressions are illustrated in Figure 1.1, where f(Yt,£t) = e ^ Y t •> 
g t ^ Y u i n . G , )  = £  (Yt -  G ,)- ' , and g°(Yt ,Gt) =  (1 -  A)(Yt -  Gt)~p- The inef- 
ficiency of the steady-state flexible price allocation is represented by the location 
of Y ^ lex below Y e. Moreover, apart from the steady-state distortion, fluctuations 
in the wedge between ge and gFlex characterize a departure from the efficient al­
location given by (1.44), and also represent distortions present in the flexible price 
equilibrium.
Figure 1.2 illustrates how mark-up shocks affect the wedge between ge and gFlex. 
It shows that even with p6 =  1 and flexible prices, mark-up shocks generate distor­
tions that affect welfare. Hence, there is an incentive to stabilize these shocks and 
depart from the flexible-price equilibrium (i.e. a strict domestic inflation target is 
not optimal).
Figure 1.3 shows how productivity shocks affect efficiency. In the case of pO = 1, 
the equilibrium flexible price allocation and the efficient allocation move proportion­
ally to each other. This leaves the welfare relevant wedge unchanged. Hence, under 
price flexibility there is no role for policy stabilization, and, thus, producer price in­
flation targeting characterizes the optimal plan. The same result holds for the case 
of foreign shocks. External disturbances do not appear in the expressions for /( .) , 
gFlex(.) or ge(.). Hence, these shocks also leave the wedge unchanged when pO = 1. 
The intuition behind this result is that, under this parametrization, the marginal 
effect of the real exchange rate on consumption utility and labour disutility offset 
each other and no stabilization process is needed.
Figure 1.4 shows the case of exogenous fluctuations in government expenditure. 
Because fiscal shocks do not affect g flex and ge proportionally, their effect on effi­
ciency depends on the steady-state level of output. In general, fiscal disturbances 
create inefficient movements in the wedge between gflex and ge, as represented in 
the Figure. The only circumstance in which there are no such movements is when 
the steady-state level of output is efficient ('Y*lex = Y*). This result is consistent
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g with the findings of Benigno and Woodford (2004) in a closed economy setting.
Therefore, the assumptions needed in order to have an inflation target as the 
optimal plan are: (1) p6 =  1; (2) there should be no mark-up shocks (pt = 0, V t); 
i; and, in the case of fiscal shocks, (3) that the steady-state level of output ought to be
j efficient from the small open economy’s point of view (i.e. p =  1/(1 — A)). These
I conditions guarantee that the flexible price equilibrium characterizes the efficient 
allocation.
Under this specification, the weights on the loss function are:
=  ( i + p)< (L46)
3>flS =  0, (1.47)
and
The target for output is:
Yt' = %Flex = (V +  P)~l {neY,t +  P9t} • (1-49)
The relative weights specified in equations (1.46) and (1.48) are analogous to 
those in the closed economy, and the policy target coincides with the flexible price 
allocation. The assumption of p = 1/(1 — A) guarantees that steady-state output 
is efficient from the point of view of the small open economy. In addition, the 
restriction pQ = 1 ensures that exchange rate movements do not affect welfare since 
its marginal effect on consumption utility and labour disutility offset each other. 
Moreover, the optimal plan does not respond to external shocks. In what follows, 
under this specification, the optimal monetary policy in a small open economy is 
isomorphic to a closed economy. This result is consistent with the findings of Galf 
and Monacelli (2005).15
15 The authors have characterized the loss function for a small open economy in the case in 
which trade imbalances and steady state monopolistic distortions are absent (i.e. p =  0 =  1 and
i . - i / d - * ) ) .
(1 -  A) k (1.48)
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Figure 1.1: Efficiency Analysis
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Figure 1.2: Efficiency Analysis - the Case of Mark-up Shocks
39
Productivty Shock
f(Yt,sV(t)
YHex* Yftex /*
Figure 1.3: Efficiency Analysis - the Case of Productivity Shocks
Figure 1.4: Efficiency Analysis - the Case of Fiscal Shocks
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1.4 .2  Q u an tita tive  resu lts  
The General Optimal Plan:
In this Section, we present some numerical analysis of the optimal monetary policy. 
In our benchmark specification, we assume a unitary elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution (i.e. p = 1). Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), we assume 
r) = 0.47. Furthermore, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign 
goods, 9, is assumed to be 3. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) argue that it should be 
between 3 and 6.16 The degree of openness, A, is assumed to be 0.2, implying a 
20% import share in GDR In addition, the baseline calibration considers the case 
of an ’’optimal subsidy” policy, where r  is set such that p. — 1/(1 — A). Moreover, 
the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods a is assumed to be 10, as 
in Benigno and Benigno (2003). To characterize an average length of price contract 
of 3 quarters, we assume a = 0.66. Finally, we assume (3 =  0.99. Starting from 
this specification, we analyse how optimal monetary policy responds to the different 
shocks.
Figure 1.5 shows the impulse responses of consumption, output, the real exchange 
rate and producer price inflation following a productivity shock. Comparing the 
optimal policy with an inflation target highlights that there are no quantitatively 
significant differences between the two. Under both regimes, higher productivity at 
home increases domestic output and consumption. In addition, a larger supply of 
domestic goods leads to a depreciation in the real exchange rate.
The zero measure specification of the Home economy enables us to study how 
the monetary authority should respond to fluctuations in external conditions when 
there are no feedback effects. Figure 1.6 presents the impulse response of the various 
domestic variables to a foreign shock, represented by an innovation in C/. Again, 
the optimal plan is quantitatively similar to an inflation targeting regime. Domestic 
consumption increases with the increase in foreign consumption and there is a real 
exchange rate appreciation. The impact on domestic competitiveness now leads to
16 This leads to a specification where Home and Foreign goods are substitutes in the utility, given 
that pQ > 1.
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a fall in home production.
As illustrated in Figure 1.7, when the economy is subject to mark-up shocks, 
optimal monetary policy departs from price stabilization. The optimal plan reacts 
to fluctuations in the wedge between marginal utility of consumption and mar­
ginal disutility of production. The policy response to a mark-up shock implies an 
exchange rate depreciation and an increase in the domestic consumption of home 
goods. As a result, domestic output increases. As shown in Figure 1.8, this is not 
the case when the economy is closed. In this case, inflation stabilization is larger, 
requiring a contraction in the level of economic activity.
The optimal response to a fiscal shock is presented in Figures 1.9, 1.10 and 
1.11.17 Figure 1.9 compares the optimal monetary policy plan with an inflation 
targeting regime. It shows that the exchange rate depreciation is smaller in the 
former. Consequently, crowding out in consumption is smaller under the optimal 
regime. As a result, whereas output falls under a policy of price stability, domestic 
production increases under the optimal plan. Conversely, as portrayed in Figure 
1.10, the optimal plan in a closed economy is closer to an inflation target and involves 
a larger fall in consumption.
These results change significantly when the goods are complements. As dis­
played in Figure 1.11, when 6 =  0.7, a fiscal shock leads to an exchange rate appre­
ciation and a fall in domestic consumption.
17 Given that gtis defined as , innovations in gt are measured as percentages of GDP.
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Figure 1.11: Impulse Responses following a Fiscal Shock - varying the Elasticity of 
Substitution between Domestic and Foreign Goods
R anking S tandard  Policy Rules
Exercises such as the ones shown above demonstrate that the source of the shock 
affecting the economy is an important determinant of the performance of policy 
rules. In the optimal targeting rule, this is captured by the composition of the 
target variables Y ?  and R S t , which stipulate how optimal policy should respond to 
different shocks. The quantitative analysis also illustrates the role of the economy’s 
characteristics (that is, variations in the structural parameters such as A and 6 )  in 
the policy prescription. In analytical terms, this is captured by the formulation of
f  l io  u ro i rrVif o rvf f  V»o i  ro r i  oVvl no  in  f  Inn ln o o  f i i n n f i n n  on /1  l r  ' 1
/  1 r - f W - l j/
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ness check has to be done by evaluating the performance of an inflation targeting 
regime compared with other standard policy rules for the different parameter values 
and types of disturbances. This exercise is also interesting per se, as it allows the 
evaluation of policies currently used by international monetary authorities.
We compute a ranking of policy rules (more specifically, domestic inflation tar­
geting, CPI inflation targeting and exchange rate peg) for different values of p, 9 
and A. We start by varying 9 and p , while maintaining A =  0.4. Alternatively, 
we can keep the log utility specification and analyse different scenarios for 6 and 
A. Further, we consider the case of 1% standard deviation productivity, fiscal and 
mark-up shocks.18
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the policy rule that leads to the highest level of wel­
fare, following a productivity shock. Domestic inflation targeting is the preferred 
policy rule for low levels of 6, p and A. A large elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and foreign goods increases the sensitivity of home demand to exchange 
rate movements. As a result, exchange rate fluctuations have a higher impact on 
the rate of marginal utility of consumption and marginal disutility of production. 
For this reason, when 9 is high, the small open economy benefits from adopting an 
exchange rate peg. The same happens when the coefficient of risk aversion is large. 
Moreover, an exchange rate peg becomes superior to PPI or CPI inflation targeting 
when the economy is relatively open.
The gains or losses of adopting different policy regimes are represented by the 
following measure:
=  r  - j y 6 =  2(1 -  p){u§
d Uc(C)
where Uq is the expected life-time utility of the representative agent. W^'b measures 
the percentage difference in the steady-state level of consumption under regime a and 
b. Table 1.3 illustrates the welfare gains or losses of adopting an inflation targeting
18Kehoe and Perri (2000) find an estimate of 0.7% for the productivity shock standard deviation. 
Gali et al (2002) find a standard deviation for price mark-ups of 4.3% (implying variance of approx­
imately 0.0016). Perotti (2005) estimates the standard deviation of a government spending shock 
for various countries. The estimates range from 0.8% to 3.5%. However, in the present paper we 
consider equally variable shocks with a2 =  0.0001.
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rather than an exchange rate peg when the economy is subject to productivity 
shocks. Although an exchange rate peg is superior to an inflation targeting regime 
when 6, p and A are large, the quantitative welfare loss is not very significant: it 
ranges from 0.001% to 0.004% of steady-state consumption. As shown in Section 
5.1, when p = 6 = 1 and the economy is subject to productivity shocks, a domestic 
inflation target coincides with the optimal policy rule. In this case, the welfare 
losses of a fixed exchange rate regime is 0.010% of steady-state consumption. Table 
1.9 shows that these costs increase to 0.013% when the economy is relatively closed 
(A =  1/5).
Table 1.1: Preferred Policy Rule following a Productivity Shock - varying the Degree
of Openness and the Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
A \ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
1/3 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
1/4 IT IT IT CPI PEG PEG
1/5 IT IT IT IT PEG PEG
Table 1.2: Preferred Policy Rule following a Productivity Shock- varying the In-
tertemporal and Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
p \0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
2 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
3 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
4 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
5 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
6 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
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Table 1.3: Welfare Costs following a Productivity Shock- varying the Intertemporal 
and Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
p \0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.010% 0.004% 0.001% -0.001% -0.002% -0.002%
2 0.007% 0.001% -0.001% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003%
3 0.006% 0.000% -0.002% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004%
4 0.005% 0.000% -0.002% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004%
5 0.005% 0.000% -0.003% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004%
6 0.004% -0.001% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004% -0.004%
W IT,PEG
Table 1.4: Welfare Costs following a Productivity Shock- varying the Degree of 
Openness and Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
x \ e  1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 0.008% 0.004% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001%
1/3 0.011% 0.004% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001%
1/4 0.012% 0.003% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001%
1/5 0.013% 0.003% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001%
w i t ,p e g
d
In the case of foreign shocks, figures for the preferred policy are identical to 
the case of domestic productivity shocks. Pegging the exchange rate outperforms 
an inflation targeting regime when the economy is relatively open, and demand is 
sensitive to exchange rate movements (i.e., 6 is large) and the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution is small (high levels of p). This is illustrated in Tables 1.5 and 1.6.
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Table 1.5: Preferred Policy Rule following an External Shock - varying the Degree
of Openness and the Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
a \ g 1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
1/3 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
1/4 IT IT IT CPI PEG PEG
1/5 IT IT IT IT PEG PEG
Table 1.6: Preferred Policy Rule following a Foreign Shock- varying the Intertem-
poral and Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
p \0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
2 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
3 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
4 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
5 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
6 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
Turning to fiscal shocks, for intermediate levels of p, 6 and A, CPI targeting is 
the best of the three standard policy forms evaluated. Under these specifications, 
the central bank can improve welfare by targeting a weighted average of domes­
tic inflation and exchange rate depreciation. This is illustrated in Tables 1.7 and 
1.8. However, the cost of imposing an inflation targeting regime under this para- 
metrization is insignificant; at most 0.001% loss in steady-state consumption (see 
highlighted statistics in Table 1.9 and 1.10). Moreover, as in the case of foreign and 
productivity shocks, when A, 9 and p are large, fixing the exchange rate is the best 
alternative.
Table 1.7: Preferred Policy Rule following a Fiscal Shock.- varying the Degree of 
Openness and the Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution______________________
A \ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
1/3 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
1/4 IT IT CPI PEG PEG PEG
1/5 IT IT CPI PEG PEG PEG
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Table 1.8: Preferred Policy Rule following a Fiscal Shock- varying the Intertemporal
and Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
p \ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
2 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
3 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
4 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
5 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
6 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
Table 1.9: Welfare Costs following a Fiscal Shock - varying the Degree of Openness 
and Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
x \ e 1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 0.003% 0 .000% -0.002% -0.002% -0.003% -0.003%
1/3 0.003% 0.000% -0.001% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002%
1/4 0.002% 0.000% -0 .001% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002%
1/5 0.002% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.002% -0.002%
w i t ,c p i
Table 1.10: Welfare Costs following a Fiscal Shock - 
Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
varying the Intertemporal and
p \ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.003% 0.000% -0.001% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002%
2 0.001% -0.002% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003%
3 0.000% -0.002% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003%
4 0.000% -0.003% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004% -0.003%
5 -0.001% -0.003% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004% -0.003%
6 -0.001% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% -0.003%
In the case of mark-up shocks, an inflation target is the preferred standard policy 
only under the knife-edge specification where p = 0 = 1 (see Table 1.11). With
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unitary elasticity of substitution and p > 1, CPI targeting is the preferred policy 
rule. In addition, whenever 9 > 2, pegging the exchange rate leads to higher welfare 
than PPI inflation targeting. The steady-state consumption losses associated with 
strict domestic price stabilization compared with a fixed exchange rate regime are
shown in Table 1.12. When mark-up fluctuations are the source of disturbance
IT  PEG ofaffecting the small open economy, Wd ’ reaches 0.043% when p = 9 = 6.
Table 1.11: Preferred Policy Rule following a Mark-up Shock- varying the Intertem-
joral and Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
p \e 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
2 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
3 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
4 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
5 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
6 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
Table 1.12: Welfare Costs following a Mark-up Shock - varying the Degree of Open­
ness and Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
p \ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.029% -0.004% -0.020% -0.029% -0.033% -0.035%
2 0.017% -0.014% -0.028% -0.035% -0.038% -0.040%
3 0.012% -0.017% -0.031% -0.037% -0.040% -0.041%
4 0.009% -0.019% -0.032% -0.038% -0.041% -0.042%
5 0.008% -0.021% -0.033% -0.039% -0.041% -0.042%
6 0.007% -0.021% -0.034% -0.039% -0.042% -0.043%
w i t ,p e g
The costs of adopting a welfare-inferior policy rule presented in the above Tables 
are small in magnitude. The shift in steady-state consumption is never larger than 
0.05%. We should note, however, that these costs are of the same order of magnitude 
as the costs of business cycles reported by Lucas (1987) (who estimates a 0.1% shift 
in steady-state consumption).
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1.5 C onclusion
In this paper, we have formalized a small open economy model as a limiting case of 
the two-country general equilibrium framework. We have characterized a utility- 
based loss function and also derived the optimal monetary plan, represented by a 
targeting rule, for a small open economy. The setup developed in this work encom­
passes, as special cases, the closed economy framework and the small open economy 
case with efficient levels of steady-state output. As a result, the examination of 
monetary policy in such environments is nested in our analysis.
The utility-based loss function for a small open economy is a quadratic expres­
sion in domestic inflation, the output gap and the real exchange rate. This paper 
has demonstrated that a small open economy, completely integrated with the rest of 
the world, should be concerned about exchange rate variability. Hence, the optimal 
policy in a small open economy is neither isomorphic to that in a closed economy, nor 
does it prescribe a pure floating exchange rate regime. Price stability (or domestic 
inflation targeting) has been shown to be optimal only under a specific parame­
terization of the model: in the cases where the economy experiences productivity 
and foreign shocks exclusively, domestic inflation targeting is only optimal under a 
particular specification for preferences; if fiscal disturbances are also present, price 
stability as the optimal plan further requires the presence of a production subsidy; 
when these restrictions on the steady-state level output and preferences are relaxed, 
deviations from inward looking policies arise in the optimal plan.
Nevertheless, under our benchmark calibration, when the economy experiences 
domestic productivity shocks and external disturbances the optimal monetary policy 
has been shown to closely mimic an inflation targeting regime. In the case of fiscal 
and mark-up shocks, the optimal plan departs from price stability. Moreover, 
the openness of the economy modifies the optimal responses to the referred shocks 
significantly.
In the sensitivity analysis exercise, we have demonstrated that inflation targeting 
(when compared with CPI and exchange rate targeting), is the preferred policy if 
the economy is relatively closed and its demand is not sensitive to exchange rate
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movements. Conversely, if \ , 9  and p are large, the small open economy may 
improve welfare by adopting a fixed exchange rate regime.
The tools developed in this paper can be applied to different economic environ­
ments. It is important to notice that the model presented here assumes that there 
are complete asset markets. Relaxing such assumption can lead to a more realistic 
representation of the model. Moreover, the introduction of asset market imper­
fections and their welfare consequences would enrich the optimal monetary policy 
analysis. Chapter 2 of this thesis will address these issues.
Another interesting extension would involve analyzing fiscal policy by allowing 
proportional taxation to be an endogenous variable. This would enable the inves­
tigation of the interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities and the optimal 
policy mix. The small open economy representation allows for the assessment of in­
teresting issues such as the imnlicat.inn n f  d iffe r e n t  u n v p rn m p n t hrm d d 
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l .A  A ppendix: The Steady S tate
In this Appendix, we derive the steady-state conditions. All variables in steady 
state are denoted with a bar. We assume that in steady state l-M t =  l + i * = l / / 3  
and Pf1 /PfLi = P f  /P f- i  = 1- We normalize the price indices such that P h  — P f - 
This implies that =  R S  =  1. From the demand equation at Home, we have:
Y  = v C +  ~ n ^( F  + G, (1.50)n
and
F * =  t1 ~  v)nQ +  (1 — v*)C* +  G*. (1.51)
1 — n
If we specify the proportion of foreign-produced goods in home consumption as 
1 — v = (1 — n)A, the proportion of home-produced goods in foreign consumption as 
v* = nA, and take the limiting case where n = 0, we have:
F =  (1 -  X)C +  AC* +  G, (1.52)
and
F* =  C* +  G*. (1.53)
Applying our normalization to the price setting equations we have:
Uc(C) = nVv {XCi  + ( l -> .)G  + G ) ,  (1.54)
Uc(C*) = S V y (c*  + G* ) , (1.55)
where
<T
We also use the following definitions throughout the Appendix
( i - * )  =  i
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a
0 < (p < l ] f i >  1 
The Symmetric steady state:
Iterating the complete asset market assumption we have:
fl5i=K°(iO ’ (L56)
where
Ko =  f l 5 o ( ^ ) ,>. (1.57)
So if we assume an initial level of wealth such that Ko = 1, the steady-state 
version of (1.56) imply C = C . Further, throughout the Appendix we assume
G* =  G =  0. Under this condition, equations (1.54) and (1.55) imply: ji = fi*.
l .B  A ppendix: A  Second Order A pproxim ation  to  th e  
U tility  Function
In this Appendix, we derive the first and second order approximation to the equilib­
rium conditions of the model under the assumptions that C =  C* and G* = G = 0. 
We obtain the second order approximation to the utility function to address wel­
fare analysis. To simplify and clarify the algebra, we use the following isoelastic 
functional forms:
u (c t) =  ^  t1-58)1 -  p
v  (yt(h),eY'T) =  (1.59)
77 +  1
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l .B . l  Dem and
As shown in the text, the home demand equation is:
Vt = PH,t
-e
[ P t J
(1 -  A)Ct +  A
RSt
-e
c : +  9 t • (1.60)
The first order approximation to demand in the small open economy is therefore:
Yt =  -0 p H,t +  (1 -  A)Ct +  AC*t +  OXRSt +  gt . (1.61)
Note that fiscal shock gt is defined as Gty G, allowing for the analysis of this shock 
even when the zero steady-state government consumption is zero. And the second 
order approximation to the demand function is:
where
^ 2  f t  d'yyt +  \y'tDvyt +  y'tDeet
yt = Yt Ct pnt RSt /
et t y t  9 t 9 t  C t
dv = -1  1 - A  - 9  6 \
d'e = 0 0 1 A
Dv =
0 0 0 0
0 A ( l - A )  0 - 0A( 1 -A)
0 0 0 0
0 —0A(1 — A) 0 02A(1-A)
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and
D' =
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0
0 0
, ( 1 _ A) - A ( l - A )
e o
-ex e\(i -  a)
1 .B .2  R isk  Sharing E quation
In a perfectly integrated capital market, the value of the intertemporal marginal 
rate of substitution is equated across borders:
Uc{c;+ 0  p(* Uc (Ci+i) St+iPt (1.63)uc (c;) p;+1 uc (ct) s,p,+i
Assuming the symmetric steady-state equilibrium, the log linear approximation 
to the above condition is
ct = c; + - R S t . (1.64)
Given our utility function specification, Equation (1.63) gives rise to a exact 
log linear expression, and the first and second order approximations are therefore 
identical.
In matrix notation, we have:
c'yt + \y 'tGvyt + y’tCeet =  0 , (1.65)
c„ =
c0 = 0 0 0 1
c ; = o ,
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and
Cl =  0.
1 .B .3  T h e R eal E xchange R a te
Given that, in the rest of the world, Pp = SP*, Equation (1.23) can be expressed
as:
Pt 1 -0 =  (1 -  A) +  A R St Pt
PH,tJ \  Pfl,t
The first order approximation to the above expression is:
1 -0
( 1.66)
PH,t =  ~
XRSt 
1 — A
The second order approximation to Equation (1.66) is:
(1.67)
where
f y V t  +  \v'tFyVt + y'tFeBt +  t.i.p + C>(||{||3) =  0, (1.68)
f  =J V 0 0 —(1 — A) -A
f'e = 0 0 0 0
and
*J =  A(0-1 )
F 1 =-1 e
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 -1
0 0 - 1  (1 — A/(l — A))
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0
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1 .B .4  P rice  S ettin g
The first and second-order approximations to the price setting equation follow Be- 
nigno and Benigno (2001) and Benigno and Benigno (2003).19 These conditions are 
derived from the following first order condition of sellers that can reset their prices:
where
and
E i |  ( 1^ 7 )  y t
Pt(h) Ph ,t  Vy (yt,r(h), ey,t)
Mr_Ph ,t  Pt Uc(CT)
I—a
=  0 ,
(1.69)
( l . r o )
(1.71)
With mark-up shocks, fit , defined as q^._1^ 1_Tg^, the first order approximation to 
the price setting equation can be written in the following way:
7T? =  k (pdt +  r]Yt -  pH't +  jut -  r}eY,t) +  PEtft?+li (1.72)
where k = (1 — a/3)(l — a ) /a ( l  +  arj).
The second order approximation to Equation (1.69) can be written as follows:
Qto = a'yyt + ^y'tAyyt + y'tAeet + ^-an tt?
-fti.p-f <9(||f||3), (1.73)
19 For a detailed derivation of the first-order approximation to the price setting see the technical 
appendix in Benigno and Benigno (2001). Benigno and Benigno (2003) have the details on the 
second-order approximation.
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ay 77 p — 1 0
a' = —7] 1 0 0
4  =
A ! . =
and
1 .B .5  W elfare
77(2 +  77) p —1 0
P - P 2 P 0
-1  p - 1 0
0 0 0 0
-77(1+77) I + 77 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
<  ^= (77 +  1 )-.
Following Benigno and Benigno (2003), the second order approximation to the utility 
function, Ut, can be written as:
00 r I rn
u t  =  E t J 2 0 ° - *  |tf(C.) - ~ j o V ( y i , e y , , ) d j (1.74)
Wto =  U c C E tv Y ,?  W vVt -  \y'tW vyt -  y'tWeet -  \ w r f +t.i.p+0(||?||3), (1.75)
where
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= -1/p. 1 0 0
and
W ' =
iktnl 0 0 0
0 —(1 — p) 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
WL =
- J  0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0
In addition, using the second order approximation to the equilibrium condition 
derived in Sections l.B .l to 1.B.4, we can eliminate the term wyyt from Equation
(1.75). In order to_ l^o so, we derive the vector L x , such that
i r t ,  - i  •
' *  > r&S
4*,'. X) y f
a y  d y  f y  Cy
where ay,dy, f y , Cy were previously defined in this Appendix. We have:
and
L x i =  -------— — fZ/x 1 +  (1 -  A) -  p *] ,
(P + ri)+lrj V '  J
Lx 2 = 1
(p +  v) +  lrl
[p{p 1 -  (1 -  A)) +  (1 -  A){rj +  p) \ ,
L x*-  1 )(1" A)/' " 1 ~  + 1}] 1
where I = (pQ — 1)A(2 — A)
The loss function Lto will have the following form:
(1.76)
(1.77)
(1.78)
Lto = UcCEtoJ 2 0 ‘ v V t +  y't L e + t . i . p  + 0 ( ||£ ||3), (1.79)
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where:
and
Ly   "h LX\Ay “I- LX2Dy “I” Lx3Fy,
Le =  We +  LxiAe +  Lx2D e ,
Ln =  wn +  Lx ian.
To write the model just in terms of the output, the real exchange rate and 
inflation, we define the matrixes N  and Ne, mapping all endogenous variables into 
[y*,Tt] and the errors in the following way:
y't =  N{Yt f y  +  Neeu
V U C  ^  /V 
(1.80)
N  =
1 0 
1 /+ A
1 P (tt)
0 -  A
and
NP =
1
0 0 0 0
0 0 - 1 0  
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
^ ' q u d i ^  »  * ,f ? 
1 - ^ 1
Equation (1.79) can therefore be expressed as:
L t o  =  V c C Yt ,R S t 4  [y,„RSt] +  [?„ ASt Leet +
(1.81)
where:
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and
L'y =  N 'L yN ,
L'e =  N 'L yN e + N 'L e
Finally, we rewrite the previous equation with variables expressed as deviations 
from their targets:
4 , = UcC E t0J 2 P ‘
+t.i.p + 0 ( i m
hs>y(Yt -  ?tT)2 + ^ rs(RS, -  RsJ)2 +
(1.82)
where:
+  Lx  i ( l  + P) + Viv + 1) -
(1 + 1) 
P ( P - 1 )
(i + 0 .
Lx2( l - A ) 2A ( p ^ - l )
(i +  o
_(A ±0(p-l)  
^  (1 -  A)p2
Lx\l{p — 1 — I)
+
(1 -  A f p  
Lx2X(p9 -  1) [P0( 1 -  A) +  A + 1]
P2
Lx3\(9  -  1) 
+  1 — A
and
** = 7Tk + {l + f,)ak L x i '
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ytT = fa t ,  and RS't = q*3et ,
with
% ~ J  + L x i( l  +  77)7/ —L x\{\ +  77) ^  i)(i+^)+Lg2 0
and
Qr s $RS
n n (p—l —l)Lx\ , L x 2 \{X ( l—X)+l)(pO—l) - L x 2 X ( l-X ) (p d - l )  
U U (1-A) +  > (  1-A) p
Moreover, we can write the constraints of the maximization problem as:
i f f  =  k (p(Yt -  Y ? )  +  (1 -  A^ ( R S t  -  R s J ) +  +  0Et*t+»  (1-83)
and
where
(Yt -  Y?) = (RSt -  +  XU,, (1.84)
Ut 1 — A ( Y ? - Y tFUx),(R S Tt - f l 5 f ' eX)]
X =
1 (1 +  Z)
vn p
and YtFlex and YtFlex are the flexible price allocation for output and the real exchange 
rate:
y,FUx =  [(*?+P) +  ¥ ] - 1 {*/(! +  -  (1 + l)fH + m -  p i c i} , (1.85)
and
R S Flex r -  'i
m !  n  =  ^  + p') + ^ - I  p ~ Pt ~  VPt ~ ( r< + P)C, } (1.86)
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1 .B .6  S p ecia l C ases
In this Section, we present the special cases described in the main text. 
Special Case 1:
The assumptions are:
1. p6 = 1
2. No mark-up or fiscal shocks.
In this case, the weights in the loss function are:
=  (77 +  p)( 1 -  A) +  ((1 -  A) -  p_1)(l -  p),
®RS = 0,
and
* ^ ( l - A )  +  ( ( l - A ) - , - > ) ( W ) ^ .
And the target variables are:
S f  = q f a  =  ? , F U x  =  [(, +  p)]-1 {,?„,«} .
Special Case 2:
The assumptions are:
1. p6 = 1
2. *. =  1/(1 -A )
3. No mark-up shocks.
In this case, the weights in the loss function are:
=  (r/ +  p)(l -  A),
®RS = 0,
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and
* ,  =  £ ( 1 - A ) .
And the target variables are:
y tT  =  <fy z t  =  Y t lex =  [(»/ +  A*)]"1 { n £ y , t  +  P 9 t )  •
Special Case 3: The Closed Economy
In this case, we have:
K  _  o-
k{r i  +  p )  ’
p r , c  =  >ygy,t___________ ( / x - 1 ) ( t /  +  1 ) /^  p j r j f i  +  p )&
4 fo +  /») (*/ +  *0(/"7 +  P + ( /* - ! ) )  (»7 +  P ) ( ^  +  P + ( M - l ) ) ’
and
f>Flex,c  _  ^ g y .t ~  P t  +  P9t
4 fa +  /O
l .C  A ppendix: P roof o f  D eterm inacy
In this Section, we show that the optimal targeting rule together with the policy con­
straints and the initial condition for inflation deliver a determinate equilibrium. The 
equilibrium conditions given by equations (1.34), (1.35) and (1.39) can be rewritten 
as:
=  71 (Yt -  ?tr ) +  k i t  + m 5?<+i, (1-87)
and
72A(yt -  Vf) -  73Ai5t + 74fff = o, (1.88)
where 8t is a linear combination of shocks following an AR(1) process
5t =  u>8t-1 +  ef, (1.89)
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and
7i = k(ri + p{l + l) 1),
7 2 =  (1 4- l ) $ y  +  P  ( I $ R S ,
_ (i +  O
7 3 ~  V ( X - A ) 2’
and
74 =  (p + Ti(l + l ) ) k ^ .
We can reduce the system given by conditions (1.87) and (1.88) to the following 
equation:
PEt*i*+1 -  (1 + P + hldl2)*t + *t-1 = (7x73/72 + %  (1-90)
where is a stationary shock20. The characteristic polynomial associated with this 
equation is:
P ( a ) = p a 2 - (  1 +/? +  7174/ 72)a +  1 (1.91)
Equations (1.87) and (1.88) form a system with one predetermined variable and one 
endogenous variable. Determinacy is, therefore, guaranteed if the above polynomial 
has one root inside the unit circle and one outside. This is true if 72/7471 > 
—1/2(1 +  (3). More specifically,
( l + Q ^ y + p ^ l - A ) 2^  k*
(l + i)2(p + »)(l + 0)2^  2(1 +0) K ;
l .D  A ppendix: R andom ization  P roblem
To ensure that the policy obtained from the minimization of the loss function is 
indeed the best available policy, we should certify that no other random policy
20More specificaly £t =  et — (1 — w)<$i_i
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plan can be welfare improving. Equation (1.34) combined with (1.35) leads to the 
following expression:
5ff =  k (fo +  p - J(l +  l)){Yt -  ytr ) +  « ,) +  0E t*?+x, (1-93)
or alternatively
= k ( ? p(i~_ i y '  - R s Tt ) + u ^ + p m f +l. (i .94)
Thus, a random realization that adds <pjVj to 7Tt+j, also increases Yt by ayk~1((pj — 
(3<Pj+i)vj and R S t by arak~l {(pj -  /3(pj+1)vj, where
“ " ■ ( T f T ' '  <i “ »
and
% = {'n + p ^i + O)- (1-96)
Consequently, the total contribution to the loss function is
UcC0‘o*Eto5 2 0 t [4>fc-2(Vj- -  f)Vj+l?  + *MV;)2] > (1-97)
where
$  =  +  ®RSO%3.
It follows that policy randomization cannot improve welfare if the expression 
given by Equation (1.97) is positive definite. Hence, the first order conditions to 
the minimization problem are indeed a policy optimal if $  and are not both 
equal to zero and either: (a) $  > 0 and +  (1 — /31/2)2fc-2$ 7r > 0 or (b) $  < 0 and 
$  +  ( l - ^ 1/2)2A:-2$ 7r > 0 holds. This analysis follows closely Benigno and Woodford 
(2003). The authors also demonstrate that these conditions coincide with the second 
order condition for the linear quadratic optimization problem.
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In the case of our small open economy conditions (a) and (b) involve complicated 
linear combinations of the structural parameters. Even though they are satisfied 
under our benchmark calibration, for many parameter combinations this is not the 
case. The following Tables illustrate when a randomization is never welfare improv­
ing.
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 Yes Yes Yes No No No
2 No No No No No No
3 No Yes No No No No
4 No No No No No No
5 No No No No No No
6 No No No No No No
Table 1.13: Parameterization under which the 2nd Order Condition to the Mini­
mization Problem is satisfied (1)
0 U  1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5
1 No No Yes Yes
2 No No No Yes
3 No No No Yes
4 No No No No
Table 1.14: Parameterization under which the 2nd Order Condition to the Mini­
mization Problem is satisfied (2)
C»V tllAJ'.(Ju .
A  t i e f  (Mkt f-t/vn* - *f- " '{yi.tlsLs
p  (‘ v\ Dva^ (_ i oQj t a u t — 9 C U v ' ^ l o f  Im j ?y t >c { o \ L ~ t i c n s i
bc+^-ctu^ f i r v ^ iy ^ e ^ - 9 .
C hapter 2
M onetary Policy under 
A lternative A sset M arket 
Structures
2.1 Introduction
How does the structure of financial markets affect monetary policy? The debate 
surrounding optimal monetary policy in open economies has been extensive over 
the past decade. Many works, including Chapter 1 of this thesis, have studied the 
role of the exchange rate in monetary policy and examined how the dynamics of the 
trade balance can affect the analysis.1 However, technical difficulties have restricted 
the attention given to the canital
The way in which asset markets function is nevertheless a crucial determinant 
of an open economy’s dynamics. Access to international borrowing and lending is 
important in determining the ability of agents to smooth consumption over time.
^ ee, for example, Corsetti and Pesenti (2000) and (2005), Benigno, G. and Benigno, P. (2003), 
Sutherland (2002), Gali and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2004).
2 The majority of open economy models dismiss the role of the capital account by assuming market 
completeness or by imposing restrictions on the structure of the economy. These assumptions ensure 
tractability of the models and solve the stationarity problem a la Obstfeld and RogofF (1995), but 
make the structure of capital markets irrelevant. Section 1.1 contains a discussion on this matter 
and presents some related literature refereces.
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In addition, the degree of sophistication of financial products dictates the economy’s 
level of risk sharing with the rest of the world. Given the importance of these 
factors, we now incorporate them into the analysis of optimal monetary policy in a 
small open economy framework.
We show that the structure of asset markets can significantly affect the optimal 
policy prescription. A small open economy may gain from managing the exchange 
rate under complete markets. On the_other_hand, in an incomplete markets setup, 
we show that this incentive is absent when domestic and foreign goods are substitutes 
in agents’ utility. In the latter case, the monetary authority should focus instead on 
targeting domestic inflation and reducing price dispersion distortion. Nevertheless, 
if the degree of substitution between the goods is significantly low, the results may 
be reversed.
Our model addresses the issue of optimal monetary policy under alternative asset 
market structures. We do this by characterizing a utility-based loss function for a 
small open economy in three cases: (a) incomplete capital markets, where there is a 
cost of borrowing from abroad that generates a country riskj>r.einium; (b) financial 
autarky (i.e. an extreme case of market incompleteness in which the country does 
not have access to international borrowing and lending); and (c) complete asset 
markets, which implies perfect risk sharing between the small open economy and 
the rest of the world.
The linear-quadratic representation of welfare presented in this work follows the 
method developed by Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Sutherland (2002). This 
approach delivers a tractable representation of the policy problem, which consists of 
a quadratic objective function and linear constraints. The resulting optimal plan 
dictates the optimal responses to productivity shocks, mark-up fluctuations, fiscal 
disturbances and external shocks. The policy prescription is contingent on the eco­
nomic characteristics determined by the structural parameters and the configuration 
of asset markets. Moreover, the derived welfare criterion enables us to assess the 
performance of standard policy rules under different asset market structures.
It follows that the optimal monetary policy js  independent of financiaLmarket
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structure when trade imbalances are ruled out (by the assumption of unitary elastic­
ity of substitution between goods and log utility). In this specific case, the evolution 
of the current account is irrelevant to the dynamics of the small open economy, and 
therefore, it is also of no importance to welfare and optimal policy. However, in all 
other cases, the characterization of financial markets is shown to be crucial to the 
evaluation of monetary policy.
The optimal policy can be represented in the form of a targeting rule in the case of 
complete markets and financial autarky. In these cases, the optimal policy prescribes 
stabilizing movements in the real exchange rate and output gap as well as inflation. 
When asset markets are incomplete, the representation of the optimal plan is more ___ 
complex and cannot be expressed in the form of a single rule. However, under the 
assumptio n thatr4here-areHiQ-mtermediatiQii_costs, it can be shown analytically that 
the optimal plan consists of stabilizing expected movements in the exchange rate and 
output gap as well as expected inflation.
The weight of inflation variability in the small open economy’s loss function is 
shown to depend crucially on the structure of asset markets and on the elasticity 
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. When goods are substitutes 
in utility, inflation variability is more costly under incomplete markets than under 
perfect risk sharing. This result is reversed if the degree of substitutability between 
goods is reduced. These findings are also supported in our quantitative analysis: a 
domestic inflation target outperforms an exchange rate peg under incomplete (com­
plete) markets for high (low) levels of the elasticity of substitution between goods. 
These different results are a consequence of the way in which the real exchange rate <1
taffects the marginal utility of consumption and the disutility of production under (jj 
alternative asset market structures.
The policy prescription is also sensitive to the source of the shock hitting the 
economy. Under mark-up shocks, the optimal monetary policy departs from price 
stability regardless of the financial market arrangement. However, the optimal 
response to productivity, fiscal or external shocks depends on the structure of the 
economy, as hinted above.
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2.1 .1  R ela ted  L iterature
In recent years there has been extensive documentation of micro-founded models of 
open economies featuring imperfect competition and price rigidities. Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995) [Redux hereafter) is commonly recognized as the pioneering contribu­
tion in the area. Since its publication, many extensions to the baseline model have 
been made. A comprehensive survey of these is provided in Lane (2001) and Sarno 
(2000).
The Redux model considers a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which 
only riskless real bonds are traded, and therefore it characterizes an environment of 
imperfect risk sharing. However, the model is nonstationary and as such presents 
an undetermined steady state. This restricts our ability to conduct quantitative 
analysis based on log-linear approximations. To solve this problem and make the 
analysis more tractable, many subsequent studies have assumed that either: (a) the 
intratemporal and intertemporal elasticity of substitution are unitary;3 and/or (b) 
that asset markets are complete. These assumptions restrict the dynamics of open 
economies by either making the structure of asset markets irrelevant (assumption 
(a)) or by imposing an extreme case in which there is perfect risk sharing across 
borders (assumption (b)). Under both (a) and (b), an important dimension of 
open economies is ignored: the current account (and a country’s net foreign asset 
position) plays no role in the transmission mechanism of the shocks (see for example 
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)).
Ghironi (2003) presents an extensive discussion of the consequences of these 
assumptions for the dynamics of open economies. Moreover, he characterizes an 
overlapping generations model were the stationarity issue is solved without the use of 
assumptions (a) or (b). Sutherland (1996) also provides an alternative formulation 
by incorporating costs of adjusting foreign asset stocks. Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe 
(2002) examine these technical difficulties in a small open economy setting.4 A
3 Models that consider the case in which purchasing power parity holds only require unitary 
elasticity of intratemporal substitution to achieve the desired tractability.
4 Other references on alternative specifications used to solve the stationarity problem and their 
implication for open-economy business cycle properties can also be found in Ghironi (2003).
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survey on the academic discussion surrounding the role of the current account and 
net foreign asset position in dynamic general equilibrium models can be found in 
Lane and Ganelli (2002).
At the empirical level, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) have shown that move­
ments in the net foreign asset position are persistent and can significantly affect long 
run exchange rates, interest rates and international interest rate differentials. These 
findings suggest that current account movements and the accumulation of foreign 
assets can be an important factor determining open economy dynamics. For this 
reason, the present work incorporates the dynamics of the current account into the 
analysis of optimal monetary policy; we also allow for a non-zero steady-state level 
of the net foreign asset position.
The original Redux model already emphasized that dismissing current account 
movements and the role of net foreign asset positions can be limiting. The paper 
shows that an exogenous monetary disturbance can have non-neutral effects in the 
long run because of its initial impact on the current account and consequent perma­
nent effect on the wealth distribution. Recent contributions have also demonstrated 
that the implications for monetary policy of assumptions (a) and (b) can be signifi­
cant. Chapter 1 of this thesis showed that relaxing assumption (a) directly affects 
the optimality of domestic price stabilization in a small open economy. Using a 
two-country model, Benigno and Benigno (2003) study the implications of relaxing 
assumption (a) for the potential gains from international monetary policy coordina­
tion. The debate surrounding the relevance of policy coordination has also inspired 
some authors to investigate the consequences of assumption (b). In a two-country 
setup, Sutherland (2002) and Tille and Pesenti (2004) analyse the consequences of 
departing from the complete markets assumption. Both studies find that the gains 
from cooperation are lower when there is imperfect risk sharing. Moreover, (also us­
ing a two-country framework) Benigno (2001) investigates the welfare consequences 
of adopting a domestic inflation target instead of a coordinated policy when asset 
markets are incomplete.
In this Chapter, we aim to contribute to this vast literature by relaxing both
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assumptions (a) and (b), and formalizing a general micro-founded loss function for 
an individual country under alternative asset market structures. The remainder of 
the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model. In Section 
2.3, we derive the dynamics of the small open economy. Section 2.4 presents the 
linear-quadratic loss function. The analysis of the optimal plan and the performance 
of standard policy rules under alternative asset market structures are presented in 
Section 2.5, while Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 T he M odel
The basic setup closely follows the one presented in the Chapter 1. The framework 
consists of a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model in which the small 
open economy representation is obtained by taking the limit of the size of one of the 
countries to zero. Preferences are characterized by home bias in consumption and, 
therefore, purchasing power parity does not hold.
However, the utility function considered in this Chapter is different from the 
one presented previously. In particular, the utility function of the representative 
consumer in country H  is given by:
00 r i  rn
Ut = Et T /J*-‘ U(C.) -  -  /  V (yi,eY,.)dj
1=1 n Jo
(2.1)
Each household contributes to the production of all domestic goods yJ attaining 
disutility ^ Jq V (yi,£yiS)dj. The remaining characteristics of agents’ preferences 
are described as in Section 2 of the first Chapter. More specifically, preferences for 
domestic and foreign good and its varieties are represented by equations (1.2), (1.3), 
(1.4) and (1.5). In addition, the price indices implied by these preferences are given 
by equations (1.6), (1.7), (1.8) and (1.9). Equations (1.13) and (1.14) describe the 
government budget constraint in Home and Foreign economies, respectively. Finally, 
the demand functions for goods produced in the small economy and the rest of the 
world are described by equations (1.11) and (1.12), respectively.
As in the previous Chapter, we consider a cashless economy featuring monopo­
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listic competition and price stickiness d la Calvo (1983). The price setting equation 
is therefore given by Equation (1.21) and the price index evolves according to Equa­
tion (1.22). However, in the present chapter, we consider alternative specifications 
for the structure of financial markets. These are presented in the next Section.
2.2 .1  A sse t M arkets
The structure of financial markets can significantly alter the way idiosyncratic shocks 
affect consumption, output and other macroeconomic variables. As described in 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 5),
“[...] think about the current account effect of a temporary rise in the country’s 
gross domestic product. In the bonds-only framework [. . . ]  a temporary productivity 
shock causes a current account surplus motivated by agents’ desire to smooth con­
sumption. But if foreigners have taken on all the country’s output risk, a shock in 
its GDP does not affect its GNP. The increase in domestic output is matched exactly 
by a lower net inflow of asset income from abroad. Neither income, consumption, 
nor the current account changes [...]. The presence of international markets for 
risky assets weakens and may sever the link between shocks to a country’s output or 
factor productivity and shocks to its resident ’s income. Sophisticated international 
financial markets thus force us to rethink the channels through which macroeconomic 
shocks impinge on the world economy. ”
In this Section, we introduce three different specifications for asset market struc­
ture and obtain the economic dynamics implied by each. First, we present the 
scenario in which international financial markets are incomplete, by assuming that 
agents can internationally trade nominal riskless bonds subject to intermediation 
costs. Then we lay out two benchmark cases of asset market structure: at one 
extreme, we analyse the case of financial autarky, in which the small open economy 
has no access to international financial markets; at the other, we examine the most 
developed form of capital markets, in which households have access to a set of con­
tingent claims resulting in an environment of perfect risk sharing with the rest of 
the world.
\ W ^
Incom plete M arkets
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We characterize the environment of incomplete markets by assuming that agents can 
trade nominal riskless bonds denominated in Home and Foreign currency. We con­
sider that home currency-denominated bonds are only traded domestically. More­
over, following Benigno (2001), the international trade of foreign currency-denominated 
bonds is subject to intermediation costs. This-cost is proportional to the country’s 
aggregate net foreign asset position. If the small open economy is a net debtor, its 
agents pay a premium on the foreign interest rates when borrowing from abroad.
On the other hand, if the country is a net creditor, households lending in foreign 
currency receive a rate of return lower than foreign interest rates. The spread is the 
remuneration of international intermediaries, and is assumed to be rebated equally 
among foreign households.
The intermediation cost assumption is introduced for technical reasons: it solves 
the stationarity problem & la Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) described in Section (2.1.1).
By ensuring that the model is stationary, this assumption guarantees the precision 
of any quantitative exercises involving a log linear version of the model. In addition, 
it allows for the examination of the second moments of macroeconomic variables. 
Nevertheless, for some of our qualitative analysis, we consider the case of zero inter­
mediation costs. This is done in order to simplify the analytical derivation of the 
optimal plan and improve our intuition on the policy prescriptions under incomplete 
markets.
We can write the household’s budget constraint at Home as follows:
PO W o ' i W  »frnv
S 0 t  bovvtru? 5 ’lSfrus m ttyw
B m , StB FtCk^ ^ ^ h ( L r t) f ; Pt(kM h)dh
P tC t+ 7 r f h + --------  A b  \  ^  B H, t - i+ S tB F t - i + -    hPtf.tTVf,
(2 .2)
where B lH t and B lFt denote domestic-currency and foreign-currency denominated 
nominal bonds and TVt are g o v ern m pnt franefpre m aH o in th o  fnrm  nf rlnm oofip
a zero steady-state risk premium by setting ^  (&) =  X- Moreover, in specifying the 
budget constraint (2.2), we also assume that households in a given country produce 
all goods and share the revenues from production in equal proportions. We also 
consider the case in which the initial wealth of all households within a country are 
equal. These two assumptions ensure that households in the same country face the 
same budget constraints in every period and state of the world. Therefore, we can 
consider a representative consumer for each economy. We should note that, even 
though idiosyncratic risk is pooled among households from the same country, there 
is imperfect risk sharing across borders.
Foreign households are assumed to trade only in foreign currency bonds: there­
fore their budget constraint can be written as
p ' c ‘ i +  o % - +B>'‘- 1+
^ /?Lc y n ,  i l l 's
K
1 — n
The intermediation profits K , which are shared equally among foreign house­
holds, can be written as
K  = B p t
* ? ( !  +  <?)
1 - RSt (2.4)
Given the above specification, we can write the consumer’s intertemporal optimal 
choices as
PtUc(Ct) = (l + it)/3Et 
Uc (Ct) =  (1 +  i*t )pEt
U c(Ct+1)
t+iJ
t + 1  J
and
Uc(Ct+1) St+iPt
StPt+i.
(2.5)
(2 .6)
(2.7)
where (2.5) and (2.7) are Home and Foreign Euler equations derived from the opti­
mal choice of foreign currency denominated bonds. Equation (2.6) results from the 
small open economy optimal choice of home currency denominated bonds. More­
over, Equations (2.5) and (2.7) imply that there is an interest rate differential across
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countries. Empirically, this assumption is supported by the findings of Engel (2002) 
and Kollman (2002), who show that allowing for interest rate differentials can im­
prove the fit of the data.
Financial Autarky
In this setup, the economy does not have access to international borrowing or lend­
ing. Consequently, there is no risk sharing across borders. Risk is pooled internally 
to the extent that agents participate in the production of all goods and receive an 
equal share of production revenue. Moreover, as in the previous Section, we assume 
that there is a symmetric initial distribution of wealth across domestic agents.
The household budget constraints, at Home and abroad, can be written as
(2.8)n
and
i < i 1 -  Ti) f L n P ( f ) y t ( f ) dh
1 — n (2.9)
Under financial autarky, the value of domestic production has to be equal to the 
level of public and private consumption in nominal terms. Aggregating private and 
public budget constraints, we have:
PH{Yt -  Gt) = PtCt (2.10)
The inability to trade bonds with the rest of the world imposes that the value of 
imports should equal the value of exports:
(1 -n )S tP’HitC-Hit = nPF,tCF,t . (2 .11)
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Com plete Markets
We characterize the most developed form of capital markets following Chari et al. 
(2002). As in Chapter 1, we introduce the complete market environment by assum­
ing that agents have access to state contingent nominal claims that deliver a unit 
of Home currency in each state of the world. In this setup, the rate of marginal 
utilities is equalized across countries at all times and states of nature.
VcjC't+i) Pi Uc(Ct+i)St+lPt /
Uc(c;)  p>+1 uc (Ct) StPt+1 1 /  *■ ' ;
2.3 A  Log-Linear R epresentation  o f th e  M odel
In this Section, we derive the log-linear approximation to the structural equilib­
rium conditions for the small open economy and the rest of the world. In what 
follows, a hat denotes log deviations from the steady state, i.e. x = x= x . A full 
characterization of the steady state is presented in Appendix A.
2.3 .1  T h e D ynam ics o f th e  Sm all O p en  E conom y:
The small open economy dynamics can be described by the aggregate supply con­
dition, the aggregate demand equation, the equilibrium condition(s) implied by the 
financial market structure, and a monetary policy rule. Tables 2.1 to 2.3 present 
the system of log-linear equations under the different asset market assumptions.
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Table 2.1: Equilibrium Conditions under Incomplete Markets
S f  =  k(pdt + rjYt + i ^ R S ,  +  f t  -  rfey,t) + AS
Yt = ( 1 -  A)Ct + \C t  +  brsR S, +  at AD
pEt(d t+1 -  d t) =  pEt(d;+1 -  C,*) +  EtARSt+1 -  SbF,t IM
PbFtt = bFit- i  + Yt — C't — — gt IM2
Table 2.2: Equilibrium Conditions under Financial Autarky
=  k(pCt + r)Yt +  x^xRSt +  f t  -  rfiy,t) + PEpiit+i AS
% =  (1 -  A)Ct + AC,* + braR S t + 9t AD
Yt -  j ^ R S t  = St FA
Table 2.3: Equilibrium Conditions under Complete Markets
= HpCt +  r]Yt +  jz ^ R S t + fi t~  Vey,t) +  ^E t^t+ 1 AS
Tt =  (1 — A) C't +  A Cf +  brsRSt +  gt AD
dt = c; + ±RSt CM
The aggregate supply condition (AS) is derived from the pricing Equation (1.21).
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Producer price inflation is denoted by ir f  and k = (1 —aft) (1 —a) / a ( l  +err)). More­
over, as shown in the Appendix, p represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
and 77 the inverse of the elasticity of goods production. This is the usual Open 
Economy New-Keynesian Phillips Curve and represents the supply side relationship 
between relative prices, output and consumption. Fluctuations in this condition 
are driven by productivity and mark-up shocks.
The small open economy demand equation (AD) is a log-linear version of Equa­
tion (1.12). The fiscal shock gt is defined as Gty G and br8 = gA(2~A) . Equation (AD) 
summarizes the demand conditions in the small open economy and it is affected by 
real external shocks and fiscal disturbances.
In the case of market incompleteness, Equations (2.6) and (2.7) determine the 
evolution of the consumption differential between the two economies. The combi­
nation of these conditions can be expressed in log-linear terms by Equation (IM). 
Moreover, in this setup, agents can trade domestic-currency and foreign-currency 
denominated bonds. We assume that bonds denominated in domestic currency are 
in zero net supply. Consequently, the aggregate budget constraint of the economy, 
including private agents and government, can be written as (IM2). This expression
q D
represents the small open economy current account equation, where bp,t = ■ tpp t-, 
bptt = ^  and S =  —^ '(b)Y .
In the case of financial autarky, the aggregate resource constraint (2.10) can 
be written in log-linear terms as (FA). And, if asset markets are complete, (CM) 
represents the risk sharing condition (2.12).5
Furthermore, when asset markets are incomplete, we allow for a non-zero steady- 
state net foreign asset position and an asymmetric steady-state level of consumption 
(C 7^  C*).6 As documented in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), countries have
different levels of net foreign assets, and this is an important determinant of economic 
dynamics. This specification can therefore lead to a better approximation of the 
open economies business cycles. In this case, the system of equilibrium condition is
5 In the above equations, the price index Equation (1.6) was used to solve for the relative prices
in terms of the real exchange rate RSt-
6 As shown in Appendix A the steady-state relationship between the net foreign asset position 
and the consumption differential is given by (1 — /3)B = X(C — C*).
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summarised in Table 2.4:
Table 2.4: Equilibrium Conditions under Incomplete Markets and Non-zero Steady- 
state Net Foreign Asset Position_____________________________________
=  k(p( 1 +  a)Ct + rjYt + jz ^ R S t + P t~  V^Y,t) + P E ^t+ i AS’
Y, =  (1 -  A)Ct +  A S ;  + br,RSt + gt AD’
pEt(Ct+i -  Ct) =  pEt(d;+l -  C,*) +  Et& RSt+1 -  SbF't IM
0E tqF,t+i =  QF,t +  Yt — (1 +  a)Ct +  paCt — jz ^ R S t — gt IM27
where qp,t = f>F,t-1 +  o / ( l  — /3)(ARSt — tt£ — pCf). The existence of a non-zero
steady-state net foreign asset position modifies the aggregate supply, demand and 
current account equations. The aggregate supply and demand equations change 
because the log-linearization is made around a different steady state for C and C*. 
Moreover, Equation (IM2/) is different from Equation (IM2) because when B ^  0 
the debt burden affects the small open economy current account. In Table (2.4) we 
denote a =  ( 1 -  0 ) I ,  db = (1 +  a)(l -  A), and drS = eix+i1(- ^ 1~x)'),
Given the domestic exogenous variables £y}t,9t, and the real and nominal exter­
nal conditions Ct* and n*, the small open economy system of equilibrium conditions 
is closed by specifying the monetary policy rule. The current Chapter examines dif­
ferent specifications for the monetary policy rule. Apart from analyzing the optimal 
monetary policy regime in the form of a targeting rule, we evaluate the performance 
of alternative standard policy rules such as an exchange rate peg, and both CPI and 
PPI inflation targets.
2 .3 .2  Foreign D ynam ics
Foreign dynamics are governed by the foreign Phillips curve and foreign demand:
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Table 2.5: Foreign Equilibrium Conditions
rt = k{Pd ;+ r?yt* +  K -  + PEtr t+1 as*
Y t =C* t +g*t a d *
The specification of the foreign policy rule completes the system of equilibrium
A A ^
conditions which determine the evolution of Yt*, C* and 7rt . We should note that 
the dynamics of the rest of the world are not affected by Home variables. Therefore, 
the small open economy can treat C* and 7r£ as exogenous.
The policy choice in the rest of the world determines how the endogenous vari­
ables respond to the structural shocks. Hence, it affects the correlation between 
C* and 7r£. In the case of a symmetric steady state, the system of equilibrium 
conditions in the small open economy is only affected by C*. Therefore, the policy 
choice of the Foreign economy is irrelevant for the policy analysis in the small open 
economy. However, if the steady-state consumption profile is asymmetric, 7t£ also 
affects Home dynamics (this can be seen by inspection of Equation (IM2/)). Conse­
quently, in this case, the choice of foreign policy rule is not irrelevant for the small 
open economy.
2.4 W elfare
In a micro-founded model, a precise measure of welfare can be obtained from agents’ 
level of utility. Therefore, the policy objective for the small open economy consists 
of agents’ life time expected utility, given by Equation (2.1). Following the linear- 
quadratic approach developed by Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Sutherland 
(2002), we derive a second order approximation to the policy objective in the Ap­
pendix. It follows that the welfare criterion can be approximated by
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Wto = UcCEt0Y , P t
&  ~ mr+zjYt +  5(1 -  p)c f
-  }«, ( * f ) ’
+  t'i-P +  ^(ll^ll )> 
(2.13)
where Jl =  1^_T^ cr-^ jy represents the steady-state wedge between the marginal utility 
of consumption and the marginal disutility from production. The weight given to 
inflation in the above expression is qn = kji(i+a) • The term t.i.p again stands 
for terms independent of policy (i.e. they are exogenous shock terms that are not 
affected by the policy choice). Finally, the element (9(||£||3) refers to terms of order 
strictly higher than two.
In order to derive a purely quadratic representation of welfare, the discounted 
linear terms in Equation (2.13) have to be eliminated. In Appendix B, we derive 
second order approximations to some of the structural equilibrium conditions and 
obtain a complete second order solution for the evolution of the endogenous variables 
of interest. Because alternative asset market characterizations imply different equi- jj 
librium conditions, the final expression for welfare varies according to the structure | |  
of the asset market.
The loss function for our small open economy under the different asset market 
structures (denoted with a superscript m) can be expressed as
Lu, = U c C E t 'Y ,?
1 im  v"2 1 l / J T i p o  1 jm  v n f i
2 VV t ' 2 r r r i o t '
+ L £ e tYt + L g e tR S t  +  ( ^ f
+  U .p +  0(||C ||3).
(2.14)
In what follows, we let the superscript m  = c signify the case of complete mar­
kets, while m  = fa  is the financial autarky setup and the incomplete market case 
is denoted by m  — i. e* denotes the vector containing the following exogenous 
variables:
et = £yt P t 9 t  C i
The weights and the vectors L™ and L™ depend on the structural
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parameters of the model and on the asset market configuration (see Appendix B). 
We should note that the nominal external shock n* does not appear in our welfare 
characterization. Even though (and the policy choice of the rest of the world) 
can affect the dynamics of the small open economy when B  7^  0 and asset markets 
are incomplete, it is of no importance for the loss function formulation. That is, 7t£ 
can affect the constraints of the policy problem, but it does not change the policy 
objective. ~fhi^
2 .4.1 T he  W eight of D om estic Inflation  in  th e  Loss F unction
The expression for ln is a complex function of the structural parameters. However, 
if we assume that the level of output is efficient in the steady state (for the small 
open economy)7 and that the net foreign asset position is zero, the expressions for 
and can be easily compared. In particular, under this specification:
i = fa = (7(1 -  A) /  l j \( l  — A)-1 (77 + 1) \
* * k  V Mp + »?) + p(1-A) + i7 + A;
and
= <7(1-A ) /  _  lc(rj + 1) \  
k  V ( P  +  * l )  +  V l )
with k = ( 6 -  1)(2 -  A) and lc = [p9 -  1)A(2 -  A).
Therefore, when domestic and foreign goods are substitutes in the utility function
(more specifically, when pQ > 1 and 9 > 1), we have that l \  = l la > qn and
I£ < qn. So when we rewrite welfare as a purely quadratic expression, the weight
on inflation under incomplete markets and financial autarky increases, while in the
case of complete markets it decreases. That is, with complete markets, the linear
term Ct — ^ \ +a) Yt in Equation (2.13) can be written as an increasing function of
inflation variability. On the other hand, with imperfect risk sharing, either in the
case of financial autarky or market incompleteness, this term is a decreasing function
of Now, if pO < 1 and 9 < 1, the conclusion is reversed: lln = l la < qn and
I% > qn. The differences in the weight on inflation have direct implications for
7As shown Chapter 1, this can be achived by setting fi =  1/(1 — A).
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optimal monetary policy. These are explored in the next Section.
2.5 M onetary P olicy
In this Section, we analyse optimal monetary policy under alternative asset market 
structures. Firstly, the optimal monetary policy plan for the different financial 
markets settings is formalized. Secondly, we carry out quantitative exercises which 
illustrate the optimal responses to different shocks and evaluate how these change 
with the characterization of the small open economy. Finally, we conduct a wel­
fare evaluation of different standard policy rules. The performances of a domestic 
inflation target, a CPI inflation target and a fixed exchange rate regime axe ranked 
based on our welfare measure.
2 .5 .1  O ptim al M on etary  P o licy  under A ltern a tiv e  A sse t M arket 
Structures:
We proceed by characterizing the optimal plan under the assumption that policy­
makers can commit to maximizing the economy’s welfare. The policy problem 
consists of minimizing the loss function given the equilibrium conditions and the 
initial conditions 7?t0 and y *. In effect, the constraints on the initial conditions im­
pose that the first order conditions to the problem are time invariant. This method 
follows Woodford’s (1999) timeless perspective approach and ensures that the policy 
prescription does not constitute a time inconsistent problem.
In the case of complete markets and financial autarky, the policy problem consists 
of choosing the path of ,Y t,C t,R S t}  in order to minimize (2.14), subject to 
the equilibrium conditions given by Tables 2 and 3, respectively. The first order 
conditions to the minimization problem (shown in the Appendix) can be written in 
the form of the following targeting rules:
QcyA(Yt -  i f ' 0) +  QcrsA (R S t -  R s f ‘) + Q%*t = 0 (2.15)
and
QfyaA(Yt -  ? f /o ) +  Q l f W S ,  -  R 0, (2.16)
where the superscript c denotes the complete market case and fa  refers to the finan­
cial autarky setting. A denotes first difference operator. The above targeting rules
and R S t as functions of the various shocks (excluding the nominal external distur­
bance 7r£). Moreover, according to these equations, policymakers should respond 
to real exchange rate and output movements, as well as inflation. The coefficients 
Qy, Qrs and Qn depend on the weights of each of the variables on welfare and there­
fore are determined by the underlying distortions in the economy. In general, the 
weights as well as the target variables are different depending of the asset mar­
ket specification. These expressions are shown in Appendix B and are complex 
functions of the structural parameters. fj/k  b s \  yti'i
In the case of incomplete mgjkets, the policy problem consists of choosing the 
path of {nf*,Yt,Ct, RSt,bp}t} in order to minimize (2.14) subject to the equations 
specified in Table 4.8 The resulting first order conditions are:
set the objectives for monetary policy. This is done by specifying the targets YtT
r f  +  A 0 (2.17)
^ — lyyYt “t“ lyrRSt lyeet ~k P^2,t ^4,t (2.18)
+ ^  _  ^<^4,t ~  ,t +  apPAEt<P4tt+ i,
8 We compute the optimal plan for the general case where the steady state level of foreign assets 
is non-zero. The case of a symmetric steady state can be obtained by setting a = 0.
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0 =  -p k{  1 +  a)ipltt -  (1 +  a)(l -  \)ip2>t -  pipZj  +  p/3 V 3|t_i +  (1 +  a)^4,t +  PaPA<f4,t
(2.20)
and
i?tA</?4it+i =  ft 1$(P3,t- (2-21)
The characterization of the optimal policy under incomplete markets is more 
complicated because of the intertemporal representation of the constraints (IM) and 
(IM2). The presence of intermediation costs also adds to the complexity of the 
problem. In general, the optimal plan for a small open economy with incomplete 
markets is the solution to a system of linear stochastic difference equations given by 
the above first order conditions and the equations specified in Table 4.
Nevertheless, in the special case in which there are no intermediation costs in­
volved in the international trade of bonds (i.e. 6 = 0), the above first order condi­
tions imply
QiyEtA(Yt+i ~  ? £ )  +  Q\.,EtA (R S t+1 -  R s J i ,)  + =  0. (2.22)
We should note that the above equation is not a targeting rule. The dynam- 
i ics of the small open economy are not determined by this equation together with
N
the other expressions in Table (2.4). Equation (2.22) is simply an equilibrium 
condition implied by the optimal plan, but does not represent a monetary policy 
rule. Comparing Equation (2.22) with (2.15) and (2.16), we can see that, while 
under incomplete markets the optimal policy stabilizes expected movements in the 
variables, under complete markets and financial autarky the targeting rule reacts to 
actual fluctuations in these variables. Behind this result lies the fact that under 
complete markets consumption is determined by the risk sharing condition which
9 The determinancy conditions are checked numerically using the algorithm of King and Watson 
(1998).
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holds in each period. Similarly, under financial autarky, domestic consumption at 
period t is financed by the domestic output in that period. On the other hand, in 
the case of incomplete markets, agents smooth consumption given their expectation 
of future income. 1—' ~ \ e) ) ’VV-*.
2 .5.2 Irrelevance of A sset M arket S tru c tu re
Under certain parameter specifications, the dynamics of the small open economy 
are independent of the asset market structure. This is the case when the elasticity 
of intertemporal and intratemporal substitution are unitary and the initial level of 
debt is zero. These specifications imply that the economy never experiences trade 
imbalances, regardless of asset market structure. Therefore, the value of domestic 
production is always equal to the value of domestic consumption.
As shown in Appendix B, if we impose the restrictions p = 9 = 1 and bp = 
b p -i =  0, the second order approximation to the equilibrium conditions for the 
three different asset market structures can also be expressed as
U'fc&H’k  tf f e d '
c t = R s t + c ;
The equilibrium conditions for the alternative forms of asset market configuration are 
therefore identical.10 Consequently, the welfare characterization is also independent 
of the degree of risk sharing. Furthermore, the utility-based loss function becomes 
isomorphic to a closed economy loss function and can be represented as a quadratic 
expression of domestic inflation and the output gap only (see Appendix B). If we 
assume that the steady-state level of output is efficient (i.e. p. = 1/(1 — A)), the 
optimal policy consists of a strict domestic inflation target. In this case, the loss 
function can be written as:
L i  = UcCEt0J 2 +  t.i.p +  0 ( |K ||3), (2.24)
10 The irrelevance of the asset market structure under this specification has been extensively 
discussed in the literature (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Benigno (2001), among others).
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where YtFlex = +  fy+i)9t denotes the flexible price allocation, or equiva­
lently, the equilibrium output when a strict domestic inflation target is implemented. 
Under this specification, the first order conditions of the minimization problem under 
incomplete markets, given by equations (2.17) through to (2.21), can be expressed 
as:
0 =  A (Yt -  ?tFlex) +  <77rf (2.25)
The same expression arises if we impose these parameter specifications on the 
targeting rule under complete markets and financial autarky, given by equations 
(2.15) and (2.16). Under this parameterization, a policy of complete domestic price 
stabilization closes the welfare relevant output gap. Hence, it is optimal to target 
producer price inflation, regardless of the asset market structure.
We should note that, in the case of financial autarky, a domestic inflation target |(
1
is the optimal policy under a less restrictive assumption. In particular, Equation;
(2.25) holds when 0 = 1, regardless of the value of p. In other words, when asset ]
1
markets are characterized by financial autarky and the elasticity of substitution, j 
between goods is unitary, the flexible price allocation coincides with the efficient! 
allocation.11
2 .5 .3  Q u an tita tive  A nalysis
We solve the log-linearized model using the algorithm of King and Watson (1998), 
which also checks numerically if the determinacy conditions are satisfied. To apply 
this numerical method, we consider the following benchmark specification for the 
small open economy structural parameters. We start with a unitary coefficient of 
risk aversion, i.e. p = 1. This specification implies a log utility function of aggregate 
consumption and is extensively used in the literature. However, many studies have 
estimated different values for this parameters. Eichenbaum et al. (1988), finds that 
this parameter should range between 0.5 and 3. On the other hand, Hall (1988)
11 In order to ensure that a strict inflation target is optimal when the economy is subject to 
fiscal shocks we should also assume that fi =  1/(1 — A). Moreover, we note that domestic price 
stabilization is never optimal when mark-up shocks are present.
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suggested a value higher than 5. We analyse the cases of p ranging from 1 to 6.
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, 0, is another 
crucial parameter in our analysis. Our benchmark specification assumes that 0 =  3. 
This is consistent with Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998), who argue that this parameter 
should be between 3 and 6. Many other papers have estimated this parameter: 
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1998) suggest it should range between 1 and 2; Trefler 
and Lai (1999) estimates are at around 5. Therefore we consider a robustness 
analysis, with 6 ranging 0.5 to 6. Our benchmark case sets p = 1 and 6 = 3, 
and therefore implies that Home and Foreign goods are substitutes in utility. The 
specification of pd < 1 is also analysed in order to evaluate the implications of 
assuming that domestic and foreign goods are complements.
In addition, the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods is assumed 
to be 10, as in Benigno and Benigno (2003). Following Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997), we assume that the elasticity of labour supply to real wages is 77 =  0.47. 
Moreover, we set /3 =  0.99, which implies steady-state annual returns of 4%. Fur­
thermore, in order to characterize an average length of price contract of 3 quarters, 
we assume that a = 0.66. This is consistent with the findings of Galf and Gertler
(1998) for the U.S. economy.
A is assumed to be 0.25, implying a 25% import share of GDP. We also vary A 
from 0.2 to 0.5. This range includes the degree of openness in countries like Canada, 
where the imports as a percentage of GDP are around 40%, but also encompasses 
lower levels of openness, such as those found in New Zealand, Chile or Peru, which 
have import to GDP ratios of around 20%.
Following Benigno (2001), we assume S = 0.01, which implies a spread between 
home and foreign interest rates of 1%. We also consider the case of zero interest rate 
spreads. Under our baseline specification, we consider a zero steady-state foreign 
asset position. However, in order to illustrate more realistic values of the debt to 
GDP ratio, we analyse the cases of ^  of up to 50%, as in Benigno (2001).
Finally, we assume an efficient steady-state level of output, i.e. Ji = 1/(1 — A). 
This specification is imposed in order to abstract from policy incentives that may
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arise from inefficiencies in the steady-state level of output. (The analysis of this 
factor can be found in the Chapter 1 and is deeply explored in Benigno and Woodford 
(2003)). The mark-up implied by our benchmark specification for A is therefore 33% 
and can reach 100% when we consider A =  0.5. Erceg et al. (2000) find the value of 
77% for the steady-state mark-up and Benigno and Woodford (2003) consider the 
case of a 50% mark-up.12
Illustrating the Optimal M onetary Policy under A lternative Asset Mar­
ket Structures
In this Section, we portray the optimal responses to the different shocks for each of 
the asset market configurations, under our benchmark calibration. Figure 2.1 shows 
the impulse responses of consumption, output, the real exchange rate and producer 
price inflation following a domestic pmdiictivity-shnrlr. These pictures illustrate 
that, regardless of the asset market characterization, the optimal policy does not 
differ quantitatively from a producer price inflation target. Following the domestic 
productivity improvement, output and consumption increase. In addition, the larger 
supply of domestic goods induces a real exchange rate depreciation. However, the 
more ‘sophisticated’ is the asset market structure, the smaller is the consumption 
reaction to this shock. On the other hand, output and the real exchange rate react 
less strongly when the degree of risk sharing is smaller.
Figure 2.2 presents the case of a real external shock Ct*. In particular, we 
consider the case of a foreign productivity shock when the rest of the world is 
following strict inflation targeting. By inspection of foreign equilibrium conditions 
(Table 5) we can see that, when 7t£ =  0, a 1% productivity shock results in a 
shift in C*. As in the case of a domestic productivity shock, following a foreign 
shock the optimal plan also prescribes domestic inflation stabilization. This holds 
for all asset market structures. In this case, higher foreign productivity leads to 
a real exchange rate appreciation, a fall in output and an increase in consumption.
12 The numerical exercise is pursued in order to obtain a qualitative analysis of the optimal policy 
and the performance of policy rules. Even though we follow the literature on the specification of 
the parameters, the choice of values in some of the sensitivity analysis has the objective of attaining 
an intuitive evaluation of optimal policy.
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The latter effect is smaller under financial autarky, because in this case the domestic 
resource constraint is always binding.
The optimal responses to a fiscal shock are shown in Figure 2.3. If asset markets 
are complete, the positive demand shock implies an increase in consumption and, 
therefore, the positive response of output to the shock is more than proportional. 
Under financial autarky and incomplete markets, there is a ‘crowding out’ effect on 
domestic consumption. In these two cases, as is clear from the impulse response of 
domestic inflation, the optimal plan is very close to a producer price inflation target.
Figure 2.4 shows that when the economy is subject to mark-up shocks, the 
optimal monetary policy departs from price stabilization under all asset market 
settings. The optimal plan reacts to the fluctuations in the wedge between the 
marginal utility of consumption and the marginal disutility of production. For the 
cases of financial autarky and incomplete markets, the shock reduces output and 
consumption. On the other hand, when the asset market is complete, the optimal 
policy implies an increase in domestic output. In this case, the exchange rate 
depreciation improves the small open economy’s competitiveness. Furthermore, 
inflation is more volatile when asset markets are complete.
Figures 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 show the impulse responses of the variables for 
the case of incomplete asset markets with a non-zero steady-state net foreign asset 
position. In this case, we calibrate the net foreign asset position in steady state as 
= =  —0.5, implying an external debt to GDP ratio of 50%. By inspection of the 
pictures, it is clear that the results exposed previously do not change and deviations 
from domestic inflation target only happen in the presence mark-up shocks.
Figures 2.9 to 2.12 illustrate the impulse responses of the variables for the case 
of incomplete asset markets with no intermediation costs (<5 =  0), contrasting them 
to the case where 6 = 1%. The specification of 6 does not seem to affect the optimal 
plan, regardless of the source of disturbance. However, as discussed earlier, when 
<5 =  0, the incomplete market model is characterized by a nonstationary net foreign 
asset position.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal Monetary Policy following a Fiscal Shock
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Figure 2.5: Productivity Shock (Non-Zero Steady-state Net Foreign Asset Position)
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Figure 2.6: Foreign Shock (Non-zero Steady-state Net Foreign Asset Position)
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Figure 2.7: Fiscal Shock (Non-zeroSsteady-state Net Foreign Asset Position)
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Figure 2.8: Mark-up Shock (Non-zeroSsteady-state Net Foreign Asset Position)
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Figure 2.9: Productivity Shock (No Intermediation Costs)
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Figure 2.10: Foreign Shock (No Intermediation Costs)
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Figure 2.11: Fiscal Shock (No Intermediation Costs)
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these results sensitive to changes in the specification of parameters? In the next 
session we proceed to compute the ranking of standard policy rules for the different 
parameter values and types of disturbances. We also test the robustness of the 
policy prescription of domestic inflation targeting.
Evaluating Policy Rules
Our welfare characterization is a precise tool for measuring the performance of dif­
ferent policy rules. In this Section, we compare welfare under a producer price 
inflation target, a CPI (consumer price index) inflation target and an exchange rate 
peg. We also report the preferred policy for different parameter specifications.
Tables 2.6 to 2.13 indicate the preferred policy rule under alternative values of 
p, 9 and A. We start by varying 9 and p, and maintain A =  0.4. Alternatively, we 
keep the log utility specification and analyse different scenarios for 9 and A.
As shown in Tables 2.6 to 2.11, in the case of imperfect risk sharing (financial 
autarky or incomplete markets), producer price inflation targeting (denoted by IT 
in the Tables below) is the best policy available regardless of the parameter val­
ues. This is true for all types of disturbances excluding mark-up shocks. On the 
other hand, when asset markets are complete, large values of A, 9 and p modify the 
performance of the different policy rules. Economies that are more open or more 
sensitive to exchange rate movements (i.e. with large values of A and 9) may benefit 
from fixing the exchange rate or targeting a weighted average of exchange rate and 
domestic inflation (i.e. CPI targeting, denoted by CPI).
If the economy experiences mark-up fluctuations, CPI targeting may outperform 
a policy of domestic price stability, even in the case of imperfect risk sharing (see 
Tables 2.12 and 2.13). Nevertheless, a fixed exchange rate regime (denoted by PEG) 
is only the best policy for extreme values of 9 under financial autarky. Similarly, 
in the case of incomplete markets, an exchange rate peg is only the preferred policy 
when 9 > 5 and A < 1/5.
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P roductiv ity
s h o c k
Incomplete
M arkets
X. \  e 1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/3 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/4 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/5 IT IT IT IT IT IT
Financial Autarky 
W 0  1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/3 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/4 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/5 IT IT IT IT IT IT
Com plete M arkets
w e  1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
1/3 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
1/4 IT IT IT CPI PEG PEG
1/5 IT IT IT IT PEG PEG
Table 2.6: Preferred Policy Rule following a Productivity Shock: varying the Elas- . 
ticity of Intratemporal Substitution and the Degree of Openness
P roductiv ity
s h o ck
Incomplete
M arkets
p\6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT IT IT IT IT IT
2 IT IT IT IT IT IT
3 IT IT IT IT IT IT
4 IT IT IT IT IT IT
5 IT IT IT IT IT IT
6 IT IT IT IT IT IT
Financial Autarky
p\0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT IT IT IT IT IT
2 IT IT IT IT IT IT
3 IT IT IT IT IT IT
4 IT IT IT IT IT IT
5 IT IT IT IT IT IT
6 IT IT IT IT IT IT
Complete M arkets
p\0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
2 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
3 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
4 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
5 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
6 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
Table 2.7: Preferred Policy Rule following a Productivity Shock: varying the Elas­
ticity of Intertemporal and Intratemporal Substitution
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F o re ig n  s h o c k
Incom plete 
M arkets 
A, \ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/3 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/4 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/5 IT IT IT IT IT IT
Financial Autarky 
A \0  1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/3 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/4 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/5 IT IT IT IT IT IT
C om plete M arkets 
A, \ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
1/3 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
1/4 IT IT IT CPI PEG PEG
1/5 IT IT IT IT PEG PEG
Table 2.8: Preferred Policy Rule following a Foreign Shock: varying the Elasticity 
of Intratemporal Substitution and the Degree of Openness
F o re ig n  S h o ck
Incomplete M arkets
p \ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT IT IT IT IT IT
2 IT IT IT IT IT IT
3 IT IT IT IT IT IT
4 IT IT IT IT IT IT
5 IT IT IT IT IT IT
6 IT IT IT IT IT IT
Financial Autarky
p \ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT IT IT IT IT IT
2 IT IT IT IT IT IT
3 IT IT IT IT IT IT
4 IT IT IT IT IT IT
5 IT IT IT IT IT IT
6 IT IT IT IT IT IT
C om plete M arkets
p \ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
2 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
3 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
4 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
5 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
6 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
Table 2.9: Preferred Policy Rule following a Foreign Shock: varying the Elasticity 
of Intertemporal and Intratemporal Substitution
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F isca l S h o c k
Incom plete
M arkets
A.\0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/3 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/4 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/5 IT IT IT IT IT IT
Financial Autarky
n e  1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/3 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/4 IT IT IT IT IT IT
1/5 IT IT IT IT IT IT
Com plete M arkets
7 i\0  1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
1/3 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
1/4 IT IT CPI PEG PEG PEG
1/5 IT IT CPI PEG PEG PEG
Table 2.10: Preferred Policy Rule following a Fiscal Shock: varying the Elasticity of 
Intratemporal Substitution and the Degree of Openness
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F isc a l S h o c k
Incom plete
M arkets
p \ 0  1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT IT IT IT IT IT
2 IT IT IT IT IT IT
3 IT IT IT IT IT IT
4 IT IT IT IT IT IT
5 IT IT IT IT IT IT
6 IT IT IT IT IT IT
Financial Autarky
p \ 0  1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT IT IT IT IT IT
2 IT IT IT IT IT IT
3 IT IT IT IT IT IT
4 IT IT IT IT IT IT
5 IT IT IT IT IT IT
6 IT IT IT IT IT IT
C om plete M arkets
p \ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
2 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
3 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
4 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
5 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
6 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
Table 2.11: Preferred Policy Rule following a Fiscal Shock: varying the Elasticity of 
Intertemporal and Intratemporal Substitution
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M ark u p  s h o c k
Incom plete
M arkets
X \9 1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT IT IT CPI CPI CPI
1/3 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI
1/4 CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI PEG
1/5 CPI CPI CPI CPI PEG PEG
Financial Autarky
k\Q 1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT IT IT CPI CPI CPI
1/3 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI
1/4 CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI PEG
1/5 CPI CPI CPI CPI PEG PEG
C om plete  M arkets
x\e 1 2 3 4 5 6
1/2 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
1/3 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
1/4 CPI CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
1/5 CPI CPI CPI PEG PEG PEG
Table 2.12: Preferred Policy Rule following a Mark-up Shock: varying the Elasticity 
of Intratemporal Substitution and the Degree of Openness
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M ark u p  s h o c k
Incom plete
M arkets
p \ 0  1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI
2 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI
3 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI
4 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI
5 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI
6 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI
Financial A utarky
p \ 0  1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI
2 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI
3 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI
4 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI PE G
5 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI PE G
6 IT CPI CPI CPI CPI PE G
C om ple te  M arkets
p \ 0  1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT CPI PEG PE G PE G PE G
2 CPI PEG PEG PE G PE G PE G
3 CPI PEG PEG PE G PE G PE G
4 CPI PEG PEG PE G PE G PE G
5 CPI PEG PEG PE G PE G PE G
6 CPI PEG PEG PE G PE G PE G
Table 2.13: Preferred Policy Rule following a Mark-up Shock: varying the Elasticity 
of Intertemporal and Intratemporal Substitution
Tables 2.14 to 2.17 display the preferred policy rule for the cases in which 0 < 1 
(maintaining p = 1). Under this specification, domestic and foreign goods are 
complements. The Tables show that a domestic inflation target is the preferred 
policy if asset markets are complete. However, when there is imperfect risk sharing, 
inflation targeting is no longer optimal when 9 < 0.8. These results hold for all 
types of disturbances.
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P ro d u c tiv ity
S h o c k
6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Incom ple te
M arkets PE G P E G IT IT IT IT
C o m p le te  M arkets IT IT IT IT IT IT
F inancial A utarky PE G PE G IT IT IT IT
Table 2.14: Preferred Policy Rule following a Productivity Shock: when Domestic 
and Foreign Goods are Complements
F o re ig n  S h o c k
0 0.5 0 .6 0 .7 0 .8 0 .9 1
Incom ple te
M arkets P E G PE G IT IT IT IT
C o m p le te  M arkets IT IT IT IT IT IT
Financial A utarky P E G PE G IT IT IT IT
Table 2.15: Preferred Policy Rule following a Foreign Shock: when Domestic and 
Foreign Goods are Complements
F is c a l  S h o c k
0 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Incom plete
M arkets P E G PE G CPI IT IT IT
C o m p le te  M arkets IT IT IT IT IT IT
Financial A utarky P E G PE G C PI IT IT IT
Table 2.16: Preferred Policy Rule following a Fiscal Shock: when Domestic and 
Foreign Goods are Complements
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Mark up Shock
e 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Incom ple te
M arkets P E G P E G CPI IT IT IT
C o m p le te  M arkets IT IT IT IT IT IT
F inancia l A utarky P E G P E G CPI IT IT IT
Table 2.17: Preferred Policy Rule following a Mark-up Shock: when Domestic and 
Foreign Goods are Complements
Finally, Table 2.18 ranks the policy rules for values of 6 =  0.00001 to 6 =  0.01 
and =  ranging from 0 to —0.5, for the case in which asset markets are incomplete. 
The results are unchanged: an inflation target is the preferred policy rule following 
productivity, fiscal and foreign shocks, regardless of the values of 6 and B. Moreover, 
as in our baseline specification (see Tables 2.12 and 2.13), CPI targeting is the 
preferred policy in the case of mark-up shocks.
P ro d u c tiv ity  S h o c k
(B/Y) \ 8 0 .001% 0.5% 1%
0 IT IT IT
0.3 IT IT IT
0.5 IT IT IT
F isc a l S h o c k
(B /Y ) \ 5 0 .001% 0.5% 1%
0 IT IT IT
0.3 IT IT IT
0 .5 IT IT IT
Foreign Shock
(B/Y) \ 5 0 .0 0 1 % 0.5% 1%
0 IT IT IT
0 .3 IT IT IT
0 .5 IT IT IT
Marck Up Schock
(B /Y) \ 8 0 .0 0 1 % 0.5% 1%
0 C PI CPI CPI
0 .3 C PI CPI CPI
0 .5 C PI CPI C PI
Table 2.18: Sensitivity Analysis: varying the Steady-state Debt to GDP Ratio and 
Risk Premium
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The quantitative results can be summarized as follows. In a small open econ- \ 
omy characterized by incomplete asset markets, the optimal monetary policy is not \ 
quantitatively different from domestic inflation targeting under our benchmark spec­
ification. This result holds for the case of fiscal, productivity and foreign shocks. 
Moreover, following these shocks, a domestic inflation targeting regime outperforms 
an exchange rate peg or CPI targeting when home and foreign goods are substitutes 
in utility. On the other hand, under perfect risk sharing, for a large set of parameter 
values, an exchange rate peg is preferred to a domestic inflation targeting regime, 
regardless of the source of the shock.
Conversely, if the degree of substitutability between Home and Foreign goods 
is significantly low (more specifically, 0 < 0.7), this result is reversed. Under 
incomplete markets, it can be optimal to target the exchange rate, but domestic 
inflation targeting is the preferred policy under perfect risk sharing. Moreover, the 
presence of intermediation costs or a non-zero steady-state net foreign asset position 
does not seem to affect the conclusions.
These findings are consistent with the results shown in Section 2.4.1. As demon­
strated in this Section, when home and foreign goods are substitutes in utility, the 
coefficient of inflation variability in the loss function is smaller under perfect risk 
sharing than it is under incomplete markets. As a result, under complete markets, 
a more flexible policy towards inflation that permits policymakers to manage the 
exchange rate optimally, can be welfare improving. In particular, allowing greater 
inflation variability increases welfare by increasing the term Ct — ^(i+a) in the 
welfare Equation (2.13). On the other hand, with imperfect risk sharing this term 
decreases (71^ ) 2 and, therefore, a more flexible form of inflation targeting reduces 
welfare. The exact opposite conclusion holds for the case in which domestic and 
foreign goods are complements.
If we consider, for example, the case of a positive productivity shock, the above 
results can be explained as follows. When asset m arke ts  a re  com plete  and goods 
are substitutes, restricting the exchange rate depreciation caused by the productivity 
improvement might be beneficial for the small open economy. A smaller deprecia-
I ll
tion diverts some output production to the foreign economy and therefore reduces 
the disutility of producing at home. At the same time, the complete market specifi­
cation ensures that consumption at home does not suffer significantly with the policy 
of diverting production. A policy that constrains the exchange rate depreciation 
(e.g. a fixed exchange rate) can therefore outperform an inflation targeting regime. 
When goods are complements, however, it is no longer possible to shift consumption 
towards foreign goods by inducing a greater appreciation in the exchange rate. In 
this case, domestic inflation targeting is the preferred policy.
In the case of incom plete m arkets, consumption is more responsive to output 
movements. In the extreme case of financial autarky, for example, consumption has 
to be fully financed by domestic production. Consequently, a policy that tries to 
reduce the disutility of production will inevitably reduce consumption utility. When 
the elasticity of substitution between the goods is high, restricting the exchange 
rate movements has a strong impact on output and consequently on consumption. 
Therefore, it does not lead to welfare gains. In this case, the authorities should 
focus on stabilizing inflation and on minimizing the distortions that price dispersion 
brings. On the other hand, lowering the degree of substitutability between the goods 
reduces output sensitivity to exchange rate movements. Hence, the income effect 
on consumption of restricting the depreciation is smaller. In addition, a relatively 
appreciated exchange rate can improve the small open economy’s purchasing power 
under market incompleteness (see equations (FA) and (IM)). When 0 is sufficiently 
low, the income effect in consumption is small and therefore its negative impact on 
welfare is smaller than the positive welfare effect from an improvement in purchasing 
power. Hence, in this case, an exchange rate peg outperforms a domestic inflation 
target.
We should note that when there are mark-up shocks, the optimal plan differs 
from an inflation targeting regime, regardless of the asset market structure and 
the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. These shocks 
always disturb the pricing decision of firms and create an incentive to depart from 
price stabilization.
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2.6 Concluding Rem arks
In this Chapter, we have formalized the dynamics of the small open economy under 
different degrees of international risk sharing. We have compared the previously 
documented complete market characterization with two forms of market incomplete­
ness: the extreme case of financial autarky; and the case of an intermediate level of 
risk sharing, in which the country is allowed to trade riskless bonds internationally 
subject to intermediation fees. We have shown that the different dynamics implied 
by alternative asset market structures have significant implications for monetary 
policy.
When a country can perfectly share risk with the rest of the world, and home and 
foreign goods are substitutes, optimally managing the exchange rate may improve its 
welfare. Following a productivity shock, for example, we have shown that a country 
may gain from restricting the exchange rate movement in order to divert some 
production towards the rest of the world. At the same time, perfect risk sharing 
ensures that consumption levels are maintained. This policy therefore reduces the 
disutility of producing domestically without decreasing agents’ utility derived from 
consumption. As a consequence, the monetary authority has an incentive to manage 
the exchange rate besides the objective of price stability. Conversely, if goods are 
complements, the ability to shift consumption towards foreign goods is restricted 
and inflation targeting is the preferred policy rule.
Under imperfect risk sharing, however, the results are entirely reversed: when 
goods are substitutes, we have shown that inflation targeting is a robust policy 
prescription; but if the degree of substitutability is considerably low, an exchange 
rate peg can be the preferred policy. Under market incompleteness (including the 
extreme case of financial autarky), when 9 > 0.7, the monetary authority is not able 
to improve welfare by switching production towards the rest of the world. This 
is because the latter has a direct effect on consumption and consumption utility. 
However, this effect is reduced when the elasticity of substitution between goods is 
significantly small. In this case, it might be beneficial to manage the exchange rate 
in order to improve the country’s purchasing power parity.
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The exception to the above analysis is the case of mark-up shocks. These 
fluctuations affect monopolistic competition distortions and create a direct trade-off 
between stabilizing inflation and smoothing such movements. Therefore, following 
this type of shock, optimal policy might deviate from*price stability regardless of the 
degree of substitutability between goods or the level risk sharing in the economy.
Moreover, optimal monetary policy is independent of the financial market struc­
ture only when the latter is entirely irrelevant for the economy’s dynamics. This 
is the case when trade imbalances are ruled out and the steady-state level of net 
foreign assets is zero. Under this specification, and provided there are no mark­
up shocks or steady-state inefficiencies in output, price stability coincides with the 
optimal plan, regardless of the degree of risk sharing.
This work has shown that the level of sophistication of the financial market has 
clear implications for monetary policy. The conclusions also vary according to the 
degree of substitutability between domestic and imported goods. An interesting ex­
ercise would be to test these findings empirically by studying how monetary policy 
has behaved in countries with different import profiles and different asset market 
structures. For example, a prediction of the model is that, in countries where im­
ported goods are complements to domestic production, the lower is the degree of risk 
sharing, the larger is the gain from targeting the exchange rate. The opposite should 
hold in countries in which imports and domestic products are close substitutes.
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2.A  A ppendix: T he Steady S tate
In this Appendix, we derive the steady-state conditions. In contrast with Chapter
1. we allow for an asymmetric steady state in the analysis of the incomplete market 
case. All variables in steady state are denoted with a bar. We assume that in 
steady state l  + it = l + i% = 1/fi and Pf1 /PfL \ = P f  fP t- i = 1. We normalize the 
price indexed such that P h = P f -
The steady-state versions of the demand equation at Home and in the rest of the 
world are
F  =  (1 -  \ )C  + AC* +  G (2.26)
and
F* = C* + G*. (2.27)
From the household and government budget constraints we have
(1 -  0)B  = C — Y (1 — r) + T r  (2.28)
and
G = TY -  T r  (2.29)
We can therefore write the following relationship between the steady-state foreign 
asset position and the consumption differential:
( 1 - 0 ) B  = \ ( C - C * ) .  (2.30)
Finally, applying our normalization to the price setting equations we have
and
Uo(C) =  nVy (AC* +  (1 -  A)C +  G) (2.31)
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UC(<?) = v'Vy ( c *  +  G*) , (2.32)
where
M = ( l - f ) ( « r - l ) ; M >1  
Equations (2.30), (2.31) and (2.32) determine the relationship between B  , G, G* 
and JL*. In particular, when G = G = B — 0, p* — p.
2.B  A ppendix: A pproxim ating th e M odel
In this Appendix, we derive first and second order approximations to the equilibrium 
conditions of the model. Moreover, we show the second order approximation to the 
utility function in order to conduct our welfare analysis. We assume G = 0 and 
use isoelastic functional forms for the utility functions, as specified in Chapter 1 by 
(1.58) and (1.59). The first and second order approximations to the optimal price 
setting condition and the price index are identical to the ones presented in Section 
(1.B.4) and (1.B.3) in Chapter 1. The approximation to the other equilibrium 
conditions described in the text are shown below.
2 .B .1  D em an d
The first order approximation to the small open economy demand is
Yh  = -Oph  + dbC +  (1 -  db)C* +  9(1 -  db)R S  +  g, (2.33)
where db =  (1 — A)(l +  a) and a = Moreover, Home relative prices are
denoted by pn = Ph / P  and the fiscal shock gt is defined as , allowing for the 
analysis of this shock even when steady-state government consumption is non-zero. 
In the symmetric steady state, in which db = 1 — A, Equation (2.33) becomes
Yh  = -0 p H + (1 -  \ )C  +  AC* +  9XRS +  g. (2.34)
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The second order approximation to the demand function is
where
Pl d'yyt +  \y'tDyyt +  y'tDeet + t.i.p + 0 (  ||€l|3) =  0, (2.35)
yt = Yt Ct p m  RSt
et £yt P t 9 t C t
dv = -1  db - 9  6 { l - d b)
and
D 'v =
0 0 0 0
0 (1 -  db)db 0 -9(1 — db — dg)db
0 0 0 0
0 - 9 ( l - d b)db 0 92( l - d b)db
D' =
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 db - (1 db)db
0 0 0 9 0
0 0 0 -o
**311 0(1- db^ db
2 .B .2  In com p lete  M arkets: A pp rox im atin g  th e  C urrent A ccou n t  
equation
We assume that home currency denominated bonds are in zero net supply. The net 
foreign asset position is therefore fully denominated in foreign currency. Aggregating
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private and public budget constraints, the law of motion for Bp,t can be written as 
PtC, +  S tB % n  S =  StBFjt- i  +  -  Gt) (2.36)
D C
Defining — =  bp,t we can rewrite the government budget constraint as
bF,t =  bF,t- ! (1 +  ij)  V (1 +  «,*) V- ( ^ 7 ^ )  -C t (! +  i't) V> (
(2.37)
Prom agents’ intertemporal choice,
u c  (c t) =  ( i + i?)^ ( ) m U c(Ct+l) St+lPt
StPt+ii
(2.38)
We can therefore write (2.37) as
0Et U c(Ct+i)bF,tSt+lPtS,P, =  b p f - i ^ ^ V c  {Ct) +  ^ Y tUc  {Ct) -  CtUc {Ct) .
(2.39)
And the log linear representation of the above equation, defining ap = j^p ,  is
-  papCt +?F,t—1 +  ap(ARSt -  rf) (2.40)
=  - Y t +  (1 +  a)Ct -  paCt -  PH ,t +  gt 
+  fiEt —papCt+i +  bpf +  ap(ARSt+i — 7Tt+i)J .
Furthermore, if we allow Bw,t = b t - i ^ ^ i ^ U c  (Ct) and st =  ~^pf-(Yt — Gt) +  
Ct, the intertemporal government solvency condition (2.39) can be written as
oo
Bwjt = Uc (Ct) St + Et/3Bw,t+1 = Et J 2  f ^ U c  (Ct)  (2.41)
T—t
and the term Uc ( C t , € c ,t ) st can be approximated, up to the second order, by
S tB p A
Pt ) '
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UCY  {
a - Y t + (l + a ( l -  p))St ~  PH,t ~  \Y ?  +  pYtCt -  YtpH,t 
+\{ap2 +  (1 +  a)( 1 -  2p))C? +  pd tpH,t ~  \pn,t
Thus, defining Bw,t =  BWjg> Bw an<^  B w  = > we ^ave
where
B m  =  (1 -/3 ) t f y t  +  o y'tB%yyt +  y'tB l et +  f3EtBw,t+1
+i.i.p +  0(|K ||3) (2.42)
uy -1  1 +  a(l — p) - 1  0
and
-1  p - 1 0
p a(l — p)2 +  (1 — 2p) p 0
-1  p - 1 0
0 0 0 0
B i  =
0 0 0 0
0 0 - p  0
0 0 1 0  
0 0 0 0
Special Case: Note that i fp  =  0 =  l , a  =  O and 6_i =  0, the second order 
current account approximation becomes
Ct = Yt + p H ,t - 9 t -  9 tP H ,t + 9tC t , 
which combining with the demand equation implies
(2.43)
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Ct = R S t +  CJ. (2.44)
This is identical to the perfect risk sharing condition.
2 .B .3  F inancia l A utarky: th e  E xtrem e C ase o f  M arket In com plete­
ness
In this case we assume that there is no risk sharing between countries. The inability 
to trade bonds across borders impose that the value of imports equates the value of 
exports:
( l - n ) S P 'H'tC'Hit = nPF,tCF,u (2.45)
given the preference specification, we can write:
-e
CH,t =  v Ph ,
Pt
P*H,t
Cu CF,t = ( l - v ) PF,t Cu
-e
Ct > C*Ft =  (1 -  v*)
P *
F,t
t J
-e
Substituting in Equation (2.45):
Ct = PH,tR St
1 - 6
[RSt]e Ct-
(2.46)
(2.47)
(2.48)
And using the definition of the consumption indexes and market clearing, con­
dition (2.48) implies
PH,t(Yt-Gt) = PtCt . 
Assuming C = C*, the second order approximation is
(2.49)
PH,t + Yt - f f t  + Yt9t = Ct , (2.50)
and can be represented as follows:
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] T E t p  Ibpyt + \ d B f v t  + y'tB {aet] + t.i.p + 0(||£ ||3) =  0,
= - 1 1 - 1 0  ,
B p  = 0,
and
0 0 - 1 0
J5/0 ,=
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Special Case: when 0 = 1, Equation (2.50) combined with the demand equation 
becomes
2 .B .4  C om p lete  m arkets: th e  R isk  Sharing E quation
Assuming a symmetric steady-state equilibrium, the log linear approximation to the 
risk sharing Equation (2.12) is
Ct = Ct + - R S f  (2.52)
P
Given our utility function specification, Equation (2.12) gives rise to an exact 
log linear expression and therefore the first and second order approximations are 
identical. In matrix notation, we have
c ;  =  Ct +  R S t. (2.51)
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where
b* uy o - i  0 J
0 0 0 1
and
b ; = o.
B ? = 0.
2 .B .5  W elfare w ith  In com plete  A sset M arkets:
Following Benigno and Benigno (2003), the second order approximation to the utility 
function, XJt, can be written as:
00 r i rn
Ut =  Et V F~* U ( C . ) - ~  I V ( y t , t y j d j
1=1 - nJo
(2.53)
Wto =  V c C E te Y ,?  -  \y'tW vyt -  sJW.e, -
where
+ t.i.p+ 0{||£||3), (2.54)
= f ik ‘
Wy = -1 /^ (1  + a) 1 0 0
w v =
i l ia L(l+o)/x
0
0
0
0 0 0
(1-/9)  0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
and
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W ' =
0 0 0 
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Using the second order approximation to the equilibrium condition, we can elim­
inate the term w'yyt. We derive the vector Lx, such that
d y  dy fy by
Thus, the loss function can be written as
Lx = Wy.
Lto =  UcCEu, Y , ? \y'tL\Vi + VtL\et + +  t.i.p +  0 ( ||£ ||3), (2.55)
where
and
Ly   Wy +  Lx\A y  +  L x\D y  +  Lx\Fy  -f- L x \B i ,
Lle = We + L x \A e +  Lxl2De A- L x \B e,
lln = wn + Lx\an.
Given the values of ay, dy , bly, f y, defined in this Appendix, we have:
Lx\ = (1 +  a)X(li(2 — A) 4- (0 — A)) — a(l\ +  0)
1 (1 +  a)A(/2(2 -  A) -  (p +  i/)(l -  A) -  A(p -  1)) -  ah  ’
Lx  o =
(1 +  a)x(h(2  -  A) -  (p + 1})(1 -  A) -  A(p -  1)) -  a/2 ’
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Lx\ = -(A  +  (1 -  A)a)0((p + r j ) - { p -  !)(</> - ( ( f ) -  l)a))
and
3 (1 +  a)A(/2(2 -  A) -  (p + r))(l -  A) -  A(p -  1 ) ) - a l 2’
(1 +  o)A(/3(2 -  A) -  (0 -  A)) -  a(l3 -  0)Lx', =
'4 (1 +  a)X(k(2 -  A) -  (p + jj)(1 -  A) -  A{p -  1)) — a/2 ’
where (i =  Oa(p -  $(p -  1 )) + ij>(6- l),i2 =  0((p + r)) -  r)(p -  l)a), l3 =  6((p + r/(l +
a) ~ ( p ~  1)0) and (1 -  0) =  i .
We write the model just in terms of the output, real exchange rate and inflation, 
using the matrixes N  and Ne, as follows:
and
2/; =  iv[yt , r t] +  jvee*,
N  =
1
db
0 
 dra
db
0 0 0 0
0 0 1db
(l-d6)
db
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
where d ., =  ,
Equation (2.55) can therefore be expressed as
L to ^ U c C E tc Y , !?
1
2 Yu RSt VLv ' Yti R St
+ Yu RSt L*et + 2t
+ t.i.p +  0 ( ||{ ||3), (2.56)
where:
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Ly =  N 'L yN ,
V i  =  N* LyNe +  AT'Le,
yt,A St
Pyy PI,yr
Pl y r pi rr
t e
lie
L e e t
Y t i R S t
P  =ye 11 P P''ye byyi Lyg I've-
l l .  =vre P P'’rfi "rg Pi>rc*
ji _  (»/ +  !)(! - 0 )  . P 1 , ( P ( p - M b )  ,0 . A  ,
(1  — rfi) p  ( a p  +  2 ( a ( l  -  A) — A) +  (1  +  a ) - 1 ^ - 1 )
H------^— L x2 H---------------------------- 35------------------------- 1/E4,
db
(2.57)
Ijr =  4 ,  = P(1 A) * + (1 + a) ( (n  -  A)(l + a) + ap6) L Xl +  e(a A(1 A) X)Lx2 
6 6
+  ^(1 -  A)-1  A 4- Lx4 +  ((pd^1 +  rs) ^*4 -  l )
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l%rr =  72(p -  1) +  (A(l -  A) 1 -  r2p)2Lx  1 +  9db( 1 -  db)( 1 +  r2)Lx2 
+  (1 -  A)-1 A(0 -  l)L z3
+  ((A(l -  A)-1 +  r2r3)r2 +  A(1 -  A)_1(-A (l -  A)-1 +  r2p)) Lx4,
ri  _  -  (p -  1) , P {db -  p) T L x 2  (r3 +  p)LxA 
'ya <% +  d?b LX1 db db
ri — (P — 1) (1 — . p{db~p)  (1 ~ d b) (A(l +  a) -  a)Lx2 (1 -  db) (  r3\
^  = ----------- 4 -----------+— 4 -----------l b  5--------------------- i t  V + Tb) L x i
V = 0tre
f  =  0lr\i
9 { p - l ) ( o - A ( 2 - A ) ( l  +  a)) {{rx + \ ) { l  + a) -  apO) p
=  ( T ^ a k  +  o r m  { L x i+ L x i)
(A(l +  a) -  a)Lx2 ((^3 +  /s)(2 — A) + A)(l +  a) +  adr3) p Lx t 
(1 -  A)<4 (1 -  A)4  H T ’
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and
f 9 (p -  1) (A(l +  a) -  a)((l -  A)-1 +  db) ((ri +  A)(l +  a) -  apQ) (A(l +  a) -  a)Lxi
4  ( l -A )d ?
, 0(A(1 +  a) -  a)Lx2 (A(l + a) -  a) , j .
+  ( T ^ x j d b—  + ------- 7b ^ A(1_A) + r ^ ) Lx^
where r\ =  A(2 — A){p9 — 1), r2 = £>((1~dfc) ^ 1~A)— and r3 = (1 +  p2)a +  1 — 2p
2 .B .6  O ptim al P la n  w ith  In com plete A sse t M arkets:
The optimal plan consists of minimizing (2.14) subject to equations in Table 4. 
Therefore, the first order conditions with respect to 7rt ,Y t ,R S t ,C t , and bp,t are:
4  n?  + Atplit = 0, (2.58)
0 =  llyyYt +  I'yrRSt ^  ^  ^  ^  ,f “  ^ 4|t>
0 = llyrYt + llrrR S t + rreet - - drsV2,t + V>3,t ~ P
A
+  (2 _  a^ 4,t -  a/jA^4it +  a ^ A ^ t ^ + j , (2.59)
0 = -pfc(l + a)y»1|t - (1 + a)(l - A)ip2tt -  fxp3tt + pfi V3|t_i + (1 + a)y?4jt + papA ip^,
(2.60)
and
£tAy?4)t+1 =  P~l 6^iyt. (2.61)
The case of no intermediation costs:
When <5 = 0, the first order conditions can be written as
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0* Et A(Ym  -  y £ j)  +  Q*».E(A(ftS1+1 -  R s l £ )  +  =  0, (2.62)
with
Qy — iyr +  (dr3 +  (1 +  a)(l — A )p l ) l y y 1
Qrs — Irr +  i^rs +  (1 +  a)(l — A )p 1)llyr,
Qn = k [(1 +  a){P + ^(1 — typ *) +  V^rs +  A(1 — A) *] lln,
p c T,i _  z h ± ?
* ~  Qi u
and
O T , t  _  ~ ( d r s  +  ( 1  +  a ) ( l  -  t y P  1 ) ^ e ^
^  _  Wy ^
Special Case: Incom plete markets, sym m etric steady state, no trade 
imbalances and specific level of steady-state output
In the case we have
1. /z =  1/(1 -  A)
2. p = e = i
3. a =  0
In this case, the first order conditions can be written as:
0 = fe+ i;r( l-A ))A yt+((l-A)i^.+(jr)Afl5( + (i’e+ 4 ( l-A ))A e (+fc(77+l)4ffff 
(2.63)
Moreover:
L x i =  0; Lx 2 — —1; Lx3 =  —1; and L x4 =  2 — A.
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And therefore:
l y y  +  Zyr(l ~ -A) =  +  1)(1 — A)
(1 “f" l y r  — 0
lit — (1 X)a/k
(lye ^re(l ^)) — -r/(l — A) 0 —(1 — A) 0
Hence, the targeting rule can be written as
(2.64)
In addition, using Equation (2.43), we can write the Phillips Curve as follows:
= k (fo +  W  -  V£Yt ~ 9 t + £ t) +  0Et9t+i. (2.65)
By inspection of Equation (2.64) and (2.65), we can see that domestic inflation 
target is the optimal plan if there are no mark-up shocks, fit .
2 .B .7  W elfare under F inancia l A utarky
Using an analogous derivation for welfare, but substituting the matrices b ly, B ly  and 
B le  for b y a , B y a  and f?/°, the loss function under financial autarky has the following 
weights13:
l(iy — (v +  1)(1 -4>) + P d2
+  { P( P^ db) + v { 2 + n ) )  L x ' a +
&  =  #  =  P(1 J r '  ( (n  -  A)(l +  o) +  ap0) Lx{a
+  4  Lx> ~ j b'
13 Note that for the derivation of wefare under Complete Market and Financial autarky, we assume 
o  =  0.
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1% = T\{p -  1) +  (A(l -  A ) '1 -  r2p)2Lx{a +  0db( 1 -  db)( 1 +  r2)Lxf2a 
+  (1 -  A)_1A(0 -  1 )Lx{a,
iit“ = ^ ( ( l - «  + (r, + l)Lx{“) ,
lle =  -»/(1 -  0) -  vin +
=  (v + l )Lx(a:
, a _  (Lx2( l - A )  +  pLx{°)
«  db
,f a _ - ( p - l ) ( l - d b) p(db — p) (1 -  4 )  r _/o  (A(l +  o) — a)Lx2° 
4  4  db LXl db
=  o.
=  o.
,/a _  (r2 +  A)Z,x{“
4ra i9 >g j2
b
.fa _  6 ( p -  1) (-Ml +  <*) — “)((1 -  A) 1 +  di) ((ri +  A)(l +  a) -  apff) (A(l +  a) -  a)Lx{“
4  ( 1 - A ) 4
d(A(l +  a) — a)Lx^a
(1 -  A)db
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and
with
and
j/a =  (■Lxf2a( l - \ )  + ( - r 2 - \  + p)Lx{a)
yc db
/ o _  A (/f ° (2 -A )  +  ( 0 - A ) )L x f  =
1 A(i|“(2 -  A) -  (p + V)(l  -  A) -  X(p -  1)) ’
Lx fa = - H ( p  +  v) -  HP -  1))
\ ( t ( 2  -  A) -  (p + V) ( 1 -  A) -  A(p -  1)) ’
L x fa = _______ ~Afl((l + ri) — {p — _______
3 A(i|“(2 -  A) -  (p +  » ,) ( ! -  A) -  A(p -  1)) ’
Lx fa a(/3/o( 2 - A ) - ( ^ - A ) )
A ( i J ° ( 2 - A ) - ( p  +  »?) ( l - A ) - A ( p - l ) )  
where l{a = (f>(0 — =  0((P +  V) and 3^° =  &((P +  *7 — (P ~  1)0)-
2 .B .8  O p tim al P la n  under F inancial A utarky
We can write the system of equations given in Table 2 in terms of Yt and RSt  as 
follows:
{iv  +  P)Yt ~ { p ~  1)A(1 -  A) 1R S t + pt -  rj£Y,t) -I- pEtir*+i, (2.66)
and
?t =  « 5 t 7 ^ |  +  C't* +  A-1gi. (2.67)
The policymaker minimizes the loss function subject to the problem (2.66) and 
(2.67). Given that the multipliers associated with (2.66) and (2.67) are, respectively, 
(Pi and (f2 > the first order conditions with respect to 7^,1* and RSt are given by:
(2 .68)
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V2 ,t -  to +  p)v>i,t =  + ig R S t  + Ig e ,, (2.69)
and
-(1  +  y  (1 -  A )-V 2ll +  (p -  1)A(1 -  A )-V x.t =  l& Y , + ig R S t  + Iget. (2.70)
The last 3 equations can be combined, giving rise to the following targeting rule
QlaA(Yt -  y,r '/o) +  Q f.A(flS, -  R s f ' ,a) + Q { ^  =  0, (2.71)
where
<3»“ = ( C + i# ( i - A)(i + y ~ i )>
Qla =  ( ( i  -  a ) ( i  +  y  _1i £  +  <#)>
Q l‘ =  k((n +  p) -  (p -  i)A ( i  -  A)(i +
?T,fa =  (Q/ 0)- l  _
and
A s f ” =  ( Q r 'T ^ e U  -  A)(l +
Special Case: when p = 1/(1 — A) and p = 0 = 1, the targeting rule is identical 
to (2.64). Also, in the less restrictive case that only 0 = 1, the targeting rule would 
be given by
0 = A (yt -  ?,FUx) + (2.72)
where YtFlex = (jj+fiZYt +  In other words, producer price stability consists
the optimal plan under the assumptions of p = 1/(1 — A) and 0 = 1, regardless of
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the value of p.
2 .B .9  W elfare w ith  C om plete  M arkets
The welfare and optimal policy derivation under complete markets are presented in 
the first Chapter. However, to use the same notation as in the other asset market 
structures, we present the solution under this alternative notation. Therefore, 
following the derivation in the previous Chapter, the loss function with complete 
markets can be written as
4, = U c C E t 'Y ,?  
+«.i.P + o ( i m
\ l Cw ( Y t - Y tT’c)2 + - l crr(R St - R S ;T >c \2  , 1 ;c 2) +  o W t  )
(2.73)
where:
Kv — C7/ +  /3)(i - 4 )  +
+ Lx  f fa +  p) +  r/fa +  1) -
U + *c)
P{P ~  1)
Lx${l -  \ ) 2\{pd -  1)
(1 +  /c)
(A +  Zc) ( p - 1 )
(1 -  A)p2 
L x\lc(p -  1 -  lc)
+ (1 -  A)2p
Lxc2\{p6 -  1) \p0{ 1 -  A) +  A +  lc]
+ p2
Lx% [1 +  A2 (2 — A)] \(6  -  1)
+  l ^ A  ’
l^ = Vk + {l + n)ak L x l '
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and
where
i f ' C =  fvet,
qZ = 2 +  ^ ( 1  +  , ) ,  - L x \ ( \  + rj) (p-1)(i - y +^ S o
1
Qr s
n  n { p - l - l c)Lx$ , L * § A (A (l-A )+ l)O tf-l)  - L x l A (l-A )(p 0 -1 )  
$ R S  °  ( 1 - A )  * + — *-----------------------------     p 
l ^ = ( P + !,) + i ^ + ( i - x ) - ^ '
L x°2 =  f c + q) +  i°i, " (1 ~  A)) +  (1 “  A)(,? +  ’
Lx* =  Cp + v) + icv ^  ~ 1)(1 _  A)m_1 ~ {n9 + ^  ’
and 1° — (p0 — 1)A(2 — A).
2 .B .1 0  O ptim al P lan  w ith  C om plete M arkets
The optimal plan consists of minimizing the loss function subject to
=  k (pYt +  (1 -  Ay ' R S t  +  \it -  T}£Y,t +  + PEf i t +i ,
and
Yt = RSt {l +lcl +9t + c ; .  p( 1 -  A)
The multipliers associated with (2.75) and (2.76) are, respectively, (pl and (p2 
first order conditions with respect to 7r^ ,Y t  and RSt are, therefore, given by
(2.74)
(2.75)
(2.76) 
. The
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=  (2-77)
n t - W i  ,t = lcvy(Yt - Y ? ) t (2.78)
and
-<P2,t -  -  ^ ) -  (2*79)
To obtain a targeting rule for the small open economy, we combine equations (2.77), 
(2.78), and (2.79):
QcaA(Y, -  Y?*) +  Qr„A(RSt -  R s f ' c) + Q%5?? =  0, (2.80)
where
QCy = ( l + n i Cyy,
=  p( 1 -  A);»r ,
and
q j  =  (p +I7(i  +  0 « .
Special Case: when p = 1/(1 — A) and p = 9 = 1, the targeting rule is identical 
to (2.64). This confirms that, under these circumstances, the asset market structure 
is irrelevant for monetary policy.
2.C A ppendix: R andom ization P roblem  - th e Financial 
A utarky Case
To ensure that the policy obtained from the minimization of the loss function is 
indeed the best available policy, we should confirm that no other random policy plan 
can be welfare improving. In the first Chapter, we analyse the case of complete
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markets. We present the conditions under which no random policy can enhance 
welfare. As shown in Woodford and Benigno (2003), these conditions coincide with 
the second order condition for the linear quadratic optimization problem. In the 
present Section, we study the case of financial autarky.
Following the same steps as in Section l.D, we characterize the relationship 
between inflation and output and inflation and the real exchange rate. Equation 
(AS) combined with Equation (FA) leads to the following expression:
~H = k ( (,? +  p)dl~ (p~ 1)Art + f t  +  I)£y,() +  PEt*t+i, (2-81) 
where d\ = (9 — 1)(1 — A) — A9. Alternatively,
= k ( fa + p ) r f i - f c - l ) A + ^  + + (2 g2)
A random sunspot realization that adds cpjVj  to 7u + j ,  will, therefore, add a contri­
bution of otyk~l {ipj — fi<Pj+i)vj to Yt and arak~l {<pj — /3<Pj+i)vj to RSt, where
fa = (7? +  p ) d i - ( p - l ) A  
(1 -  A) (2.83)
and
fa _  (y? +  p)di - { p -  1)A 
di
Oty (2.84)
To obtain what is the contribution to the loss function of the realization (pjVj 
to 7Tt+j, we rewrite the loss function as follows. Noticing that (dr3A-1 — 1 )RSt = 
Yt +  t.i.p, the loss function under financial autarky can be written as
Lu, = U c C E t tY ,?
WvZ + (dr.A-1 - 1 r ' & W t  -  r tT):
, - 1 ,fa 1 ;/a-r2
+  t.i.p, 
(2.85)
where
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Yt = l‘ye t,
If =
(itS  +  (c lr ,* -1 ~  I ) " 1# )
j f a  j f a  j f a  j f a
•>ye I'y^ <'yg i>y c +
R S t — lrSet>
and
If, = 1 j f a  j f a  j f a  j f ai r e  i r j i  i r g  l r c *
” (itS + ~  1 )& )
Consequently, the contribution to the loss function of a random realization in ipjVj
is
V c C p o l E t ^ l ?  [ i ’ ak - \ Vj -  +  l ^ i - P j f ]  , (2 .86)
where
* Y = ( i t S  + (d' ‘x ~1 - 1)~1i£)<
and
* &  = (l,rra + (drsX -1 - l ) l l ; ) .
It follows that policy randomization cannot improve welfare if the expression given 
by Equation (2.86) is positive definite. Hence, the first order conditions to the 
minimization problem are indeed a policy optimal if and l la are not both equal 
to zero and either: (a) > 0 and +  (1 — f31^ 2)2k~2l la > 0, or (b) < 0 and
+  (1 -  Pl/2)2k2l la > 0 holds.
Chapter 3
O ptim al M onetary and Fiscal 
Policy for a Sm all Open  
Econom y
3.1 Introduction
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis suggest that international aspects of an economy, 
such as the trade balance and international financial markets, can affect the policy 
prescription considerably. In particular, these factors dictate whether or not there 
are policy incentives to affect the exchange rate. When these incentives exist, 
monetary policy deviates from price stability. But can fiscal, rather than monetary 
policy be used strategically in an open economy? This Chapter addresses this 
particular issue by incorporating distortionary taxation into the framework presented 
in Chapter 1. Whenj>rices are perfectly flexible, our results show Jhat,,-Contrary 
to the closed economy case, thg.Qptimal tax rate is time varying jn  a small open 
economy. Moreover, it demonstrates that the introduction of price stickiness reduces 
the optimal variability of both taxes and inflation.
The small open economy characterization closely follows the one presented in 
Chapter 1. We assume that there are no trade frictions (i.e. the law of one price
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holds) and that capital markets are perfect (i.e. asset markets are complete). On 
the other hand, following recent contributions by Benigno and Woodford (2003), 
Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe (2001) and Siu (2001), we allow for distortionary income 
taxation.
To highlight the open economy dimension of the fiscal policy problem, our analy­
sis focuses initially on the case of flexible prices. Indeed, in this structure, there are 
two policy incentives: reducing the inefficiency caused by movement in distortionary 
taxation; and strategically managing the real exchange rate. In a closed economy 
framework, it is optimal to perfectly smooth taxes so as to avoid distortions in 
households’ marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. In an 
open economy, however, varying the level of proportional taxes may improve welfare 
by affecting the overall level of consumption utility and production disutility. For 
example, higher income taxes can lower domestic disutility of production without 
a corresponding decline in the utility of consumption. This is possible because a 
higher level of taxation reduces the depreciation in the reaj^exchange rate, allow­
ing domestic agents to switch consumption towards foreign produced goods.1 Note 
that, in a closed economy, this mechanism is absent because a fall in the disutility 
of domestic production would be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the 
utility of consumption.
The denomination of government debt does not alter the key mechanism de­
scribed above, but it is important in determining the dynamic properties of our 
variables of interest. If public debt is indexed to consumer price inflation, and 
therefore yields real returns, taxes are nonstationary. On the other hand, if infla­
tion can affect the level of real debt, taxes will follow a stationary process.
Once we allow for sticky prices, a further distortion is added to the economy, 
namely the inefficiency in the allocation of resources caused by positive domestic 
producer inflation (as in Woodford (2003)). Also, under sticky prices, both infla­
tion and taxes affect the agent’s consumption-leisure decision. Like income taxes, 
domestic producer inflation can also be used in a strategic way to affect the terms of
'This fact depends on the specified values for the structural parameter (in particular the elas­
ticities of intertemporal and intratemporal substitution).
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trade and the overall level of utility. Consequently, the introduction of price rigidity 
reduces the variability of taxes because, in this case, domestic producer inflation is 
strategically used to affect the exchange rate.
The quantitative results suggest that the cost of inflation overshadows the ineffi­
ciency caused by varying distortionary taxation and, therefore, changes in domestic 
producer inflation are quantitatively small. Note that this result holds even in a 
model with real bonds and is a consequence of the conflict between price stability 
and the incentive to affect strategically the real exchange rate. This is differ­
ent, however, from the trade-off (emphasized by the Benigno and Woodford (2003), 
Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe (2001) and Siu (2001)) between price stability and the use 
of inflation as insurance that arises only in models in which the government issues 
nominal bonds.
From a methodological point of view, our analysis follows the technique devel­
oped in Benigno and Woodford (2003). Specifically, we propose a linear quadratic 
approach to the optimal policy problem. The present work encompasses, as special 
cases, the closed economy framework (Benigno and Woodford (2003)) and the small 
open economy case in which there are endogenous lump sum taxes (De Paoli (2004)). 
Under price flexibility, our loss function is quadratic in the output and real exchange 
rate gaps. With price rigidities, the variability of inflation also affects welfare.
The linear quadratic approach allows us to derive simple policy rules that pre­
scribe the optimal state-contingent responses to shocks. We do so by specifying 
targeting rules as in Svensson (2003). In particular, the optimal plan is composed 
of two rules: one that specifies targeting a linear combination of domestic producer 
inflation, domestic output growth and changes in the real exchange rate; the other 
seeking to stabilize expected producer inflation at zero.
3 .1 .1  R ela ted  literatu re
Following the work of Ramsey (1927), the traditional optimal taxation literature 
has focused on closed economy frameworks. These studies have examined how 
distortionary taxes should respond fiscal shocks. Lucas and Stokey (1983) have
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shown that, in an environment in which the government can issue state-contingent 
debt, it is optimal to smooth taxes, and the resulting tax variance is small relative to 
fiscal shocks. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) extend the analysis to economies 
with risk-free debt and show that, in this environment, it is optimal to use state- 
contingent inflation to absorb the fiscal shock.
Recent contributions to the optimal taxation literature (Correia, Nicolini and 
Teles (2003), Schmitt-Groh§ and Uribe (2004), Siu (2004) and Benigno and Wood­
ford (2003)) incorporate monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidity into 
the analysis. Correia et al. (2003) assume that state-continent bonds are avail­
able and determine the conditions in which inflation is irrelevant to the optimal 
plan. Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe (2004), Siu (2004) and Benigno and Woodford
(2003) consider an economy in which there is no state-contingent debt and show 
that optimal inflation volatility is close to zero, even for a small degree of price 
rigidity.
Our work is related to some recent contributions that have analysed the in­
teraction of monetary and fiscal policy in open economies. Beetsma and Jensen 
(2005) analyse monetary and fiscal policy interaction in a two-country monetary 
union model. The authors assume that per capita public spending delivers utility 
to the consumer and that taxes are lump sum. Similar fiscal policy assumptions are 
adopted in Galf and Monacelli (2005b), who consider a continuum of small economies 
in a currency union setting. Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) investigate the costs 
and benefits from fiscal cooperation in a two-period version of Beetsma and Jensen
(2004).
Ferrero (2005) lays out a currency union model in which lump sum taxes are not 
available to fiscal authorities. The paper analyses the optimal fiscal and monetary 
plan under commitment. In another interesting paper, Adao, Correia and Teles
(2005) examine the implications of the choice of exchange rate regimes for fiscal 
policy. The authors find that the assumption of lack of labor mobility is crucial in 
establishing that the choice of exchange rate regime is irrelevant.
We aim to contribute to this vast literature by characterizing an integrated frame-
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work for fiscal and monetary policy in a small open economy under alternative as­
sumptions regarding inefficiencies created by the policy instruments.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes 
the structure of the model. Section 3.3 presents the log-linear version of the model. 
Section 3.4 discusses the policy problem while the analysis of the optimal policy plan 
is conducted in Section 3.5. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 T he M odel
We lay out a two-country dynamic general equilibrium framework, which follows 
closely the one presented in Chapter 1. We consider a very simple small open 
economy model in which markets are complete and producer currency pricing holds. 
As in the previous chapters, the goods markets are characterized by monopolistic 
competition and the price setting follows Calvo (1983). However, in this Chapter, 
fiscal policy is endogenous. In particular, we assume that production taxation is 
chosen optimally.
H ousehold B ehavior
There is a measure n of agents in our small open economy, who have a utility 
function of the same form:
OO
U, = Et J 2  F - '  [U(C.) -  V(ys(h), ey,.)]. (3.1)
S=t
Households obtain utility from consumption U (C ) and contribute to the production 
of a differentiated good y(h), attaining disutility V(y(ti),£Y,)- Productivity shocks 
are denoted by £yiS.
As in Chapter 1, we assume that markets are complete domestically and interna­
tionally. This assumption implies that the marginal utilities of income are equalized 
across countries at all times and in all states of nature:
Uc (g,Vi) p;  Uc (Ct+i) St+iPt 
Uc (Ct)  Pt*+1 Uc (Ct) StPt+i
(3.2)
The preference specification for home and foreign goods is identical to that de­
scribed in Chapter 1. The demand conditions in the small open economy and the 
rest of the world can therefore also be represented by the following equations:
y f W  =
Vt(f )  =
’Pt(h)' - „ r PH,t -G
. Pn,t . I [ Pt \
( l - A ) C t +  A RSt
-e
M f )
Pp,t
{C* +  Gj’} .
+  Gt j ,  (3.3) 
(3.4)
Price Setting
Following Calvo (1983), in each period a fraction, a  6 [0,1), of randomly picked 
firms is not allowed to change the nominal price of the good it produces. The 
remaining fraction of firms, (1 — a), chooses prices optimally by maximizing the 
expected discounted value of profits. Therefore, the optimal choice of producers 
that can set their price pt(j) at time T  is therefore
Pt(j) Ph ,t  o-mcrVy (yt,r(j), £y ,t )
.Ph ,t  Pt  (1 ~  t t )(c -  1)Uc(Ct )
=  0 . 
(3.5)
Monopolistic competition in production leads to a wedge between marginal utility 
of consumption and marginal disutility of production, represented by .
Movements in the tax rate, t*, affect this wedge and generate distortions in agents’ 
choices between consumption and labour. However, changes in the tax rate are no 
longer exogenous, which is different from the case studied in the previous chapters. 
We allow for exogenous fluctuations in this wedge by assuming a time-varying mark­
up shock fnbt ?
Thus, the price index evolves according to the following law of motion:
(Pff,*)1" 7 =  +  ( ! - “ ) iptih))1-'’ . (3.6)
2 This mark-up shock is introduced in order to allow for the evaluation of pure cost-push shocks. 
It can be interpreted as a shock to the level of monopolistic power of firms. Alternatively, it may be 
thought as a shock to wage mark-up in an environment where the labour market is also characterized 
by imperfect competition and there is a set of differentiated labour inputs.
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G overnm ent B udget C onstrain t
We consider two alternative specifications for government debt. In particular, 
we consider the cases in which the government issues bonds denominated in domestic
currency and in which public debt is denoted in real Jprms(or,  equivalently, debt_ 
is indexed to consumer price inflation). The structure of debt denomination is 
exogenously given. We also abstract from the existence of seigniorage revenues.
In the first case, we focus on the situation in which the government issues one- 
period nominal risk-free bonds expressed in local currency units, collects taxes and 
faces exogenous expenditure streams. The law of motion of government debt, 
expressed in nominal terms, is
Dn = ££ -!(! +  i t - 1) -  PH,tsu  (3.7)
where st is the real primary budget surplus
st * T tY j ) - G t - T r u
and Gt and TV* are exogenously given government purchases and (lump-sum) gov­
ernment transfers, respectively, and r* denotes the income tax rate.
In addition to the case of nominal bonds, we consider the case in which the 
government issues riskless real one-period bonds D[. Under this specification, the 
government budget constraint can be written as
D \=  0 ^ ,( 1  +  rt- i ) - ^ st. (3.8)
The implication for fiscal and monetary policy of the different debt characterizations 
are explored later in the text.
Note that, expressions analogous to (3.5), (3.7) and (3.8) can also be derived for 
the foreign economy.
t4oU /" S o lOH ?
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3.3 A  Log-linear R epresentation  o f th e  M odel
As in the previous chapters, we approximate the model around the steady state 
(details are in the Appendix). The log-linear system of equilibrium conditions for 
the small open economy is given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: System of Log-linear Equilibrium Conditions
Phillips Curve
7rf =  k (pd t + r]Yt -  pH + met + u?t -  rfey,^ +  PEtn?+ 1  
Demand
Yt = -e p H +  (1  -  A )C +  A C * +  ex RSt + gt
Risk Sharing Condition
Ct = Ct + iR St
Government Budget Constraint
dt — dsa( 1 — p ) (—pCt — jz^ R S t)  +  t(t£  +  Yt) — gt +  f$Etdt+i
    — —   >
Price Index
(1 -  \)pH + XRS =  0
•w here  d t = d t - i —daa(a A R S t+ b T f^ )—pdaaC t
The first equation is derived from the price setting condition (3.5) and represents
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the small open economy Phillips Curve.3 The demand equation is derived from log- 
linearizing condition (3.3) and the price index equation is derived from the linearized 
condition (1.6) of Chapter 1. The government budget constraint is represented in 
a compact form to allow for different types of bonds. We specify a =  A /(l — A) 
and 6 = 1  for the case of nominal bonds, and a = b = 0 for the case of real bonds.4 
Note that, in the case of zero steady-state government debt, the denomination of 
government debt is irrelevant for the dynamics of the small open economy. In this 
case, the government budget constraint becomes
dt- i  = r(?t +  Yt) - g t  + pdt . (3.9)
The system of structural equilibrium conditions is closed by specifying monetary 
and fiscal policy rules. Given the domestic exogenous variables £y,t,<7t, roc* and the 
external shock Ct*, we can determine the dynamics of Yt, R S t , Ct, ^ , dt and PH,t- 
Foreign dynamics are governed by the foreign Phillips curve, demand condition 
and government budget constraint:
3We denote pH,t = \n(PH,t/P t), =  \a{PH,t/P H ,t-1), 9t =  and dt =  p represents 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion and rj the inverse of the elasticity of goods production. Also, 
we define k  =  , <*> — yr? and daa =  ^ . See the Appendix for a detailed derivation of the
the approximations.
4To obtain the value of the interest rates in equations (3.7) and (3 .8) we use households’ in­
tertemporal choice (i.e. the Euler equation). See the Appendix for a detailed derivation.
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Table 3.2: Foreign System of Log-linear Equilibrium Conditions
Phillips Curve
Tt = k {pd; +  r)Yt* + U)?*t +  fit -  7iey^j + PErft+i
Demand
Yt’ = C '+ M
Government Budget Constraint f >\  I t
d* =  - p d „ ( i  -  0)<5? +  r * ( f ; +  ? , * ) - &  +  /3£td;+1
•w here d*=d*_ 1 - d ^ ^ - p d * aC*
The specification of the foreign policy rules completes the system of equilibrium 
conditions that determine the evolution of Yt*, C*, dt, r* and 7r*. Note that the 
dynamics of the rest of the world are not affected by Home variables. Therefore, 
the small open economy can treat Ct as an exogenous shock. Neither the policy 
choice of the rest of the world, nor the denomination of foreign public debt, can 
influence how C* affects the small open economy.
3.4 Welfare M easure
The policy objective for the small open economy is given by the expected utility of 
the agents belonging to the economy:
W  =  Eto I E  -  -  r
[t=t0 I n JO
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We assume that policymakers can commit to maximize this objective function and 
that they are committed to past promises following a timeless perspective commit­
ment (as in Woodford (2003, Ch.7)).
We derive a second order approximation to the policy objective around the steady 
state in the Appendix. The second order Taylor expansion of the utility function 
can be written as:
W t o  =  U c C E t ,
1 (*7+1) ( y - _  _ rH \2T r ( Yt ~  ^+iy^y,t)2 ~  2^  {*?)
+  t.i.p +  0 ( ||£ ||3), 
(3.10)
where the term t.i.p stands for terms independent of policy (i.e. constants or func­
tions of exogenous shocks that are not affected by the policy choice). The term 
0 ( ||£ ||3) refers to terms of order strictly higher than two. And the parameter p  
denotes the steady-state degree of monopolistic distortion, (i.e. p  =
To eliminate the discounted linear terms that appear in the Taylor approxi­
mation, we follow the method developed by Benigno and Woodford (2003) and 
Sutherland (2002). We use a second order approximation to some of the structural 
equilibrium conditions to obtain a complete second order solution for the evolution 
of the endogenous variables of interest. It follows that the loss function for our 
small open economy can be expressed as a quadratic function of Y t ,  R S t ,  and
L l  =  U c C E t 0 £ / 3 ‘ + t.i.p +  0 (11^ | |3) (3.11)
where fs t  — (RSt — R S t ), yt = {Yt ~  ^ t ) .  The target variables and R St are 
functions of the various exogenous shocks, and the weights 4>y, $ r s  and depend 
on the structural parameters of the model (these are defined in the Appendix).
Equation (3.11) indicates that policymakers should seek to minimize both the 
discounted value of a weighted sum of squared deviations of inflation from zero and 
the squared fluctuations in the output and real exchange rate gap. As in Chapter 1,
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the open economy dimension of the model gives rise to a real exchange rate term as 
a policy objective. The only case in which there is no concern for the real exchange 
rate in the policy objective function is the special parametric case in which pO = 1 
and d3a(p — (1 — A)-1) =  0. This is consistent with the results of Chapter 1 and 
Galf and Monacelli (2005), where there is no fiscal stabilization problem. Galf and 
Monacelli (2005) find that, when p = 9 = 1 and p = (1 —  A)-1 , the small open 
economy is isomorphic to a closed economy, and a producer price inflation target is 
optimal. <Q_x{ 4  M?
By inspection of the weights ^ v ^ y ,  and $ r s  in the Appendix, we can analyse 
what determines welfare losses in the small open economy. Our small open economy 
is characterized by three frictions that are common to the closed economy frame­
work: (a) monopolistic competition with an inefficient output level; (b) the staggered 
price setting mechanism that creates dispersion of output across the differentiated 
goods; and (c) distortionary income taxation that generates inefficiencies in agents’ 
labour/leisure decisions. Therefore, factors such as the degree of monopolistic com­
petition p, the degree of price stickiness a, and the steady-state level of government 
taxes r  are important determinants of the weights 4^ and 4>y in the loss function.
In an open economy, however, another policy incentive arises. As first empha­
sized by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), "In an open economy there exists an economic 
distortion that is directly associated with openness, namely, a country’s power to af­
fect its terms of trade by influencing the supply of labour product. [...] the improved 
terms of trade allow domestic agent to finance higher consumption for any given 
level of labour effort. "
In our framework, there is a similar incentive because policymakers may wish 
to increase the unconditional mean consumption for a given level of domestic pro­
duction (or alternatively, decrease the unconditional mean of output without an 
equivalent fall in the unconditional mean of consumption). Equation (3.10) il­
lustrates analytically the above argument. It shows that welfare in a small open 
economy is affected by the unconditional means of consumption and output, and 
those are directly affected by the real exchange rate. _ In particular, if we abstract
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from the steady-state monopolistic distortion,5 the term E[Ct — can be rewritten 
as a function of E[(l — p9)RSt\. That is, the unconditional mean of the real ex­
change rate has a direct impact on the small open economy’s welfare. Hence, there 
exists a “real exchange rate” externality (see Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Benigno 
and Benigno (2003) and Arseneau (2004), amongst others).
Following the linear quadratic approach, we express the unconditional means 
present in the Taylor expansion (3.10) in terms of the variance of the endogenous 
variables. This delivers a simple representation of the loss function and allows for 
a derivation of the optimal plan that is time invariant (and therefore abstracts from 
time-inconsistent problem). As derived in the Appendix, the term E[Ct — can 
be written as a function of the real exchange rate, output and inflation variability. 
That is, there is an incentive to affect the variance of the real exchange rate. In the 
present framework, both taxes (if distortionary) and inflation (in the case of sticky 
prices) can affect those variances by influencing the supply of domestic goods.
3.5 O ptim al P olicy
In this Section, we analyse optimal monetary policy under different specifications of 
the model. We start by characterizing the case of flexible prices and later turn to the 
case of sticky prices. Throughout the analysis, we explore the implications of having 
a non-zero steady-state level of government debt. This implies that inflation has 
direct fiscal consequences; i.e. it affects the real value of government debt. Under 
these alternative environments, we first explore the international dimension of fiscal 
policy. We do so by comparing the optimal plan for the small open economy with 
a closed economy.6
The quantitative analysis of the optimal policy is presented in this Section. In 
particular, we illustrate the optimal response to productivity shocks under the dif­
ferent scenarios. The parameter values used in the numerical exercise are shown 
in Table 3.3. Note that the incentive to affect the inefficient level of output given
5 As shown in the first chapter, this can be done by setting /x =  (1 — A)-1 .
6 More specifically, we contrast the general optimal policy prescription with the case in which 
the small open economy is isomorphic to the closed economy (as alluded to above).
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Table 3.3: Parameter Values used in the Quantitative Analysis
P a ram e te r Value N otes:
P 0.99 Specifying a quarterly model
V 0.47 Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
e 3 Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) (unless specified otherwise)
A 0.4 This implies a 40% import share of the GDP
p 0.157 Specifying a Log utility function
a 0.66 Characterizing an average length of price contract of 3 quarters
a 10 Following Benigno and Woodford (2003)
das 2.4 steady-state debt to GDP of 60% (unless specified otherwise)
T 0.2 steady-state taxes of 20% of GDP
by monopolistic competition is ruled out in the quantitative analysis. This is done 
by assuming a specific level of steady-state mark-up (/Lt =  (1 — A)-1 ) that ensures 
efficiency in the steady-state level of output in the small economy. We impose this 
restriction in order to concentrate on the roles of distortionary taxation, sticky prices 
and the terms of trade externality.
3 .5 .1  T h e C ase o f  F lex ib le  P rices
In this Section, we start by considering the case in which prices are perfectly flexible 
(that is, a = 0). Our objective is to understand the open economy dimension of the 
optimal (fiscal) problem. The assumption that a  =  0 implies that — 0. The 
loss function for our small open economy becomes
min UcCEu, Y , P -2 1*  - 2  2 *YVt +  2 TrSt +  t.i.p +  0 ( ||£ ||3). (3.12)
When prices are perfectly flexible, domestic producer inflation is not costly and, 
hence, it does not appear in the objective function. In this environment, policy­
makers have the following policy incentives: (1) minimizing distortions created by 
distortionary taxation; (2) reducing inefficiencies in the steady-state level of output 
(implied by monopolistic competition); and (3) strategically managing the terms of 
trade. By using the relationship between distortionary taxes and output dictated 
by the Phillips curve, it is possible to rewrite the objective function (3.12) as
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min U c C E to ^ P 1 - r j ' ) 2 + )^>Trs2t +  t.i.p +  0 ( ||£ ||3),
where <3>r =  — + ^ ^ - 1  $y . The constraints of the policy problem are given by 
the equilibrium conditions presented in Table 3.1 (under the assumption that a  =  0 
and, thus, A;-1 =  0). We define <pt as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the 
government budget constraint. In other words, <pt represents the marginal value,
As shown in the Appendix, the optimal plan can be summarized by the following 
conditions:
where mo is defined in the Appendix. The above equations represent the small 
open economy optimal plan under price flexibility. As shown in the Appendix,
ensure that the first order conditions to the problem are time invariant. This 
method follows Woodford’s (1999) timeless perspective approach and ensures that 
the policy prescription does not constitute a time inconsistent problem.
Next, we analyse if these conditions deliver a determinate equilibrium for all the 
endogenous variables. Also, we assess under what circumstances the variables of 
interest for our small open economy inherit the stochastic properties of the exogenous 
shocks.
The Case of Nom inal Government D ebt
measured in utility terms, of one unit of the government revenue in any given period.
(3.13)
-b d ,s(<pt -  ipt_ i) =  0, (3.14)
and
E m + i = vu (3.15)
we impose further constraints, associated with initial conditions 7Tf0 and R St0, to
When inflation influences the burden of government debt (i.e. when dS3 ^  0 and
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6 ^ 0 ) ,  the optimal plan can be summarized by
(3.16)
or, alternatively,
$Trst +  "A *r(?t -  r D  =  0. p( 1 -  A) (3.17)
Also, in this case, <pt is time-invariant. The above equation can be interpreted 
as the small open economy targeting rule a la Gianonni and Woodford (2003) and
the output gap and the real exchange rate gap.
In this case, the evolution of expected producer inflation and government debt 
are indeterminate; we can only determine the evolution of real debt. This can be 
verified by inspection of the government budget constraint.
T he Case in which th e  G overnm ent Solvency C ondition is Independen t 
of Inflation
When the government only issues real debt (i.e. b = 0), or the steady-state debt 
is zero (i.e. ds3 = 0), inflation does not affect the government budget constraint. 
Furthermore, under flexible prices, the system of equilibrium conditions specified in 
Table 3.1 is completely independent of domestic inflation. In other words, producer 
price inflation is indeterminate.
By combining equations (3.13) and (3.15) we obtain the following expression:
In this case, the optimal plan entails stabilizing expected movements in the output
Indeed, the equilibrium dynamics of the small open economy under the optimal plan 
are not determined by this equation together with the other expressions in Table 
3.1.7 Rather, Equation (3.18) is simply an equilibrium condition implied by the
Svensson (2003). The optimal plan prescribes stabilizing a linear combination of
$ TEt A rst+i + $yEtAyt+ l =  0.
U '^hccf etc you. nUCVK 1  
(3.18)
and real exchange rate gaps. Note that the above equation i's not a targeting rule
7The determinancy conditions are checked numerically using the algorithm of King and Watson
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optimal plan - it does not represent a policy rule that policymakers should follow.
In contrast to the case in which inflation affects the government budget con­
straint, government debt now follows a unit root process (see the Appendix). More­
over, taxes, output and the real exchange rate face permanent changes following a 
temporary shock to fiscal conditions. That is, these variables are nonstationary.
Assessing the International Dim ension o f Fiscal Policy under Flexible 
Prices
To gain some intuition on the open economy dimension of the fiscal policy, we can 
assume 6  = p = 1 and ji = 1/(1 — A). The first restriction implies that there are no 
trade imbalances, whilst the second implies that monopolistic distortions are at an 
efficient level from the small open economy’s perspective. Under this specification, 
using a model with lump sum taxes, Galf and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2004) 
find that the small open economy is isomorphic to a closed economy and that the 
flexible price allocation is equivalent to the constrained efficient allocation.
In this case, the real exchange rate vanishes from the loss function. Furthermore, 
the targeting rule for the small open economy is analogous to the closed economy 
case (i.e. the case in which A =  0). In particular, Equation (3.16) is reduced to
Vt  =  {% ~  t J" )  = 0. (3.19)
The output gap is fully stabilized (as in Benigno and Woodford (2003)) and the
first best outcome can be achieved. Under these restrictions, there are no terms
of trade externalities. This is because the assumption 6  = p = 1 implies that
the small open economy is isolated with respect to terms of trade changes. Also,
there are no steady-state distortions in the level of output, given the assumption of
fi = 1/ (1 — A). Finally, there are no welfare costs associated with inflation, because
prices are perfectly flexible. Hence, there is only one policy incentive: to smooth
taxes across states and across periods in order to minimize distortions in agents’
labour-leisure decisions.
(1998).
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Since inflation is not costly, it is possible to use unexpected variations in domestic 
prices in order to equilibrate the government budget constraint after idiosyncratic 
shocks. The resulting allocation is the same as the one that would prevail if lump­
sum taxes were available. This result is consistent with the findings of Bohn (1990), 
Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) and Benigno and Woodford (2003).
Figure (3.1) illustrates the optimal response to a positive productivity shock. 
The productivity shock generates a fiscal primary surplus. But unexpected deflation 
increases the real value of public debt in order to equilibrate the government’s budget 
constraint. Hence, in this case, taxes can be perfectly smoothed across states and 
times and the welfare relevant output gap is closed.
On the other hand, when the steady-state level of debt is zero, the first best 
outcome cannot be achieved. In this case, the optimal plan implies
Et Ayi+i =  EtA(rt+i — tJ+1) =  0. (3.20)
Even though tax smoothing is the only policy objective, this cannot be imple­
mented. Taxes have to adjust when disturbances affect the government budget 
constraint. When das =  0, inflation cannot act as a "shock absorber” because it 
has no impact on the fiscal side of the economy. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Barro (1979) and Aiyagari et al. (2002). As shown in Figure (3.2), the 
tax rate follows a random walk. Taxes vary across states, but they remain constant 
after the shock hits the economy. In other words, the best policy available entails a 
"jump" in the tax rate in order to adjust the level of the primary surplus after the 
shock. Subsequently, taxes are kept constant so as to minimize distortions in the 
trade-off between consumption and labour.
We now examine the case in which 9 ^ 1  and p ^  1. This allows an analysis of 
the open economy dimension of the stabilization problem. This specification allows 
for trade imbalances and introduces a terms of trade externality into the policy 
problem. In this case, the optimal plan is given by Equation (3.17). Hence, it is 
no longer optimal to keep taxes constant because of the incentive to exploit the real
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exchange rate externality.
Figure (3.3) illustrates the optimal response to a positive productivity shock 
when 6  ^  1 and p  ^  1. Following the shock we observe an increase in the level of 
taxes, a fall in domestic output and a depreciation in the real exchange rate. But 
higher taxation limits the real exchange rate depreciation (that is, the real exchange 
rate would have depreciated by even more had taxes remained constant). The 
relatively higher level of the real exchange rate diverts domestic consumption toward 
foreign-produced goods. Hence, varying taxes reduces the disutility of domestic
production without an equivalent fall in the utility of consumption.
In the small open economy, movements in the real exchange rate help to redi­
rect demand towards foreign produced goods. This is because changes in the real 
exchange rate can improve the purchasing power of domestic households and can 
modify the relative price of domestic goods versus foreign goods. Note that, when 
p  =  9  =  1. the income and the substit.utio— a — x— c — 1 — 1----------- '
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3 .5 .2  T h e C ase o f  S tick y  P rices
We now turn to the optimal policy problem in the case of sticky prices (i.e. a  > 0). 
We characterize the general optimal fiscal and monetary plans, in which there are 
two policy instruments (inflation and taxes), and four policy objectives: minimizing 
the distortions created by sticky prices and taxation; managing the real exchange 
rate; and reducing steady-state inefficiencies generated by monopolistic competition. 
As before, we allow for different types of bond denominations.
The policy problem consists of choosing the path of }Yt ,R S t,d t,T t} so as 
to minimize (1.29), subject to the following: the equilibrium conditions specified 
in Table 3.1: the initial condition for dt0~i\ and the constraints on iTt0 and R St0 
that ensure a time-invariant policy problem & la Woodford (2003) (see Appendix for 
details).
As before, we express the optimal state-contingent response to shocks in the form 
of targeting rules. In particular, the optimal plan can be written as follows:8
(1 +  0*y
(1 -  A)P J
Ayt -I- $ rA rs t +
(1 -  r)  +  bd33k ('Wt +  dss(a +  1)tt£ i) =  0, (3.21)
and
(3.22)
where 7 -  d33 -  (1 +  a)) +  ^  +  (T=5j ) ]  •
We first note that the variables of interest in this targeting rule are: current 
and past domestic producer inflation; the rate of change in the real exchange rate 
gap; and the rate of change of the output gap. Also, Equation (3.22) states that 
expected producer inflation is set to zero under the optimal plan.
We can compare the targeting rule (3.21) with the one in Chapter 1, in which 
there is no fiscal stabilization problem. The relative weights on the target variables 
are different now, since and are affected by the degree of distortionary
taxation in steady state. Moreover, past producer inflation enters the targeting
5 See Appendix for a full derivation of the optimal policy problem.
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criteria, except in the case of zero steady-state government debt.
Furthermore, Equations (3.21) and (3.22), together with the constraints specified 
in Table 3.1, imply that output, the real exchange rate and taxes follow nonstation- 
ary processes.9 This result contrasts with the case of flexible prices. In the latter,
in order to adjust the level of real debt. As a result, taxes, the output gap and the 
real exchange rate gap are stationary.
The Case in which a Small Open Economy is Isomorphic to a Closed 
Economy
To understand how the open economy dimension changes the stabilization prob­
lem under sticky prices, we first focus on the special case in whichi and
incentives: reducing the inefficiencies created by distortionary taxations; and mini­
mizing the relative price distortion. These restrictions imply that the loss function 
is only affected by inflation and output gap variability. However, even though there 
are two policy incentives and two policy instruments, the first best outcome cannot 
be achieved. That is, it is not possible to keep inflation and taxes simultaneously 
constant across states and over time. In this case, the optimal plan implies
Here taxes cannot be smoothed over time, which is different from the stabilization 
problem under flexible prices (this can be seen by comparing the above equation 
with Equation (3.20)). By^inspection of th e Phillips curve we note that, when 
prices are sticky, a permanent change in taxes would imply a nonstationary process*T '   ” "" . -- —
for inflation (and an explosive path for the domestic price level).
Figure (3.4) illustrates the optimal response to a positive productivity shock for 
the special case in which the small open economy is isomorphic to a closed economy.
9 See the Appendix for a detailed derivation of the dynamic properties of the variables of interest.
the system is stationary when bonds are denominated in nominal terms and the 
steady-state debt is non-zero. In that case, domestic producer inflation varies freely
0 = p = 1 and n = (1 — A) *. Under these assumptions, there are only two policy
u E tA (rt+i -  rJ h )  +  k X7rf =  0. (3.23)
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Taxes vary in order to satisfy the intertemporal solvency condition. And changes 
in taxes are accompanied by changes in inflation, as dictated by the Phillips curve. 
If, on the other hand, lump sum taxes were available, as in Chapter 1, these could 
adjust in response to the shock, closing the output gap and stabilizing domestic 
inflation.
Optimal Fiscal and M onetary Interactions in a Small Open Economy
When 6 ^ 1  and p ^  1, in our small open economy, there is an incentive to
divert production toward the rest of the world, as we have emphasized before. If
we impose this assumption along with d3S =  0, Equations (3.21) and (3.22) imply 
that
 ^ |  QyEtAyt+i = 0, (3.24)p{ 1 -  A)
and the optimal plan also specifies that
Etnt+i = 0. (3.25)
Equation (3.24) is identical to Equation (3.18) obtained under flexible prices. 
When there is no nominal burden from existing debt (i.e. dsa = 0), the optimal 
policy under both flexible and sticky prices therefore prescribes the stabilization 
of the expected growth rate of the output gap and expected change in the real 
exchange rate gap. The difference between these two cases arises in the use of 
the two stabilization tools (i.e. inflation and taxes). As shown in Figure (3.5), 
taxes are more volatile under flexible prices than under sticky prices. This happens 
because under flexible prices domestic producer inflation does not affect the supply 
of home produced goods. Thus, inflation cannot be used as an instrument to redirect 
production toward the rest of the world. Hence, only taxes can be used as a policy 
instrument to exploit the terms of trade externality.
Figure (3.6) compares the closed and open economy cases. Whereas in a closed 
economy taxes are procyclical, the incentive to divert production makes taxes move 
in a countercyclical way in our small open economy.
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Figure (3.7) contrasts the case of flexible and sticky prices under the assumption 
that d ss  ^ 0. Under sticky prices, domestic producer inflation is costly and therefore 
it varies less under the optimal plan. However, in an open economy framework with 
price stickiness, the variability of taxes is also reduced when compared to the case 
in which prices are flexible. As mentioned earlier, taxes move less because domestic 
producer inflation can be used to manipulate the consumption-leisure choice.
From a quantitative point of view, however, our framework suggests that the cost 
of inflation will overshadow the inefficiency caused by varying distortionary taxation 
and, therefore, changes in domestic producer inflation are quantitatively small. Note 
that this result holds even in a model with real bonds, and is a consequence of 
the conflict between price stability and the incentive to strategically affect the real 
exchange rate. This is different, however, from the trade-off (emphasized by Benigno 
and Woodford (2003), Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe (2004) and Siu (2001)) between 
price stability and the use of inflation as insurance that arises only in models in 
which the government issues nominal bonds.
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3.6 O ptim al Inflation and Tax Variability
In the previous Section, we analysed the main policy incentives for a small open 
economy when fiscal and monetary policy tools are available. We now explore 
how the degree of openness and nominal rigidities affect the volatility of taxes, the 
real exchange rate and domestic producer inflation under the optimal plan. To 
do so, we use the parameter values specified in Table 3.1. For the calibration of 
the shocks, we follow Galf and Monacelli (2005), who fit an AR(1) processes to 
(log) labor productivity in Canada (their proxy for domestic productivity). Using 
quarterly, HP-filtered data over the sample period 1963:1 2002:4, the authors obtain 
the following estimates: ey,t = 0.66(0.06)ey)t_i +  at and crat = 0.0071.
We compute the moments based on these Monte Carlo simulations because, un­
der certain specifications, our model is nonstationary. We first generate simulated 
time series of length T for the variables of interest and compute the standard de­
viation. We repeat this procedure J times and then compute the average of the 
moments. We set T equal to 400 quarters and J equal to 500.
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Figure 3.8: Optimal Volatilities under Flexible prices
previous Section suggests that the degree of openness has direct implications for 
the optimal volatilities of taxes and the real exchange rate. In particular, whereas 
taxes are perfectly smoothed in closed economies, this is not the case in a small 
open economy. Figure (3.8) displays the relationship between the sample standard 
deviation of our variables of interest and the openness parameter, A. Higher levels 
of openness imply higher tax variability and lower real exchange rate volatility. This 
is because the incentive to use taxes to affect the real exchange rate increases as the 
economy becomes more open.
When nominal price rigidities are introduced, both taxes and inflation can affect 
agents’ labour supply, and therefore, both instruments can be used to exploit the 
terms of trade externality. Hence, it is interesting to see how the degree of nominal 
rigidities affects the variability of taxes and inflation. Figure (3.9) presents the 
optimal volatility of taxes and domestic producer inflation for the parametrization 
specified in Table 3.1. Not surprisingly, optimal inflation volatility is decreasing in 
the degree of nominal rigidity. On the other hand, the volatility of taxes initially 
decreases with a  and then rises as the degree of price rigidity becomes extreme. 
When price rigidities are introduced, inflation can be used to affect the real exchange 
rate, and this fact reduces the required movement in taxes. But for significantly 
high levels of price rigidity, this conclusion does not hold. In these cases, inflation 
is practically constant (given the welfare costs associated with price dispersion) and 
only taxes are used to exploit the terms of trade externality.
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3.7 C onclusion
This Chapter presents an integrated analysis of fiscal and monetary policy in a small 
open economy. The literature on optimal policy in open economies has extensively 
analysed the monetary stabilization problem when inflation is costly and taxation 
is non-distortionary. In this Chapter, we start our analysis by characterizing the 
opposite scenario. That is, we study the optimal policy problem in an environ­
ment in which prices are perfectly flexible (and therefore inflation is costless) and 
production taxation affects households labour-leisure trade off (i.e. taxes are dis­
tortionary). We lay out this specification in order to highlight the international 
dimension of fiscal policy. Our results show that, whereas it is optimal to perfectly
cm rvnfVi f o v o o  in  a  r*lnco/-l onr-innm-ix fVio n n f  1 m  o 1 f a v  r o f o  vrarioo m m r f i
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rigidity reduces the required variability of tax rates. But the presence of nominal 
rigidities also reduces the policy incentive to use inflation to affect the level of real 
government debt. Consequently, the variability of inflation is also smaller when 
nominal rigidities are present.
Our quantitative exercise shows that the optimal response to a positive pro­
ductivity shock in a closed economy implies a fall in taxes (i.e. fiscal policy is 
procyclical). On the other hand, in our small open economy, under the benchmark 
specification for the parameter values, the optimal plan prescribes a countercyclical 
fiscal response to the productivity shock. In this case, higher taxation reduces the 
positive impact of the technological shock on output.
Finally, we follow the approach of Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe (2005) and calculate 
the second moments of the variables based on Monte Carlo simulations. We show 
that the optimal variability of taxes increases with the degree of openness. This is 
because the higher is the degree of openness, the larger is the incentive to use taxes 
to exploit the terms of trade externality. On the other hand, the introduction of 
price stickiness initially reduces, and then increases, tax variance. This is a result of 
the optimal trade off between using taxes and inflation to affect the terms of trade.
An interesting exercise could be to investigate empirically the prediction of the 
model. In particular, one could examine the variability of taxes in countries with 
different levels of openness.
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3. A  A ppendix
We derive the second order approximation to the equilibrium conditions of the model. 
We assume that in steady state G =  Tr = 0, 1 +  it =  1 4- = 1/13 and Pf*/Pt^i =
P f/P fL i =  1- We normalize the price index such that P fj = Pp. In addition, 
we assume an initial level of wealth such that C = C*. The approximation for the 
demand equation, the risk sharing conditions and the price index are described in 
Sections (l.B .l), (1.B.2) and (1.B.3) of Chapter 1. In this Appendix, we derive 
the second order approximation to the price setting with endogenous production 
taxation, the government budget constraint, and the utility function. As in the 
previous Chapter, we use isoelastic function, forms for the utility function with p 
representing the coefficient of risk aversion and rj the inverse of the elasticity of goods 
production.
3 .A .1  P rice  S ettin g
The first and second-order approximations to the price setting equation follow Be­
nigno and Benigno (2003). The introduction of the tax component is done in 
the same manner as in Benigno and Woodford (2003). The optimal price setting 
condition of sellers that can reset their prices is
Et j  2 > / ? ) T- U ( C r ) '  Y„,t P t(h) p H,T crmctVy (y t,T(h ), eY,t)
[P„,T Pt  ( 1 - 0 ( 1  - r t ) U c(CT)
=  0 , 
(3.26)
where
(3.27)
Income taxes are represented by r*and met is a markup shock. The evolution 
of the domestic price level is therefore
(3.28)
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We can write the second order approximation to Equation (3.26) as follows:
Vo =  E 0 
where
zt =  r}Yt +  pCt ~ P h  +  met ~ q t~  rj^Y.t,
and
X t = (2 +  r))Yt -  pCt + P h  + met + qt -  rjeY,t- 
We define qt = 1 — t* and, therefore,
qt =  - u r t ~  \ Y Z ^ t  +  0 ( ||^ ||3),
where co = t^=.1 — T
The first order approximation to the price setting equation can be written in the 
following way:
= k  (pd t + r)Yt -  pH + met + ujTt -  T)eY,t) +  PEtvj*+1, (3.30)
where k = (1 — a/3)(l — q:)/q:(1 +  arf).
And the second order approximation to the price setting can be written as follows:
f  y Zt + U x ,  + f a " ) 2} +  t.i.p  + 0(115U3). (3.29)
t—0 J
Qto = <?>ZEtP* a'yyt +  \y'tAyyt +  y'tAeet + t.i.p +  0 ( ||£ ||3), (3.31)
with
rj p — 1 u> 0
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77(2 + 77) £ -1 UJ 0
p ~P2 —pco 0
-1 P -1 u 0
U) —pui u U) 0
0 0 0 0 0
and
-77(1 + 77) 1 + 77 0 0
0 0 0 0
<  = 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
3 .A .2 G overnm ent B u d get C onstraint
We assume at first that all public debt consists of riskless nominal one-period bonds. 
The law of motion of government debt is
A  = A - i ( l  + h - 1) — PH,tSt,
where
st =  r tYt - G t -  T rt .
Defining
./ _  A  (1 + it)dt —
Pt ’
we can rewrite the government budget constraint as
j  _  j  (* +  ®t) , pH,t „ , _• \dt ~  dt - 1—^  b —5—54(1 +  *t).
l i t  Pt
(3.32)
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In log-linear terms the government budget constraint is given by
/3d!t = 1P H , t ~ s Ts  1 ( f t  +  ft j+ g t+ T r — ^ — 0  ( tt?  +  V (1 ~ A)Ai25t)
To derive a second order approximation to the intertemporal government solvency 
condition, we define,
NW t =  n  'Uc . (3.33)
and use the individual intertemporal choice (i.e. the Euler condition):
U c(Ct) = (l + it)(3Et UC (C m ) Pt
Pt+il
(3.34)
Substituting the Euler equation for interest rates, Equation (3.32) implies:
N W , = Et Y i Uc (Cr, Cc .t ) WH,t (3.35)
T=t
The second order approximation to condition (3.35) is
Uc {Ct ,€c ,t ) stPH,t = Ucs <
1 + s t Y  -  pG +  pn  +  s t t  + \ s t Y 2 -  psrY C  +  s t Y p h  
+ s t ? Y  + \p 2 C 2 +  + sTr 2
—psTrC  +  sT?pH +  psgC -  spHg 
+t.i.p +  0 ( ||£ ||3)
Defining N W t = NWp fw W > we have:
N W t =  (1 -  P) b'yVt + \y 'tB yyt + y'tBeet + 0EtN W t+ i +  t.i.p  +  0 ( ||£ ||3),
K = sT —p 1 sT 0
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and
Note that
B 'y =
ST
- p s T
ST
ST
0
BL =
pS'j- ST 
J1
0 0 0 0
0 0 ps 0
0 0 —s 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
n  = 7T? +  Y ^ A R S t .
0
0 — psT 0
1 sT 0
The first order approximation to condition (3.33) is therefore)
N W t =  -pC t + 3,-1 -  5f, =  -pC t +  -j 4RS, + f f ) .
Hence, the first order approximation to the intertemporal bujget coiistraint can be 
written as:
~pCt + St_i - ( y ^ - jA R S t  + ?rf) = (1 - P )(-p C t +  PH,t | sT(?t + Yt) -  sgt)
- p C t+i +  St K — A R S k , + Sr*,)
Throughout the text, we use an alternative representati<|i of the budget con­
straint in order to allow for a zero steady-state government dbt. The above equa­
tion is rescaled, using dt =  d33d't (note that sT = )• l ^ e  ^nal expression
is
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-pd3SCt +  dt- 1 -  (y ^ d ssA R S t +  dS3?rf) =  (1 -  (3)d3S(-p C t +  pH,t) +  T{?t +  Yt) -  gt
A+j3Etd& —pC t+i +  dt — (  ^ - A R St+ i +
An analogous derivation can be conducted in the case of R eal Bonds. In this 
case, the flow government budget constraint is,
0 ;  =  0 U ( l  +  r t- -nt
or, alternatively,
J Ph ji(i + n) + + r*)>
where
(3.36)
(3.37)
4  = D rt (l  + rt).
In order to derive the second order approximation to the government budget 
constraint we use a the recursive formulation, in which
RWt = drt_ 1u c (c t), (3.38)
and
RW t = Et ' £ l i r - t Uc (Cr) H PH,t-
T—t
Defining RW t =  RWL xf W, we havettw
(3.39)
R W t  =  ( 1 - / 3 ) rb'yyt + \y 'tRB yyt + y',RBeet +PEtR W t+1+ t.i .p + O m \3), (3.40)
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I Uy sT —p 1 sT 0
and
ST psT sT sT 0
- p s T p2 0 - p s T 0
RB'y = ST 0 1 s T 0
ST - p s T S T s T 0
0 0 0 0 0
i
o o 0 0
0 0 ps 0
RB'e ~ 0 0 —s 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 _
approximation to the intertemporal budget
-p C t +  c£_i =  (1 -  0){-pC t +  PH,t + sT(?t +  yt) -  sgt ) (3.41)
+(3Et —pCt+1 +  <Et
As it will be shown in the next Section, the welfare function depends only on 
rb'y ,R B y  and RB'e, which are equal to b'y ,B'y and B'e. This imphes that the loss 
function formulation is independent of the denomination of government debt. How­
ever, the first order approximation to the government budget constraint changes 
with the bond denomination. Hence, the constraint of the policy problem varies 
according to the type of bond being issued by the government.
Moreover, we can write the budget constraint as follows:
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-pC t + d ^ - ( a A R S t  + bTT?) = (1 -  0 )(-p C t -  j — +  sr ( r t +  ? t) -  s&)
+f3Et —pCt+i +  d* — (aAi?<St+i +  ^7rH-i)J >
where a =  A/(l — A) and b = 1 in the case of nominal bonds, and a = b = 0 in 
the case of real bonds (in this case d!t = drt'). Alternatively, rescaling the above 
equation using d!t = dS3dt, we obtain the government budget constraint as specified 
in the text (see Table 3.1).
3 .A .3  W elfare
Following Benigno and Benigno (2003), the second order approximation to the utility 
function can be written as:
00 r i  cn
U, =  ~ n Jq (3.42)
Wu, = UcCBta Y , ? w'yVt ~  \y\W yyt -  y'tWeet -  lui„jr? +S.i.p+0(||C ||3), (3.43)
where,
W y = —1//X 1 0  0 0
175
and
W ' =
^  0 0 0 0
0  - ( 1 - / 9 )  0  0  0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
- 2 0 0 0
W ' =
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Using the second order approximation to the equilibrium condition, we can eliminate 
the term w'yyt. Do do so, we will derive the vector Lx, such that:
dy dy fy Cy by Lx = Wy.
Given the values of ay, by, f y, Cy, and dy defined in this Appendix, we have:
Lx  i =
((—1 +  </>) (1 — Op) A2 +  (— (—1 +  0) 20p — 1 +  20) A — 0) (—1 +  t )
ft
Lx  2 = Tip (—1 +  0) +  (—1 +  A))
ft
and
L x 3 =
(-1  +  0) E (1 -  Op) A -  0 ( -1  +  0) S/0 +  m  +  0E 
ft
Lx  5 = (—1 +  0) (1 — Op) A2 +  (— (—1 +  0) 20p — 1 -+• 20) A — 0ft i
where, V =  ((rj +  1) r  -  77), S =  (-1  +  r  -  cf5S +  d3S/3) , ft =  —\PZ -  Ep -  \I/, Z 
(pO — 1)A(2 — A) and 1 — 0  =  1/p.
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The loss function L*0 can be written as follows:
Lto = UcCEt0 J ^ l3 t 2 VtLyyt "I" +  2^r?rt +  t.i.p +  0 ( ||£ ||3), (3.44)
where,
and
Ly   “I” LX\Ay “I- LX2Dy “I- LXZFy “1“ LxhBy,
Le = We + L x iA e +  L x 2 De,
I t C  —  *^7T " t  Ex  J  U-7T *
Note that LX4 is irrelevant since Cy =  0
To write the model just in terms of the output, real exchange rate, taxes and 
inflation, we define the matrices N  and Ne that map all endogenous variables into 
[Yf,Tt] and the errors in the following way:
y't =  N[Yu RSuTt} +  Neeu (3.45)
where
1 0 0
1 1+ A p( 1 -X ) 0
0 A( I = A ) 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
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and
N P =
0 0 0 0
0 0 - 1 0  
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Equation (3.44) can therefore be expressed as
Lto = U c C E ts Y ,? Yt, R S t,T t Yt ,R S UTt + Y t,R S t , r t
+t.i.p + 0 ( ||£||3),
Leet +
(3.46)
where,
and
L'y =  N 'L y N ,
L'e =  N 'L y N e -f N 'L e
The last step is to eliminate the cross variables terms Y tR St• For that we use 
the following identity (derived from combining the demand function with the risk 
sharing condition):
and, therefore,
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Y t,R S t ,Tt Ly [?(, R S t , ?tj =  Yt,R S t , r t
'■yy lyt 0
\yT h/y 0
0 0 0
— (lyy +  ^  ~ |y  ^yt)^2 +  (kt +  
+U .p  +  0 ( ||£ ||3).
[yt ,A S*,rt]
(1 + 0 I 'JDO2
(3.48)
Substituting (3.48) into (3.46), we have:
Lu, = U c C E t ^ P ( i + 0
+
p
1/ /n-2£ ee* +  5**71?
+ti.p+Ofl|f||3).
(3.49)
Finally, we rewrite the previous equation as deviations from the target variables:
Lto =  U c C E f Y ,?
+i.i.p +  0 ( ||£ ||3),
\ $ Y (% -  ?(r )2 +  -  a s f ) 2 +  i<M 5?f)2
(3.50)
where,
=  Lx5 < -2 p r  +  p2 dsa (1 -  0) +  r  + [pr -  p2dss (1 -  /?)] (Z +  A) -  rAp
+Lx2 j ( l - A ) A  +
1 +  /
(—A) (1 + A) ( 1 - A ) - 0 A ( 1 - A ) 2p
+Lx 1 ^2/o -  p2 +  (2 +  t)) ri +
+  ( , +  i ) ( i  — f l -  i  — H  + ^  + ^ +pg,
1 + /  J
— (p -  P2) (I +  A) -  ( -1  +  p) Ap 1 
1 +  / J
®rs = Lxh
dsa (1 — P) (I +  A) 2  +  A2  — (1 +  I) (I +  A)j +  ^ (1 +  I) It
(1 -  A) 2
r (/ +  A) A (<9 -  i )  -  A0(1 -  A)
+Lx  2
+Lx  1
v
+  62 \ ( 1  -  A)
(1(1 4 - 2A) +  (p — 1)
t ( l - A ) 2
(I +  A) (—1 +  p)
(1 — A) p ,2 ’
y tT  =  <7yet>
and
with
~  ^raeti
qv $ T J  +  La?i(l +  7 7 )7 7 —Lxi(l  +  77) -q*g Lx2 (1 -  A) A
qgg = Lx5{p( l  + t) - p 2dss(l  - /3)} 
+Lx  1 {p ( p -  1)}
+Lx2 {A2  — 1}
+1  —  Pi
180
0 0 -<£, - L * 2 { ^  +  0A (1-A )}
and
lrg =  Lx  5
+Lx  2
+Lxl
(I +  A) pdss (1 — (3) — I 
1 - A
|  (I +  A) (1 +  A) _  A0  _  ^ 2  J
-Ip
+
1 -  A 
(I +  A) (-1  +  p) 
p{ 1 —A)
Special Czise
* A ssum ptions: p — 0 — 1 and  <f) = A
In this case, the weights in the loss function are
1 -  A
®RS
1 — A =  0,
and the target output is
_?ZL_ 
1 — A
YtT = q‘yet,
where
1 +  T) T) 0 -1  0
*Note: In the text we use the above specification (as in Gall and Monacelli, 
2005). However, by inspection of the weights presented in this Appendix, we can 
verify that the necessary conditions for a zero weight of the exchange rate in the 
loss function are pO = 1 and d3S{(j) — A) =  0.
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3 .A .4  O ptim al F iscal P o licy  under F lex ib le  P rices
The optimal policy can be represented by the following Lagrangian:
C  =  E t - t o
+ V 2  ,t
^ Y ( ? t  -  +  1 $ T ( R S t  -  R S t  ) 2 +  9 1 , t  ( r> Y t +  ( 1  -  A ) ~ l R S t  -  w r t
- d ssR S t +  dt- i  -  dss(aARSt +  bn?) +  dss(l  -  /3)( j ^ R S t) 
- r ( r t +  Yt ) +  /3Et [dasi2St+i -  dt +  dsa(aARSt+i +  &tt^i)]
+ w  ( 3  -
i/
+bdss9 2 t<I_ 1Tf" + d33 (a +
+ ii .p  +  0 ( ||£ ||3).
The last line of the Lagrangian contains the constraints for the optimal policy that 
ensure that the problem is time invariant. Note that, in the text, we denote the 
Lagrange multiplier on the government budget constraint as <pt. In this Appendix, 
we use the notation <^2)t-
These are the first order conditions:
—bda3 {<P2 ,t ~ (3.51)
$ „ ( ? «  -  ? t T ) +  -  T(f 2 , t  +  V?3,t =  °> ( 3 -5 2 )
$ y ( R S t  —  R S t  ) +  ^  ~  d 3 a { a  4- 1 ) (< P 2 ,t  ~  ^2,t-1)
+C5^S (T^X ) ^ 2,t +  0 a d s s { E t iP 2 , t + l  -  < P 2 ,t) —  _  j^ V>3, t  =  0,
(3.53)
and
-  T(f 2 , t  =  0 ,  
~^2,t +  £^2,4+1 =  0.
(3.54)
(3.55)
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In addition, the first order condition at time to implies — V^.to-i) =  0.
Substituting Ct =  +  ^R St into the government budget constraint, we have
— pdggCf -  dggRSt +  1 ~  dggfaARSf +  Wr^) =  (3.56)
d„( 1 -  $){-pC ; -  - ^ j R S t )  + r ( t t  + Yt) -  gt 
+fiEt —pd3aCl+l — dsaR St+1 +  4  — daa[(iAIlSt+\ ■+■ •
Furthermore, under the assumption that a  =  0, the Phillips curve implies
-1 (  Vi 1 + 0 + P \  (\r {>T\ _  -T'
( (i +  0  ) (Yt ~ Y‘ ] =  {ft ~ n ) - (3-57)
By integrating Equation (3.56) forward we can rewrite the intertemporal budget 
constraint of the government as
<?,-! -  d„ba? = % + daaa A P^  ^  (Yt -  i f )+  (3.58)
d’° f +~  A)(ft -  r ? )  +  £  /?‘+s b  (? «-  ? «T) ] '
'  s = 0
where,
m  = _  d^ ( i + w - i ) ) ,
(1 - /3 )
and
f t  =  [ - c ;  -  St +  ft’
oo
+ ( l - / 3 K sBt ^ / 3 ‘+s
. P (( +  A) A .  Pi1
I ;  ~  a S S ^ t  ~l + l 1 +  I
3=0 (1 — /5) dgg l  +  l
y tT +
X- d 3,gt +  P{\ Jrf d „ Y ^ +  
■T' P — ®(1 “f" 0
( 1 - / 3 )  da
-f
1 +  /
9 t  ~ J L L1 +  i
The combination of the first order conditions implies:
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$ Tp{ 1 - A )  -  - r  (1 +  1) y -T \
(1 +  0  (y<- y‘ - St) + M i ^ T f Y{Yt - Yt }
+771o<^2,t ~  dss( 1 +  ^ (V ^ .f — V?2Jt—l)  ~  0,
where 8 t =  Ct* +  & -  YtT +  and m0 =  ^  (5 +  +  j
Alternatively, we can write:
(Yt -  Y ?) = m i8 t -  m 2 <p2,t +  (1 +  a)dsSm 3 {<p2it -  <p2 ,t-1).
where
7711 = (1 + 02$y  + $rp2(l -  A) $rp2( l - A ) 2
2 \  - 1
/ ( l + O ^ y  +  ^ t l - A ) 2^ 1
m2 =  (  p tT T i) J  ro°’
and
3 (, p ( l -A )( l  + i) ) '
Substitution of Equation (3.60) into Equation (3.58), we have:
_  “ (1 +  0 -r 1 7  , n i
^ 2,t (^1 + ^ 2) _1 (t7i+ 772) * {n\ + n2)^>2't~1'
and using (3.55) we have
-(1  +  n -  1 ~
<^ 2,7 — --------------- dt  H E t f t + i ,n 2 772
where
(3.59)
(3.60)
(3.61)
(3.62)
and
n i =  -((1  -  /3)m -  dssp( 1 -  A))7773dss,
772 =  (4s/9(1 -  A) +  777)7772.
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Therefore the evolution of the Lagrange multiplier and government debt can be 
written as
and
5  =  * -1  -  (IT T ) + ( T T l ) ^ 1- ( 3 ' 6 4 )
Case (i) : das =  0
In this case, Equation (3.61) implies
<P2 ,t = 1 +  ^~ ft (3.65)ni n i
and
dt = dt~i +  j j - — jE tA ft+ i- (3.66)
Thus, under this specification, government debt has a unit root.
Case (ii) : dS5 ^  0 and of Nominal Bonds
In this case, we define a = anc  ^b = —1. The first order condition at time 
to combined with (3.51) implies that <p2jt is constant over time. In this case, the 
first order conditions (3.51) to (3.55) can be expressed as the following targeting 
rule:
ir(RSt -  RSt)  +  - 7 7 -— -  ? tr ) =  0 . p{ 1 -  A)
Moreover, in the special case where p = 6  = 1 and p. = 1/(1 — A),
% =  Y*. (3.67)
Equation (3.58) implies
d t —  1 d g g b T t t    f t ] (3.68)
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that is, if the underlying structural disturbances composing Y,tT are stationary, out­
put and the real exchange rate will also be stationary. Finally, Equation (3.68) 
determines the evolution of real debt.
3 .A .5  O ptim al F iscal and M on etary  P o licy  w hen  P rices are Sticky:
In this case the Lagrangian is:
C  = -to +^2,t
i $y(?t -  y,T)2 + i$r(ast -  RSTt f  +
+  vYt +  (1 -  -  uTt +  PEtTT?} +
- d ssRSt +  dt-i -  daa(aARSt + bn?) +  dss(l -  /3 ) ( j^ R S t) 
 ^ —r( r t  + Y t )  + f3Et ^fssi25t+i — <k + dss(aARSt+i +  &7Tt+i)J
+ w  ( ?« -
+V»l,«o—1 * — +  M s S V’2 ,t c - l5fto +  < M a  +  i )'(’2,t0- i RSU,
+t.i.P +o(iien3).
As before, the last line in the Lagrangian contain constraints in the initial conditions 
that ensure a time-invariant policy problem. The first order conditions are:
$*7?t ~  (<Pi,t ~  1 -  bdss(<p2>t -  <p2 ,t-i) = 0, (3.69)
$ y(Yt -  ?tT) +  T]ipi t -  Tip2jt +  <p3tt = 0, (3.70)
$ y(RSt — R S t ) +  y>i,t -  dsa(a +  1 ){ip2>t -  <p2 ,t-i)  (3-71)
_ ^ v ?2,t +  Pada3 {Etip2tt+i -  (p2 }t) -  _  1 ^ 3 ,t = 0)
(3.72)
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and
+  ^¥>2,4+1 ~  0. (3.73)
These equations imply that,
E t 7?,+i = 0. (3.74)
And the first order conditions can be combined and written as
(1 +  0**
L (1  -  A )p
A y i  +  $ TA f s t +
7T
( 1  -  r )  +  b d a sk
( v c f * +  d 8g ( a + l ) n f * _ 1) =  0 ,  (3.75)
where 7  =  d33 -  (1 +  a)) +  r) +  ■ We define =
(R St -  R S Tt ) and yt =  (Yt -  ?tT).
Combining the first order condition with the government budget constraint and 
the Phillips Curve leads to the following expressions:
<P2,t = K  +  w'2)TT” + ¥>2,4-1 >
(3.76)
-7 _  E f t + l  n 2 (P2,t  . n 3 dgg
41 -  7 + 7  “  7 TT + ( 1 + 0  (v>2’‘ “  ¥’2'(~ l) (3.77)
and
+  / ( l  - =  - m ° ^2 , 4  +  ( a  +  1 ) rf- « (V?2 >* ~  ¥ > 2 , 4 - l ) i  ( 3 ’7 8 )
where,
n[ =  -  ( (1  -  f3)m +  d3Sp(  1 -  A ) ) ( a  +  l ) r a 3d aa +  d aam 4 +  m 5) ,
=  ( < W ( 1  -  A) +  m ) m 2 ,
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n3 =  -ap (  1 -  A)(a +  1 )dS3ms,
7714 = ap( 1 -  A)(-7772 +  (a +  l)d 3am z) +  f$7r V ku
and
r  (1  +  Z) u; 1 1 f  t
m 5 =  7 7 -----------------------[ l — +  bds(1-13) k \ku>h ( ^ + b d s 3 )  ■
Conclusion
This thesis analyses how macroeconomic policy should be conducted in a small open 
economy. Firstly, it characterizes the optimal monetary policy in the benchmark 
case in which the small economy can perfectly share its risk with the rest of the 
world. Under this specification, Chapter 1 demonstrates that a small open economy, 
completely integrated with the rest of the world, should be concerned about exchange 
rate variability. The optimal policy in a small open economy is neither isomorphic to 
that in a closed economy, nor does it prescribe a pure floating exchange rate regime. 
Price stability (or domestic inflation targeting) has been shown to be optimal only 
under a particular specification for preferences and in the presence of a production 
subsidy. When these restrictions on the steady-state level output and preferences 
are relaxed, deviations from inward looking policies arise in the optimal plan.
The model presented in Chapter 1 assumes that the asset markets are complete. 
Chapter 2 relaxes this assumption to deliver a more realistic representation of the 
model. The Chapter studies how the introduction of asset market imperfections 
affects welfare and the optimal monetary policy analysis. Our analysis compares 
the complete market characterization presented in Chapter 1 with the following 
forms of market incompleteness: the extreme case of financial autarky; and the case 
of an intermediate level of risk sharing, in which the country is allowed to trade 
riskless bonds internationally subject to intermediation fees. It shows that the 
different dynamics implied by alternative asset market structures have significant 
implications for optimal monetary policy. The degree of substitutability between 
domestic and imported goods is also an important determinant of the optimal policy j
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis concentrate on the analysis of monetary policy
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when inflation is costly (due to sticky prices) and taxation is non-distortionary (be­
cause taxes are lump-sum) Chapter 3 starts by analyzing the opposite scenario, in 
which prices are flexible and production taxation affects households’ labour-leisure 
trade off. The results show that, whereas in a closed economy it is optimal to 
perfectly smooth taxes, the optimal tax rate in an open economy varies over time. 
Chapter 3 also investigates the optimal fiscal and monetary policy mix when prices 
are sticky. It demonstrates that the introduction of price rigidity reduces the re­
quired variability of tax rates as well as inflation.
As first emphasized by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), "In an open economy there 
exists an economic distortion that is directly associated with openness, namely, a 
country ’s power to affect its terms of trade by influencing the supply of labour prod­
uct ". This thesis analyses the policy implications of this distortion in a small open 
economy setting. It does so under alternative asset market specifications and in the 
presence of different policy instruments.
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